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This study analyzes the domestic political, economic, and bureaucratic factors that affect the nuclear policymaking process in Great Britain. Its major conclusion is that, although there have been changes in that process in recent years (notably the current involvement of a segment of the British public in the debate about the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces), future British nuclear policymaking will remain much what it has been in the past. Three ideas are central to understanding British thinking on the subject: (1) Britain's long-standing resolve to have her own national nuclear force is largely traceable to her desire to maintain first-rank standing among the nations of the world in spite of loss of empire. (2) Financial considerations have always been important--so much so that they have usually dominated issues of nuclear policy. (3) The executive branch of government dominates the nuclear policymaking process but does not always present a united front. The United States heavily influences British nuclear policy through having supplied Britain since the late 1950s with nuclear data and components of nuclear weapon systems such as Polaris and Trident. The relationship works both ways since the U.S. depends on Britain as a base for deployment of both conventional and nuclear systems.
This study analyzes the domestic political, economic, and bureaucratic factors that affect the nuclear policymaking process in Great Britain. Its major conclusion is that, although there have been changes in that process in recent years (notably the current involvement of a segment of the British public in the debate about the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces), future British nuclear policymaking will remain much what it has been in the past. Three ideas are central to understanding British thinking on the subject: (1) Britain's long-standing resolve to have her own national nuclear force is largely traceable to her desire to maintain first-rank standing among the nations of the world in spite of loss of empire. (2) Financial considerations have always been important--so much so that they have usually dominated issues of nuclear policy. (3) The executive branch of government dominates the nuclear policymaking process but does not always present a united front. The United States heavily influences British nuclear policy through having supplied Britain since the late 1950s with nuclear data and components of nuclear weapon systems such as Polaris and Trident. The relationship works both ways since the U.S. depends on Britain as a base for deployment of both conventional and nuclear systems.
This book offers new perspectives on British nuclear policy-making at the height of the Cold War, arguing that the decisions taken by the British government during the 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions cannot be properly understood without close reference to Duncan Sandys, and in particular the policy preferences that emerged from his experiences of the Second World War and his efforts leading Britain's campaign against the V-1 and V-2. Immersing himself in this campaign against unmanned weaponry, Sandys came to see ballistic missiles as the only guarantor of nuclear credibility in the post-war world, placing them at the centre of his strategic thinking and developing a sincerely-held and logically-consistent belief system which he carried with him through a succession of ministerial roles, allowing him to exert a previously undocumented level of influence on the nature of Britain's nuclear capabilities and its approach to the Cold War. This book shows the profound influence Sandys' personal belief system had on Britain's attempts to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent.
Global politics has changed with unaccustomed swiftness since the end of the Cold War. Eastern Europe is free; the Soviet Union has broken up; China presses free market economic reform; and the United States and Russia have declared a joint commitment to end nuclear war. The force of these changes has created a new agenda for global politics and security policy. This does not mean that nuclear weapons have lost their centrality. Nuclear development programs continue in the major holders of advanced weapons. In Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran nuclear intentions are subject to widespread speculation and scrutiny. Negotiations for renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remind us that the treaty requires serious efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. Nuclear Choices points out that the Cold War's end has not banished mistrust. Instead, it has opened the door to frank conversation about the usefulness of force and the need to address common fears. States now face a global choice among alternative nuclear futures. If they desire to avoid runaway nuclear development, the choices come down to three: the status quo, disengagement, or abolition. Larkin argues that if they chose the status quo, they elect a world in which only terror and self-restraint keep devastation at bay, a world in which instant destruction is possible. This study focuses on the nuclear weapons programs of Great Britain, China, and France, because they may be less familiar to students of international affairs. Each of these countries has developed a substantial nuclear capability that could decisively shape the result of coming global nuclear decisions. Larkin concludes that these three minipowers could conclude that nuclearism serves their interests, refuse disengagement, and encourage proliferation. If they are prepared to abandon nuclearism, they have tremendous political leverage on Russia, the United States, and also on undeclared and aspiring nuclear weapons states. For now, only the United Kingdom, France, and China maintain sufficient warhead inventories and production capabilities to have strong effects on how the United States and Russia view their own strategic capabilities. Nuclear Choices asserts that governments, polities, and parties today do not know how to guarantee themselves against weapons of mass destruction. They must either acquire the political and social means to achieve such guarantees or accept a world in which nuclearism will continue to cast its shadow over all aspects of nation building. It will be of interest to political scientists, policymakers, military analysts, and those interested hi the nuclear issue.
This thesis examines why British nuclear weapons policy, both in doctrine and in its essential strategic elements, has not changed with the end of the Cold War. It was undertaken in order to find and test the reasons why British policy remains unchanged when the threat for which the policy was ostensibly developed has disappeared, when international politics have undergone fundamental change, and when the nuclear policies of other nations, notably the two superpowers, have been radically overhauled. The hypothesis is that there are three main reasons why British policy has not changed. First, the basic agreement on nuclear issues between the two main political parties results in a lack of serious political debate on this subject. Second, secrecy over defence decisions contributes to the absence of accountability and democratic control of decision-making. Third, the assumptions underlying the ways of thinking of those who make decisions have not changed with the end of the Cold War. The reason for wanting to test assumptions was because the surface position has a dubious logic: it appears illogical to continue with the same nuclear weapons policy when the main stated reason for it has disappeared. Official rationales are not helpful in explaining why this should be so. One way of obtaining a clearer view of the reasons for this policy anomaly is to pinpoint the basic assumptions underlying policy formulation. These assumptions were identified and examined in a two-stage interview study of decision-makers; one set of interviews conducted before the Cold War ended, and the second conducted in 1992. The study shows that at the end of this period the basic assumptions which underlie defence decisions have not changed in any significant way. Evidence is presented to support the view that these are the main reasons for the lack of policy change, and that these three factors interact. The absence of political debate, for example, is in part due to the lack of information provided to Parliament; denial of information also means that informed public challenge of decisions is rendered impossible and that the public becomes apathetic on the nuclear issue. This in turn means that decision-makers assume a tacit approval for their policies, and see no reason to question their assumptions.
Nuclear Power Hazard Control Policy presents an analysis of the factors that appear to have influenced the formation and form of nuclear power hazard control policy in Britain. Particular attention is directed to those political groups that have developed a special interest in the problems of nuclear power, and to the interplay between organized groupings and public opinion generally. The metamorphosis of these groupings is traced from the origins of the nuclear industry in World War II to their prominent role during the Windscale Inquiry. This volume is comprised of nine chapters and begins with a simple account of the technical nature of nuclear hazards and of the legal and administrative framework that has been developed to control them. The subsequent chapters concentrate primarily on the influence exerted by social and political factors. Throughout the study, emphasis is given to the policy constraint imposed by increased expectations in the form of demands for higher standards of living, as well as improvements in the quality of the environment. The final chapter describes a model of the policy-making system that takes account of the consequences of variation with time in the environment surrounding the system. Appendices are included to provide a chronology of the relevant events and a summary of the administrative arrangements that various countries have made to control the safety of nuclear reactors. This monograph will be of value to policymakers concerned with the hazards of nuclear power and how to control them.