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This is the first detailed, scholarly study of French foreign policy during the relatively brief period at the end of World War II when General de Gaulle was President of the provisional French government. During these years de Gaulle took the vitally important step of returning French foreign policy to the pragmatic, nationalist tradition of Poincaré and Louis Barthou. De Gaulle's efforts on the international scene, although not strikingly successful in themselves, foreshadowed many of the aims and policies which were pursued in various ways by his successors in the Fourth Republic and which he himself has reaffirmed in the years since 1958. In the opening chapter, Mr. DePorte outlines French foreign policy between 1918 and 1940 and at the same time places de Gaulle firmly within that tradition of French diplomacy which rejected the notion that France could afford to be dependent on either Germany or Great Britain. In the second chapter, the author reviews de Gaulle's wartime experience, emphasizing his preoccupation with restoring France to full status as a Great Power and pointing out the extent to which his distrust of alliances preceded the problems he encountered with his allies as leader of the Free French. This discussion also includes a perceptive reevaluation of de Gaulle's difficulties with President Roosevelt. The remaining chapters of the book deal in detail with the working out of diplomatic policies and problems during de Gaulle's term in office. Domestic affairs are discussed when events at home had a bearing on policy abroad. Through the issues and attitudes of these years--the Franco-Soviet pact, the distrust of allies and their blocs, the attempts to organize other groupings around France, the proposals for a Western European entity in which at least part of Germany could find a place--runs the unifying theme of the constant thrust for recognition of France's standing as a major power. During this period de Gaulle suffered many setbacks, but it is noteworthy that his basic objective the acceptance of France's right to participate in the great decisions of peace and war--which he himself did not achieve, was attained by his successors.
De Gaulle was the first major Western leader to pursue a foreign policy designed consistently to break the vicious circle of the Cold War and the straitjacket of the nuclear balance of terror between Russia and the United States. At the same time, he sought to establish in France a new set of institutions designed to break another vicious circle: that of the divisive conflicts between French social groups and political parties, which led to weak governments and an ineffective state. This book studies the link between these two aims, both by examining de Gaulle's political aims and style in a political and cultural context, and by looking first at French policy towards the Atlantic alliance, and then at the impact of de Gaulle's foreign policy on domestic politics. As a result, many of the orthodox notions about de Gaulle are questioned.
French President Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969) has consistently fascinated contemporaries and historians. His vision_conceived out of national interest_of uniting Europe under French leadership and overcoming the Cold War still remains relevant and appealing. De Gaulle's towering personality and his challenge to US hegemony in the Cold War have inspired a vast number of political biographies and analyses of the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic mostly from French or US angle. In contrast, this book serves to rediscover de Gaulle's global policies how they changed the Cold War. Offering truly global perspectives on France's approach to the world during de Gaulle's presidency, the 13 well-matched essays by leading experts in the field tap into newly available sources drawn from US, European, Asian, African and Latin American archives. Together, the contributions integrate previously neglected regions, actors and topics with more familiar and newly approached phenomena into a global picture of the General's international policy-making. The volume at hand is an example of how cutting-edge research benefits from multipolar and multi-archival approaches and from attention to big, middle and smaller powers as well as institutions.
This account of the relationship between two leaders captures the personalities behind the policies, tracing both their mutual respect and continual quarrels.
Background and prospects of De Gaulle's Fifth Republic at home and on the world scene.
On 14 January 1963, General de Gaulle (described by the Foreign Office as an 'almost impossible ally') brutally vetoed Britain's first bid to join the Common Market. It was a blow that delayed Britain's entry for a decade and hastened the end of Harold Macmillan's political career. Peter Mangold writes in arresting detail about the fascinating personal duel that shaped high politics and Anglo-French diplomacy. He portrays two of the most complex and skilful leaders of the post-war era, old friends from their association in Algiers during World War II: de Gaulle the dour, lofty moralist obsessed with high notions of France; and Macmillan, the canny, ambitious fixer, always the pragmatist seeking to get things done. As Resident Minister, Allied Forces Headquarters in Algiers in 1943, Macmillan had done much to help de Gaulle, and protect him from Churchill's and Roosevelt's hostility. They next met in 1958, as leaders of their two countries, when Britain and France faced many similar problems ranging from decolonization and their determination to retain national Great Power status to relations with the impetuous Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. But while both seemed anxious to retain their old wartime connection, they were now rivals with very different views of the world. Divided by the Atlantic as much as the Channel, the two leaders disagreed fundamentally over America. De Gaulle sought the leadership of a Europe independent of the United States; the pro-American Macmillan talked of Britain as a 'bridge' between the two sides of the Atlantic. When Macmillan finally sought EEC membership, de Gaulle played on the old alliance to keep the British Prime Minister off guard. Ultimately, Macmillan was outwitted, out-manoeuvred and even, perhaps, outclassed by the General. "The Almost Impossible Ally" is a fascinating story of a friendship turned sour, and of a compelling new episode in the turbulent relations between Britain and France.