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This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue détente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies. From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking détente with the Soviet Union. British statesmen realized that only through compromise with Moscow over the German question could the elusive East-West be achieved. Against this, the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was seen by the British as perpetuating tension between the two blocs. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations to the West German state and its search for compromise with the Soviet bloc. Charting Britain's attempts to reconcile this contradiction, this book argues that Britain successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards détente in the early 1960s, whilst drawing towards Western Europe and applying for membership of the EEC in 1961. Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of détente and the evolution of European integration. This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history.
A new interpretation of the British government's policy towards Germany in the years immediately after 1945, and a reassessment of the part this policy played in the development of the Cold War.
The release of previously unavailable Soviet archives has allowed a re-examination of Anglo-Soviet relations during Churchill's peacetime administration, with special emphasis on the Kremlin's motivation for resisting the Prime Minister's attempts to end the Cold War. Throughout 1951-55, the time was not yet ripe for détente: the USSR and Western powers were less than willing to accommodate each other. Instead they engaged in the consolidation of their own blocs and the build-up of their defensive potential. With Winston Churchill becoming the most outspoken advocate of détente, the Kremlin greeted the return to power of the Conservative Party under his leadership with a general mistrust. After Josef Stalin's death in March 1953, détente remained a distant reality. The collective leadership was keen to reduce international tensions without modifying its predecessor's foreign policy, or abandoning Soviet strongholds of central and eastern Europe. As part of its peace offensive, the Kremlin was prepared to improve the atmosphere in relations with Britain and increase the volume of Anglo-Soviet trade. However, the British remained mistrustful of the intentions of Stalin's successors, and refrained from initiatives leading to a relaxation of export controls independent from American embargo policy. The author demonstrates that Stalin's heirs suspected that Churchill's pursuit of détente was designed to secure far-reaching concessions. Moscow also felt that as a junior partner acting in full dependence on and in co-operation with US policy, Churchill was in no position to conciliate between the USSR and the USA. Engaged in a domestic struggle for power, members of the collective leadership were reluctant to allow their opponent, Georgi Malenkov, to negotiate single-handedly with western statesmen. It was only after Nikita Khrushchev's ascendance to power and Churchill's resignation from office that the Kremlin was prepared to participate in summit talks with the western heads of government.
This illustrated book that includes tables, charts, and maps primarily discusses the role of USAREUR (US Army Europe) in rearming and training the new German Army which was perhaps the Army's single greatest contribution toward maintaining security in Western Europe. Likewise, the relationship between American soldiers and their French and West German hosts evolved over time and is a critical element in telling the story of the US Army in Europe.
This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue détente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies. From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking détente with the Soviet Union. British statesmen realized that only through compromise with Moscow over the German question could the elusive East-West be achieved. Against this, the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was seen by the British as perpetuating tension between the two blocs. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations to the West German state and its search for compromise with the Soviet bloc. Charting Britain's attempts to reconcile this contradiction, this book argues that Britain successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards détente in the early 1960s, whilst drawing towards Western Europe and applying for membership of the EEC in 1961. Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of détente and the evolution of European integration. This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history.