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Interdoc was established in 1963 by Western intelligence services as a multinational effort to coordinate an anti-communist offensive. Drawing on exclusive sources and the memories of its participants, this book charts Interdoc's campaign, the people and ideas that lay behind it and the rise and fall of this remarkable network during the Cold War.
Gray examines West Germany's efforts to deny international acceptance of East Germany as a legitimate state following World War II, in the process telling an important story of the reassertion of Germany as an important power after the disaster of the war.
Taking an in-depth look at cases of the two Germanys, the United States and China, and Israel and Egypt, Armstrong examines why initiatives by Brandt, Nixon/Carter and Mao, and Sadat and Begin succeeded where previous attempts at rapprochement had failed.The book looks first at the available theory and then at rapprochemnet in practice. Were there, the author asks, similarities between the three cases in terms of the prevailing international circumstances, the strategies and tactics adopted in the pursuit of improved relations, and the formal negotiations that ushered in the new relationships? Armstrong concludes that some underlying principles did indeed govern the shift from mutual antagonism to mutual acceptance--principles that may apply equally in today's post-Cold War world.
In The Political Economy of Regional Peacemaking, scholars examine the efficacy of trade agreements, economic sanctions, and other strategies of economic statecraft for the promotion of peace both between rival states and across conflict-ridden regions more generally. In the introduction, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman pose five central questions: (1) What types of economic statecraft, including incentives and sanctions, can interested parties employ? (2) Who are the appropriate targets in the rival states—state leaders, economic and social elites, or society as whole? (3) When should specific economic instruments be used to promote peace—prior to negotiations, during negotiations, after signature of the treaty, or during implementation of the treaty? (4) What are the limits and risks of economic statecraft and economic interdependence? (5) How can economic statecraft be used to move from a bilateral peace agreement to regional peace? The chapters that follow are grouped in three sections, corresponding to the three stages of peacemaking: reduction or management of regional conflict; peacemaking or progress toward a peace treaty; and maintenance of bilateral peace and the regionalization of the peace settlement. In each chapter, the contributors consider the five key questions from a variety of methodological, historical, cultural, and empirical perspectives, drawing data from the Pacific, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The conclusion expands on several themes found in the chapters and proposes an agenda for future research.
This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue détente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies. From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking détente with the Soviet Union. British statesmen realized that only through compromise with Moscow over the German question could the elusive East-West be achieved. Against this, the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was seen by the British as perpetuating tension between the two blocs. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations to the West German state and its search for compromise with the Soviet bloc. Charting Britain's attempts to reconcile this contradiction, this book argues that Britain successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards détente in the early 1960s, whilst drawing towards Western Europe and applying for membership of the EEC in 1961. Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of détente and the evolution of European integration. This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history.
Presenting a thorough examination of critical aspects of twentieth century history this book explores how the events of the twentieth century still cast a shadow over relations between Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic.
Mary Hampton argues that a set of ideas that influenced American policymakers in the postwar era help explain the unique evolution of the Western Alliance and Germany's rapid unification in 1990. These ideas, called the Wilsonian impulse, derived from the historical lessons concerning World War I and the interwar years learned by prominent American policymakers. The most important lesson was that a trans-Atlantic community of nations must be built that included a democratic and equal Germany. West German leaders were persistent in appealing to the Wilsonian impulse to promote their national interests. In particular, Bonn was able to ensure over time Washington's pledge to aid in the peaceful unification of Germany. The success of that policy became evident in 1990. Recent works in international relations theory have explored the impact of ideas on international institutions and on the foreign policymaking process. This study contributes to that literature by examining the role ideas have had on the evolution of Western relations in the postwar era. Hampton focuses on the cluster of ideas she calls the Wilsonian impulse. Derived from the historical lessons drawn from World War I and the interwar years, these distinctly Wilsonian ideas largely constructed the beliefs that American foreign policymakers held about trans-Atlantic relations in the immediate postwar period. Central was the belief that the European balance of power system must be superceded by a Western community of nations wherein a democratic Germany would be included on an equal basis. Hampton examines how the influence of the Wilsonian impulse permitted West German leaders to gain rapid entrance into the Western Alliance on favorable terms. More importantly, the U.S. led the West in sharing responsibility for the eventual unification of Germany as part of the Allied pledge of support for Bonn. The peaceful unification of Germany in 1990 brought to fruition the future envisioned by the Wilsonian impulse. This book will be of interest to scholars and researchers of 20th century American foreign policy and modern German history.