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This is an incisive report by a noted federal government foreign policy expert Contents: Between Russia and Iran: Room to Pursue American Interests in Syria * 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat AssessmentPresident Donald Trump has underscored containing Iran's sway as a key element in establishing a "strong and lasting footprint" in Syria as the United States moves toward bringing its Soldiers home. In pursuing this key American objective, this paper recommends that Washington take advantage of the "daylight" between Russia and Iran, and that it be American policy at all levels to work to expand it. This long-existing "daylight" was underscored in 2018 by calls in Moscow for Iran to withdraw its forces from some or all of Syria, and by Putin's positive regard at the summit in Helsinki with President Trump for Israel's security requirements.Russian acquiescence to U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian-associated and other forces in Syria reinforces the conclusion that backing a dominant Iran is not one of President Vladimir Putin's priorities. However, while he will not forcefully oppose the United States and Israel constraining Tehran, Putin will resist pressure to break totally with Iran and with the proxies Iran bankrolls and trains to fight in Syria. In addition, Russia's leverage on Iranian military and political activities in Syria is limited.Russia's solution to its own dilemma of restraining Iranian behavior in the region has been one of addition and mediation rather than subtraction. Moscow dilutes Iranian influence by working with other powers, including those most antithetical to Iran. Russia's relations with Israel are now arguably closer to a "strategic partnership" than those with Iran. Russia's dealings with Saudi Arabia correspond more aptly to an "oil axis" than the "Shiite axis" description used by some to characterize the ties between Moscow and Tehran. Russia's economic ties and diplomacy with Turkey and greenlighting of Turkish military action in Syria against Kurdish forces have also diluted Iranian leverage in Syria.1. Executive Summary * 2. "A Very Good Question" * 3. Tainted Success * 4. Friction Among Allies * 5. Strategic Partners? * 6. Sanctions Depress Trade * 7. "Axis of Oil" vis-a-vis "Shiite Axis" * 8. Israeli Security Lobby * 9. Russian-American Deconfliction * 10. Addition, Not Subtraction * 11. Push-Pull with Turkey * 12. Sanctions, Strikes, JCPOA Withdrawal * 13. Implications for U.S. Policy
President Donald Trump has underscored containing Iran's sway as a key element in establishing a "strong and lasting footprint" in Syria as the United States moves toward bringing its Soldiers home. In pursuing this key American objective, this paper recommends that Washington take advantage of the "daylight" between Russia and Iran, and that it be American policy at all levels to work to expand it. This long-existing "daylight" was underscored in 2018 by calls in Moscow for Iran to withdraw its forces from some or all of Syria, and by Putin's positive regard at the summit in Helsinki with President Trump for Israel's security requirements.Russian acquiescence to U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian-associated and other forces in Syria reinforces the conclusion that backing a dominant Iran is not one of President Vladimir Putin's priorities. However, while he will not forcefully oppose the United States and Israel constraining Tehran, Putin will resist pressure to break totally with Iran and with the proxies Iran bankrolls and trains to fight in Syria. In addition, Russia's leverage on Iranian military and political activities in Syria is limited.Russia's solution to its own dilemma of restraining Iranian behavior in the region has been one of addition and mediation rather than subtraction. Moscow dilutes Iranian influence by working with other powers, including those most antithetical to Iran. Russia's relations with Israel are now arguably closer to a "strategic partnership" than those with Iran. Russia's dealings with Saudi Arabia correspond more aptly to an "oil axis" than the "Shiite axis" description used by some to characterize the ties between Moscow and Tehran. Russia's economic ties and diplomacy with Turkey and greenlighting of Turkish military action in Syria against Kurdish forces have also diluted Iranian leverage in Syria.America's imposing military capabilities and veto-wielding membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council will provide it and its allies with continuing leverage on developments in Syria. Putin ultimately will not be able to count on U.S. acceptance of any deal that leaves Bashar al-Asad in place after a transition and new elections. Such an outcome would also dash Russian hopes of significant American, European, and regional contributions to the immense costs of reconstruction that lie ahead in Syria. Russia is unlikely to link its actions with the United States in Syria to U.S. policy toward Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, or to U.S. sanctions on Russia.To attain the conditions that will make possible the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, the United States needs to maintain a properly resourced military presence on the ground and in Syrian airspace. Only if it does so will Russia regard the United States as the most important counterweight to Iran with which Moscow will want and will need to deal. Even after the April 13-14, 2018, U.S.-UK-French strikes on Syrian chemical weapons facilities, President Putin remained eager for talks with President Trump and addressed Syria at their summit in Helsinki. The Trump administration should therefore continue judiciously to engage Russia as the United States works toward the goals of assuring the defeat of the so-called Islamic State (IS), constraining Iran's malign activities, bolstering Israel's security, and deterring Syrian government use of chemical weapons, without conceding anything in advance on Asad's future or Iran's place in the region.
Due largely to Russia's military intervention, Syrian president Asad's fortunes have recovered since June 2015. Russia, together with Hizballah and Iran, averted Asad's military defeat. What Russian president Putin accomplished in Syria is important for American security interests and policy in the region because it frames hard choices Washington must now make. Russia has profited from a hard core of Alawite and Christian support for Asad inside Syria. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to become militarily involved in Syria facilitated Russian military intervention. Russia also benefited from the disunity among the diverse opposition to Asad and their external patrons. While Saudi Arabia and Turkey were both early proponents of ousting Asad, Saudi Arabia is now more focused on defeating Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Turkey on fighting Kurdish separatist forces in northern Syria. In return for help from Putin in resolving its Kurdish problem, Turkey in 2016 helped Putin resolve Russia's Aleppo problem. As President Trump considers and implements a way forward on working with Russia in the fight against ISIS and toward peace in Syria, recent events underscore fundamental constraints under which Putin will be operating and some challenges that have been overstated. First, Russia will find it hard to deliver Asad's agreement to any political arrangement that requires him to step aside. Asad plays Russia off against Iran and Hizballah, extending no preference to Putin for Russia's contribution to his survival. Second, Tehran will not be keen to see its leverage in Damascus diminish and that of Moscow grow. Tehran will support Asad in his resistance to any Russian pressure that would impact Syria's role as Iran's land bridge to Lebanon. Third, while working with Iran militarily in Syria, Russia also engaged with major Sunni powers in the Middle East, most interestingly Saudi Arabia, as well as with Israel. Fourth, Putin does not want Syria to be a "negative" issue in Russian presidential elections in 2018. Cooperation with the Trump administration and renewed American treatment of Russia as a "respected equal" would make Syria a more manageable electoral issue for Putin. As Washington continues to formulate and fine-tune a new approach to fighting ISIS and terrorism under the Trump administration, this study makes the following policy recommendations. First, the United States must cast aside sentiment and strictly prioritize its objectives and preferred or acceptable outcomes. Second, the United States should work toward a Syria that remains unified even as the American fight against ISIS benefits from Syrian Kurdish military prowess. The Kurds should be part of the mix in political negotiations going forward but only in the context of a unified Syria at the end of the process. Third, the United States should explore the military pros and cons of more robust cooperation with Russia in Syria, without conceding anything in advance on Asad's future or Iran's place in the region. The U.S. needs to be prepared selectively and judiciously to strike Syrian regime forces from time to time to inhibit their attacks on nonterrorist opposition fighters and civilian populations. Fourth, Washington should work quietly with Moscow toward diminishing Iranian leverage in Syria and the region. That said, while Moscow probably hopes that its weight in Syria will increase over time at Iran's expense, Russia has little interest in sharing influence there with the U.S. Finally, with or without Russia, the United States should engage militarily in Syria more robustly. Besides being necessary to fight ISIS more effectively, this will also help reverse the view that began to take hold in the region during the Barack Obama administration that the United States is a declining power, and encourage regional capitals to rebalance their relations with Moscow.
Thanks in large part to Russia's military intervention, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad'sfortunes have made a remarkable recovery since May/June 2015. Russia, together with the LebaneseHizballah, Iran, and Iranian-organized Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, andelsewhere, has succeeded in averting Asad's military defeat. What Russian president VladimirPutin has accomplished in Syria is important for American national security interests and policyin the region because it frames some of the hard choices Washington must now make.Russia has profited from a hard core of Alawite and Christian support for Asad insideSyria. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to become militarily involved in Syria facilitated themove of Russian forces into the country. Russia also benefited from the disunity among thediverse opposition to Asad and their external patrons. While Saudi Arabia and Turkey wereboth early proponents of ousting Asad, Saudi Arabia is now more focused on defeating Houthirebels in Yemen, and Turkey on fighting Kurdish separatist forces in northern Syria. In returnfor help from Putin in resolving its Kurdish problem, Turkey in 2016 helped Putin resolve Russia'sAleppo problem.As President Donald Trump considers and implements a way forward on working withRussia in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and toward peace in Syria,events of the past several years underscore several fundamental constraints under which Putinwill be operating and some challenges that have been overstated.First, Russia will find it hard to deliver Asad's agreement to any political arrangement thatrequires him to step aside to bring the conflict to an end. Asad plays Russia off against Iran andthe Lebanese Hizballah, placing them all on the same level and extending no preference to Putinfor Russia's contribution to his survival.Second, Tehran will not be keen to see its leverage in Damascus diminish and that of Moscowgrow. Tehran will support Asad in his resistance to any Russian pressure that would impactwhat Tehran sees as its existential interests in Syria as a vital link in Iran's land bridge to theLebanese Hizballah.Third, while working with Iran militarily in Syria, Russia has successfully pursued engagementwith most major Sunni powers in the Middle East, most interestingly Saudi Arabia, as wellas with Israel. However unpopular on "the street," Putin and Gulf Sunni royals appear to haveno complexes about dealing with each other.Fourth, Putin does not want Syria to be a "negative" issue going into the next Russianpresidential elections, scheduled for March 2018. This may be the major reason he has wanted to "solve" Aleppo so quickly in 2016 and pivot again to peacemaking efforts more prominence.Cooperation with the Trump administration and renewed American treatment of Russia as a"respected equal" would make Syria a more manageable electoral issue for Putin.As Washington continues to formulate and fine-tune a new approach to fighting ISIS andterrorism under the Trump administration, this study makes the following policy recommendations.First, the United States must cast aside sentiment and strictly prioritize its objectivesand preferred or acceptable outcomes.Second, the United States should work toward a Syria that remains unified even as theAmerican fight against ISIS benefits from Syrian Kurdish military prowess. The Kurds should bepart of the mix in political negotiations going forward but only in the context of a unified Syriaat the end of the process.
The volume deals with competition among regional and external players for the redistribution of power and international status in the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on Russia’s renewed role and the implications for US interests. Over the last few years, a crisis of legitimacy has beset the liberal international order. In this context, the configuration of regional orders has come into question, as in the extreme case of the current collapse in the Middle East. The idea of a “Russian resurgence” in the Middle East set against a perceived American withdrawal has captured the attention of policymakers and scholars alike, warranting further examination. This volume, a joint publication by ISPI and the Atlantic Council, gathers analysis on Washington’s and Moscow’s policy choices in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ engagament in the countries beset by major crises.
The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country's overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights. Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, the United States is substantially changing the U.S. role in the world. Other observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, while acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S. foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been less change and more continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration is substantially changing the U.S. role in the world-particularly critics of the Trump Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration-view the implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an unforced error of immense proportions-a needless and self-defeating squandering of something of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70 years. Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent years-particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the world-view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. interests. Congress's decisions regarding the U.S role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.
Blackwill examines in detail Trump's actions in a turbulent world in important policy areas, including the United States' relationships with its allies, its relationships with China and Russia, and its policies on the Middle East and climate change. This report acknowledges the persuasive points of Trump's critics, but at the same time seeks to perform exacting autopsies on their less convincing critiques.
Taner Akçam is one of the first Turkish academics to acknowledge and discuss openly the Armenian Genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman-Turkish government in 1915. This book discusses western political policies towards the region generally, and represents the first serious scholarly attempt to understand the Genocide from a perpetrator rather than victim perspective, and to contextualize those events within Turkey's political history. By refusing to acknowledge the fact of genocide, successive Turkish governments not only perpetuate massive historical injustice, but also pose a fundamental obstacle to Turkey's democratization today.