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Examines military interventions in Greece, Turkey, Thailand, and Egypt, and the military's role in authoritarian and democratic regimes
Argentina has most of the characteristics that various theories of democracy postulate as prerequisites for achieving liberal democracy: an urban industrial economy, key economic resources under domestic control, the absence of a peasantry, the absence of ethnic or religious cleavages, relatively high levels of education, strong interest groups, an
In Turkey: The Pendulum between Military Rule and Civilian Authoritarianism, Fatih Çağatay Cengiz explains Turkey’s trajectory of military and civilian authoritarianism while offering an alternative framework for understanding the Kemalist state and state-society relations.
Based on a conference held in Washington, DC, 13-14 Mar 1995.
In sharp contrast to neighboring India, the Muslim nation of Pakistan has been ruled by its military for over three decades. The Army and Democracy identifies steps for reforming Pakistan’s armed forces and reducing its interference in politics, and sees lessons for fragile democracies striving to bring the military under civilian control.
Steven I. Wilkinson explores how India has succeeded in keeping the military out of politics, when so many other countries have failed. He uncovers the command and control strategies, the careful ethnic balancing, and the political, foreign policy, and strategic decisions that have made the army safe for Indian democracy.
"The country-specific chapters serve to underline the differences between African democracy and liberal democracy, yet some authors are at pains to emphasize that whatever their limitations, African democracies are an advance over what had gone before." -- African Studies Review
The authors of this volume explore the challenges of establishing democratic accountability and control over the military and other security establishments in countries which have either been the victims of authoritarian military rule or wracked by violent internal conflict. The book examines both successful democratic transitions and failed ones. A wide range of cases is covered, including Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, the Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierre Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. The possible role of regional interventions and institutions, notably in West Africa and the Balkans, is also examined.
The Democratic Coup d'État advances a simple, yet controversial, argument: democracy sometimes comes through a military coup. Covering coups that toppled dictators and installed democratic rule in countries as diverse as Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, and Colombia, the book weaves a balanced narrative that challenges everything we knew about military coups.
Unlike most other emerging South American democracies, Venezuela has not succumbed to a successful military coup d'etat during four decades of democratic rule. What drives armed forces to follow the orders of elected leaders? And how do emerging democracies gain that control over their military establishments? Harold Trinkunas answers these questions in an examination of Venezuela's transition to democracy following military rule and its attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military over the past sixty years, a period that included three regime changes. Trinkunas first focuses on the strategic choices democratizers make about the military and how these affect the internal civil-military balance of power in a new regime. He then analyzes a regime's capacity to institutionalize civilian control, looking specifically at Venezuela's failures and successes in this arena during three periods of intense change: the October revolution (1945-48), the Pact of Punto Fijo period (1958-98), and the Fifth Republic under President Hugo Chavez (1998 to the present). Placing Venezuela in comparative perspective with Argentina, Chile, and Spain, Trinkunas identifies the bureaucratic mechanisms democracies need in order to sustain civilian authority over the armed forces.