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The years 1790 to 1830 saw Britain engage in an extensive period of war-waging and empire-building which transformed its position as an imperial state, established its reputation as a distinctive military power and secured naval preeminence. Despite this apparent success, Britain did not become a world super power in the conventional sense. Instead, as Professor Collins demonstrates, it operated as an enclave power, influencing or dominating many regions of the world without ever asserting global hegemony. Even in the 1820s, Britain still had to fight to maintain influence, and sometimes struggled to assert dominance on the borderlands of the empire. By locating naval and military power at the heart of Britain's relationship with the wider world, Bruce Collins offers an insightful reinterpretation of the interaction between military and naval war-making, the expansion of the empire, and the nature of the British regime. Using examples of conflicts ranging from continental Europe and Ireland to North America, Africa and India, he argues that the state’s effectiveness in war was crucial to its imperial expansion and gives new significance to British military conduct in an age of revolution and war.
Samuel Auchmuty was born in New York in 1756. During the American Revolution his remained loyal to King George and he joined the British 45th Foot in 1777. After the war he remained in British service, campaigned in many parts of the world and rose through the ranks. Despite a varied and distinguished career he has not received the attention he warrants, neither as a Loyalist from New York, nor as a successful British soldier.Auchmuty served in India through the Second and Third Mysore Wars, the Rohilla War and a serious mutiny. In 1798 Auchmuty was adjutant-general of the successful Red Sea campaign against French forces in Egypt. Returning to Britain in 1803 he commanded the defences in Thanet, East Kent, at the height of the French invasion threat. He was the only British commander to emerge from the River Plate campaign with credit, capturing Montevideo in 1807. In 1811 he commanded the land forces that captured Java from Franco-Dutch control. He ended his life as Commander-in-Chief, Ireland. John Grainger examines his part in events which shaped world history.
Heart Like a Fakir is a history of the final forty years of British East India Company rule in India as witnessed by General Sir James Abbott (1807–1896), the man for whom the Pakistani town of Abbottabad is named. Based on extensive research into primary source documents, the book uses the life of General Sir James Abbott as a narrative thread to explore the troubled period between William Dalrymple’s White Moghuls and the Indian Rebellion of 1857. General Sir James Abbott was one of the most remarkable characters in British colonial history, becoming Great Britain’s first guerilla leader, the first Briton to reach the fabled Central Asian city of Khiva, and a British Deputy Commissioner who became the King of Hazara. He may have also been the inspiration for Rudyard Kipling’s The Man Who Would Be King and the character of Mr. Kurtz in Joseph Conrad’s novel Heart of Darkness. This book chronicles the remarkable collapse of the social contract between Britons and the peoples of India in the first half of the nineteenth century, taking a fresh look at British perceptions of race, gender, and the nature of social and sexual relationships between them, leading up to the Great Rebellion of 1857— the cataclysm that ended British East India Company rule.
In the nineteenth century, European states conquered vast stretches of territory across the periphery of the international system. Much of Asia and Africa fell to the armies of the European great powers, and by World War I, those armies controlled 40 percent of the world's territory and 30 percent of its population. Conventional wisdom states that these conquests were the product of European military dominance or technological superiority, but the reality was far more complex. In Networks of Domination, Paul MacDonald argues that an ability to exploit the internal political situation within a targeted territory, not mere military might, was a crucial element of conquest. European states enjoyed greatest success when they were able to recruit local collaborators from within the society and exploit divisions among elites. Different configurations of social ties connecting potential conquerors with elites were central to both the patterns of imperial conquest and the strategies conquerors employed. MacDonald compares episodes of British colonial expansion in India, South Africa, and Nigeria during the nineteenth century, and also examines the contemporary applicability of the theory through an examination of the United States occupation of Iraq. The scramble for empire fundamentally shaped, and continues to shape, the international system we inhabit today. Featuring a powerful theory of the role of social networks in shaping the international system, Networks of Domination bridges past and present to highlight the lessons of conquest.
While popular images of the British Raj are saturated with images and memories of military campaigns, remarkably few scholarly studies have considered the direct impact that the army exerted on the day-to-day operations of the British in India. Douglas Peer's book demonstrates not only how important the army was to the establishment of British domination but also to its subsequent form and operation. Soldiers and civilians, with rare exception, were united by the truism that British rule could only be retained by the sword. A rationale and a programme for the Raj emerged that emphasized the precariousness of British rule and showed that its security could only be assured by constant preparedness for war. Consequently, military imperatives and the army's demands for resources were given priority in peacetime as well as wartime. This accounts for the origin of the Burma War (1824-26) and the capture of Bhartpur (1825-26), neither of which would appear at first glance to be strategically vital or economically desirable. Authorities in London viewed this militarization of the colonial administration and its treasury with misgivings, recognizing not only the financial costs involved, but the political consequences of an increasingly autonomous army. Their efforts to restrain the army were only partially successful. Even William Bentinck (1828-1835), long famous for ushering in a period of reform in India, could only temporarily curb military spending and the influences of the army. He left the military chastened but undefeated; the army's interests were too deeply entrenched and even Bentinck was forced to concede Britain's dependence on the Indian army.