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Argentina's recently established democracy endured the trauma of four major military uprisings between 1987 and 1990, continuing even after the rebels' original motivations faded. Exploring the causes of the rebellions and the rebel movement's development, Deborah L. Norden's Military Rebellion in Argentina underlines the inherently undefined nature of new democracies and reveals important dimensions of how coalitions are formed within the armed forces. By focusing on a military movement rather than merely separate incidents of insurrection, this study reveals central motivations that could be otherwise overlooked. Norden begins with an analysis of the relation between democracy and military insurrection in previous postauthoritarian civilian periods, then turns to Argentina's long battle against military intervention in politics. The study focuses on the internally divisive effects of the 1976-1983 military regime, which generated the intra-army cleavages that emerged during the subsequent period of civilian rule, and the civilian policies that prompted the rebels to action. At the heart of the study is an examination of the evolution of military rebellion, looking at the shift from policy-provoked reaction to more independent, politically motivated organization. Norden also explores general themes such as intransigent interventionism and the effects of different military regimes in South America on the likelihood of democratic consolidation. Deborah L. Norden is an assistant professor of government at Colby College. Her articles on Latin America have appeared in numerous journals.
This book provides a unique explanation of why Angola and Nigeria—Africa’s two largest oil-producing nations—have experienced different political and economic outcomes since attaining independence. It explains why Asian-led oil-for-infrastructure deals materialised in Angola but failed in Nigeria between 2004 and 2007. One hypothesis of the natural resource curse is that resource wealth leads to underdevelopment because it entrenches autocracy, but that fails to explain the different political economy outcomes in Angola and Nigeria, which were both predominantly autocratic post-independence. The book reveals, through the application of a game-theoretic model, that Angola’s José Eduardo dos Santos successfully used the country’s oil wealth to consolidate power early in his reign by eliminating potential threats to his dictatorial ambitions. He ruled for 38 years, and thus represented one of Africa’s longest autocracies, but was eventually upended by his own ruling party—an unusual outcome. By contrast, no Nigerian leader attained the same level of consolidation over oil or power. Perennial contestation for power—through multiple successful military coups—resulted in an uneven evolution towards a more open and competitive political settlement. The findings of this book will deepen the reader’s understanding of the resource curse and illuminate the importance of tailoring governance solutions to reflect the specificities of any resource-wealthy context.
Examines military interventions in Greece, Turkey, Thailand, and Egypt, and the military's role in authoritarian and democratic regimes
This title was first published in 2000: The continent of Africa is undergoing great change. While on the one hand there is talk of a re-awakening of Africa or Renaissance various countries in Africa are still plagued by poverty, intra- and interstate violence. In some countries the legacy of neo-colonialism and under development contributed to social strife and the potential criminalization of the State. This book addresses the topic of democratization and sustainable democracy in Africa against this background.
Why have so many attempts at democracy in the past half-century failed? Confronting this much discussed question, this title offers a novel explanation for the coups and rebellions that have toppled fledgling democratic regimes and that continue to threaten many democracies.
Regime Consolidation and Transitional Justice explores the effect of transitional justice measures on 'regime consolidation', or the means by which a new political system is established in a post-transition context. Focusing on the long-term impact of transitional justice mechanisms in three countries over several decades, the gradual process by which these political systems have been legitimatised is revealed. Through case studies of East and West Germany after World War II, Spain after the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975 and Turkey's long journey to achieving democratic reform, Regime Consolidation and Transitional Justice shows how transitional justice and regime consolidation are intertwined. The interdisciplinary study, which will be of interest to scholars of criminal law, human rights law, political science, democracy, autocracies and transformation theories, demonstrates, importantly, that the political systems in question are not always 'more' democratic than their predecessors and do not always enhance democracy post-regime consolidation.
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.
Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United States to win the “hearts and minds” of its populace, undermining the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases, campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency. Ultimately, elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed for counterinsurgency success. Instead, decisions of key actors in government and elites to prioritize either short term personal and political advantage or respect for political institutions held a central role in counterinsurgency success or failure. In each of the four cases in this study, elected governments pursued policies that benefited members of the government and elites at the expense of boarder legitimacy and improved performance. Expectations that democratization could serve as a key instrument of change led to unwarranted optimism about the likely of success and ultimately to flawed strategy. The United States continued to support regimes that continued to lack the legitimacy and government performance needed for victory in counterinsurgency.
Explains how dictatorships rise, survive, and fall, along with why some but not all dictators wield vast powers.