Download Free Beliefs And Policymaking In The Middle East Analysis Of The Israeli Palestinian Conflict Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Beliefs And Policymaking In The Middle East Analysis Of The Israeli Palestinian Conflict and write the review.

Click here to read an excerpt from the book. I have long tried to understand why the Arab-Israeli Conflict has not been resolved. Despite many attempts at regional and international negotiations since the time of the Mandate, the Conflict has persisted and the Palestinians still do not have a state. The continuation of the Palestinian question within the more general context of this issue places it at the heart of the Conflict and this is the reason why I centered my analysis on the Israelis and just the Palestinians (instead of all the Arab states in the region). Lack of a solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict may thus be associated with absence of a state for the Palestinians. My case study begins with a brief introduction to trends in negotiations after which I come to my central research question: Why, despite all these attempts at negotiation had the Arab-Israeli Conflict not been resolved? I had a feeling the problem might have to do with beliefs. That is, both sides to the Conflict held (and some still hold) maximalist beliefs about having the whole of what was mandated Palestine for themselves. Both sides have made advances toward peace but the Conflict continues and the Palestinians still do not have a state. I assumed that unless both sides changed their beliefs regarding territory there would be no resolution to the Conflict. In my view, change was not a matter of eliminating a belief but changing the priority of one belief over another, i.e. to believe in peace instead of believing in having all the land of Palestine. Before developing some ideas about beliefs in the next section, I reviewed some of the literature in international relations that dealt with conflict analysis. Two of the more popular ones are the realist approach and organizational theory. Realist theorists Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz examine conflict in terms of maximizing interests, in particular power. (See Introduction.) Their approaches can explain situations where interests are clear-cut but power cannot always impose itself as is seen by international attempts at negotiation or even Israel’s efforts to impose a solution on the Palestinians. Organizational theory does not necessarily explain situations where state or government bureaucracies don’t exist, e.g. with the Palestinians during the time of the Mandate. I then decided to go ahead and see what beliefs had to offer to conflict analysis. In the section following the realist and organization discussion, I looked at beliefs from the standpoint of belief system theorists in international relations and from the psychological approaches that influenced them. In order to better examine beliefs and be able to use them to explain this Conflict (and perhaps others later), I formulated four questions and then looked at what belief system theorists and psychologists had to say about them: How were beliefs formed, were they consistent with behavior, could they change and if so, how. Two of the major theories in psychology were looked at: Attribution and learning. (See Introduction for more on these approaches.) From these two approaches we can learn much about how beliefs are formed and, in so doing, how they can change. For example, in interpreting incoming information individuals tend to attribute causes to explaining event. This causation process implies some reasoning ability and facilitates learning. One problem with attribution theory is that it indicates what an individual should do but the person is not always so careful in causal analysis. Still, the approach is valuable to understanding beliefs. These theories also highlight the importance of experience, as the past is so often the source of recurrent behavior. For any successful negotiation, communicat
"Although George W. Bush memorably declared, “I'm the decider,” as president he was remarkably indecisive when it came to U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His administration's policymaking featured an ongoing clash between moderate realists and conservative hard-liners inspired by right-wing religious ideas and a vision of democracy as cure-all. Riven by these competing agendas, the Bush administration vacillated between recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination and embracing Israeli leaders who often chose war over negotiations"--Front flap.
Over the past century alone, Russia has lived through great achievements and deepest misery; mass heroism and mass crime; over-blown ambition and near-hopeless despair – always emerging with its sovereignty and its fiercely independent spirit intact. In this book, leading Russia scholar Dmitri Trenin accompanies readers on Russia’s rollercoaster journey from revolution to post-war devastation, perestroika to Putin’s stabilization of post-Communist Russia. Explaining the causes and the meaning of the numerous twists and turns in contemporary Russian history, he offers a vivid insider’s view of a country through one of its most trying and often tragic periods. Today, he cautions, Russia stands at a turning point – politically, economically and socially – its situation strikingly reminiscent of the Russian Empire in its final years. For the Russian Federation to avoid a similar demise, it must learn the lessons of its own history.
Preface p. vii 1 Introduction: The Analytical Framework Raymond Hinnebusch p. 1 2 The Middle East Regional System Raymond Hinnebusch p. 29 3 The Impact of the International System on the Middle East B.A. Roberson p. 55 4 The Challenge of Security in the Post--Gulf War Middle East System Nadia El-Shazly and Raymond Hinnebusch p. 71 5 The Foreign Policy of Egypt Raymond Hinnebusch p. 91 6 The Foreign Policy of Israel Clive Jones p. 115 7 The Foreign Policy of Syria Raymond Hinnebusch p. 141 8 The Foreign Policy of Iraq Charles Tripp p. 167 9 The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia F. Gregory Gause III p. 193 10 The Foreign Policy of Libya Tim Niblock p. 213 11 The Foreign Policy of Tunisia Emma C. Murphy p. 235 12 The Foreign Policy of Yemen Fred Halliday p. 257 13 The Foreign Policy of Iran Anoushiravan Ehteshami p. 283 14 The Foreign Policy of Turkey Philip Robins p. 311 15 Conclusion: Patterns of Policy Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch p. 335 Glossary p. 351 Bibliography p. 355 The Contributors p. 365 Index p. 369 About the Book p. 381.
For most of the twentieth century, considered opinion in the United States regarding Palestine has favored the inherent right of Jews to exist in the Holy Land. That Palestinians, as a native population, could claim the same right has been largely ignored. Kathleen Christison's controversial new book shows how the endurance of such assumptions, along with America's singular focus on Israel and general ignorance of the Palestinian point of view, has impeded a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Christison begins with the derogatory images of Arabs purveyed by Western travelers to the Middle East in the nineteenth century, including Mark Twain, who wrote that Palestine's inhabitants were "abject beggars by nature, instinct, and education." She demonstrates other elements that have influenced U.S. policymakers: American religious attitudes toward the Holy Land that legitimize the Jewish presence; sympathy for Jews derived from the Holocaust; a sense of cultural identity wherein Israelis are "like us" and Arabs distant aliens. She makes a forceful case that decades of negative portrayals of Palestinians have distorted U.S. policy, making it virtually impossible to promote resolutions based on equality and reciprocity between Palestinians and Israelis. Christison also challenges prevalent media images and emphasizes the importance of terminology: Two examples are the designation of who is a "terrorist" and the imposition of place names (which can pass judgment on ownership). Christison's thoughtful book raises a final disturbing question: If a broader frame of reference on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had been employed, allowing a less warped public discourse, might not years of warfare have been avoided and steps toward peace achieved much earlier?
Discusses the history of and analyzes the factors shaping American policies in the Middle East.
Originally published in 2007, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, provoked both howls of outrage and cheers of gratitude for challenging what had been a taboo issue in America: the impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy. A work of major importance, it remains as relevant today as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006. Mearsheimer and Walt describe in clear and bold terms the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel and argues that this support cannot be fully explained on either strategic or moral grounds. This exceptional relationship is due largely to the political influence of a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. They provocatively contend that the lobby has a far-reaching impact on America's posture throughout the Middle East―in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict―and the policies it has encouraged are in neither America's national interest nor Israel's long-term interest. The lobby's influence also affects America's relationship with important allies and increases dangers that all states face from global jihadist terror. The publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy led to a sea change in how the U.S-Israel relationship was discussed, and continues to be one of the most talked-about books in foreign policy.
A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington’s unwillingness to confront Israel’s ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington’s management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington’s distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.