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The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Today’s cyber defenses are largely static allowing adversaries to pre-plan their attacks. In response to this situation, researchers have started to investigate various methods that make networked information systems less homogeneous and less predictable by engineering systems that have homogeneous functionalities but randomized manifestations. The 10 papers included in this State-of-the Art Survey present recent advances made by a large team of researchers working on the same US Department of Defense Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) project during 2013-2019. This project has developed a new class of technologies called Adaptive Cyber Defense (ACD) by building on two active but heretofore separate research areas: Adaptation Techniques (AT) and Adversarial Reasoning (AR). AT methods introduce diversity and uncertainty into networks, applications, and hosts. AR combines machine learning, behavioral science, operations research, control theory, and game theory to address the goal of computing effective strategies in dynamic, adversarial environments.
The Elgar Companion to Information Economics dexterously navigates this interdisciplinary field of research which celebrates the crucial contribution of information to decision making, market dynamics, and economic well-being. Offering a wealth of conceptual analysis, this erudite Companion embarks on an intellectual journey exploring the fundamentals of information economics. This title contains one or more Open Access chapters.
Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
A classic treatment of game theory from the acclaimed Annals of Mathematics Studies series Princeton University Press is proud to have published the Annals of Mathematics Studies since 1940. One of the oldest and most respected series in science publishing, it has included many of the most important and influential mathematical works of the twentieth century. The series continues this tradition as Princeton University Press publishes the major works of the twenty-first century. To mark the continued success of the series, all books are available in paperback and as ebooks.
We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Using simple but rigorously defined mathematical models, Thomas Quint and Martin Shubik explore monetary control in a simple exchange economy. Examining how money enters, circulates, and exits an economy, they consider the nature of trading systems and the role of government authority in the exchange of consumer goods for storable money; exchanges made with durable currency, such as gold; fiat currency, which is flexible but has no consumption value; conditions under which borrowers can declare bankruptcy; and the distinctions between individuals who lend their own money, and financiers, who lend others’.div/DIV