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This operation resulted from the XII Corps' plan to envelop Nancy from the north and to capture it so that the corps could continue its attack in sector toward the West Wall and beyond. The initial plan called for a single envelopment north of Nancy with one regimental combat team of the 80th Infantry Division conducting a hasty crossing of the Moselle River near Pont-a-Mousson. Once a bridgehead was established, Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division was to exploit by striding eastward to encircle Nancy and trap the German defenders there. Another regimental combat team of the 80th Inf Div was to force a crossing of the Moselle near Toul and to attack Nancy from the West. The initial attempt to cross the Moselle near Toul failed, however, because of poor reconnaissance, lack of artillery support, faulty coordination, and a tenacious defense by a strong enemy force holding good the Moselle south of Nancy, the corps commander ordered another crossing north of Nancy to execute a double envelopment of the city. This crossing was successful. The 80th Infantry Division secured a bridgehead at Dieulouard and Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division, passed through the bridgehead and exploited to secure the high ground around Arracourt, thereby preventing the escape of German forces trapped in the Nancy pocket. The successful crossing at Dieulouard illustrates the need to cross armor into a bridgehead as soon as possible in order to retain the power of maneuver, to provide mobile forces for rapid penetration and movement toward follow-on objectives, and to provide firepower and maneuver against hostile counterattacks against the bridgehead. (author).
An analysis concerning the crossing of the Moselle River by elements of the XX US Corps, Third Army, in Sept 1944. The action occurred at Arnaville, just south of Dornot, France, where the US 5th Infantry Division fought several divisional size German forces. Included in the German order of battle was: 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, Division Number 462, 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. The Arnaville crossing, which was successful, was a continuance of the river crossing effort after US elements had previously been unsuccessful in a river crossing attempt at Dornot. The main emphasis of this battle analysis is on the Moselle River crossing at Arnaville. Both primary and secondary sources of information concerning this battle are available. In addition to the unit operational reports and books listed in the bibliography, there are numerous interview transcriptions. These interviews were conducted with both individual combatants as well as with groups. Only US units and personnel are interviewed, and the interview techniques are not discussed. It is not specifically known who the interviewer is, nor has there been an evaluation conducted as to the reliability and accuracy of the interviews. Although those involved in the action contributed a great deal of valuable after-action material, one must accept that individual perceptions are the product of individual interpretations. Facts present themselves in all of the reference material and it is only through reading a large volume of available data that one can successfully begin to separate fact from interpretation. This analysis is the product of that attempt.
During the race across France after the break out of Normandy, the pace was slowed before the city of Matz. BG James A. Van Fleet's 90th Infantry Division provided a spearhead for the XX Corps advance. The crossing of the Moselle River in November in the face of extensive enemy fortifications provide valuable lessons in the conduct of hasty river crossing operations under fire. (Author).
Crossing a river against a defending enemy force is a difficult and complex task for any army. History has shown that preparation is necessary to avoid disasters during this type of operation. In 2003, the Third Infantry Division crossed the Euphrates River because it was prepared for this task and possessed the necessary equipment. Since then, no other divisions or corps has executed river crossing operations. While the United States Army focused on counterinsurgency operations during the last twelve years, it underwent significant changes to adapt to meet the adversities on the battlefield. It transformed its war-fighting organizations, trained its corps and divisions with computer simulations, and relegated field training to brigade and below units. In addition, its current doctrine now refers to river crossings as the deliberate wet gap crossing. Because of these changes, many questions arose as to the present corps and divisions’ preparedness to do large-scale operations, to include its ability to plan, prepare, and execute the deliberate wet gap crossing. If called today, could these organizations conduct this complex operation? Examining river crossings in Europe during the Second World War was appropriate for insight into how the previous generation of corps and divisions prepared and executed such a complex task. After analyzing how these units were able to cross the numerous waterways in Europe, the present Army should consider reassessing its doctrine, training, and organization and equipment to prepare its units for future deliberate wet gap crossings.
Powerhouse I was the name given to the crossing of the Meurthe River in the Vosges of France on November 20, 1944. The commander of VI Corps, Major General Edward H. Brooks, ordered the 3rd Infantry Division to conduct a major assault crossing of the Meurthe between Claire Fontaine and St. Michel. As objective training in river crossing operations progressed over five days, the artillery laid on harassing fires with an effective cover plan. Clear weather also allowed XII TAC to provide close support. Against light opposition, the 3rd Infantry Division crossed the Meurthe on footbridges which were speedily installed by the Engineers. Construction of Bailey and treadway vehicle bridges soon followed. The crossing of the Meurthe River by the 3rd Infantry Division was one of the most successful large-scale river crossing of World War II. Careful preparation, good plans, training, engineer and artillery support combined with weak enemy opposition to assure the success of Powerhouse I and the subsequent disintegration of the German Winter Line.
The US 5th Infantry Division's deliberate river crossings at Dornot and Arnaville over the Moselle River during September 1944 demonstrated the advantages of combined arms operations. Lessons learned included the use af antitank weapons in overwatch positions, the effective utilization of close air support, the employment of armor, the importance and initiative and company grade leadership to small unit infantry tacties, the effective use of smoke, and problems of command and control in the river crossing.
On 7 February 1945, the 80th Infantry Division began crossing the Sauer River in the allies offensive against the German homeland. German forces, having been thwarted in the Battle of the Bulge, were in poor shape both in personnel and equipment and offered little resistance to the crossing. The Sauer River itself became the 80th Division's more substantial foe. Swollen to twice its normal width and with currents of as much as seventeen miles per hour, the Sauer extracted a high toll in men and material. The assault had been underway three days before the first bridge was in place. The division objective was secured fourteen days after the operation was begun. The Fourth Armored Division then passed through the 80th and the race to the Rhine was on. (Author).
This work deals with an Infantry Division river crossing action. As back ground information, two preliminary attacks are also included. During the months of September and October, 1944, the 80th Infantry Division had been engaged primarily in what amounted to local attacks. These were exclusive of the Moselle River crossings during the first half of September. Local attacks are never allotted a great deal of space in after action reports, but to, the immediate units concerned they are very important. In addition, they are important to the commander as his plans for a large scale attack may depend on the results of numerous local attacks. Many small unit commanders never knew what part they were playing in the commander's plan but if there is no danger of a violation of security regulations, as much information as possible should be disseminated to these people. When they have an understanding of the mission as a whole, it enables them to see that the actions of their unit may be a key in the success or failure of the entire operation.
On 21 March 1945 the Fifth Infantry Division was alerted to prepare to launch a surprise night crossing of the Rhine River at Oppenheim, Germany. Despite the haste involved in the assault timing, engineers made elaborate preparations for supporting the infantry and bridging the river. The crossing of the Rhine in assault boats by the 11th Infantry Regiment at 2200 hours on 22 March was lightly opposed and successful. On 23 March other regiments of the Fifth Infantry Division crossed the river and exploitation of the bridgehead began on 24 March. The Fifth Infantry Division crossed the Rhine River without benefit of aerial bombardment, artillery preparation, ground smoke, or airborne assistance. This operation is an excellent example of a well planned and ably executed river crossing by an Army on the move.
Action around the Our River bridgehead in February 1945 by the 6th Armored Division was an effort to divert Germans from an attack by the US XII Corps. Nevertheless, this action provided a basis for penetrating the West Wall. As a follow up to the Allied march across France, the pace was slowed as units neared Germany. The lessons of the combined Arms team in securing and exploiting a heavily defended bridgehead are clearly demonstrated.