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The U.S. Air Force has experienced many acquisition program failures - cost overruns, schedule delays, system performance problems, and sustainability concerns - over program lifetimes. A key contributing factor is the lack of sufficient technical knowledge within the Air Force concerning the systems being acquired to ensure success. To examine this issue, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition requested that the Air Force Studies Board of the National Research Council undertake a workshop to identify the essential elements of the technical baseline - data and information to establish, trade-off, verify, change, accept, and sustain functional capabilities, design characteristics, affordability, schedule, and quantified performance parameters at the chosen level of the system hierarchy - that would benefit from realignment under Air Force or government ownership, and the value to the Air Force of regaining ownership under its design capture process of the future. Over the course of three workshops from November 2014 through January 2015, presenters and participants identified the barriers that must be addressed for the Air Force to regain technical baseline control to include workforce, policy and process, funding, culture, contracts, and other factors and provided a terms of reference for a possible follow-on study to explore the issues and make recommendations required to implement and institutionalize the technical baseline concept. Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force summarizes the presentations and discussion of the three workshops.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) aims to improve mission effectiveness and efficiency. In support of this effort, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center operated by the RAND Corporation, to construct a baseline of the DoD's government acquisition and procurement functions, including a functional decomposition and estimate of the cost of executing the government portion of the DoD's acquisition enterprise. NDRI researchers estimated these costs at between $29 billion and $38 billion in fiscal year 2017 dollars. To gain perspective on these costs, NDRI researchers identified commercial benchmarks for the amount of program management levels. As a percentage of DoD contracting obligations, NDRI researchers estimated the DoD's program management portion of these costs at about 1.5 percent in the last few years, which is below industry benchmarks of 2-15 percent.
All major weapon system programs establish a program baseline early in the acquisition cycle which sets forth cost, schedule, and performance targets for the program. If the thresholds are exceeded, a review and assessment procedure is initiated in an attempt to understand why the threshold was "breached" and how the program can be brought back on track. Most programs experience events that require changes to their baselines at some point in their life-cycles. The baselining process can be a useful management tool for acquisition managers by providing metrics for measuring program status and a process for responding to deviations from the plan. The overall goal of the research reported here is to enhance the usefulness of the acquisition program baselining (APB) process as a management tool for acquisition decisionmakers. This report documents the results of both Phase 1 and Phase 2 research efforts. It should interest analysts and government officials concerned with the defense acquisition process.
Accumulating baseline data on the defense acquisition system is essential to gauging just how successful reform efforts have been so far. This article delineates the first step in that process. Baselining, in and of itself, or as a step in continuous process improvement, has become an accepted modern management technique. Baselining attempts to describe and capture the level of success of an existing system, before proposed system changes are applied to the existing system. The changed system should show a large enough increase in success over the existing system to warrant the cost and other expenses of implementation. The Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Reform (AR) Program is a series of changes being incorporated into the DoD acquisition system. This article is an ex post facto attempt to baseline the DoD acquisition system prior to the introduction of reforms. To do that, one has to determine the effective date of the changes and the level of success of the then-existing DoD acquisition system. Data are available to allow one to do just that. The main point of this article is to identify and describe the first step in a three-step process called benchmarking, baselining, or a part of continuous process improvement. Step 1 is to identify a process, procedure, or product into which a series of changes or improvements are to be incorporated. Describe the current process, procedure or product as carefully as possible as regards its current effectiveness and efficiency. Establish a date for this baseline of the existing system. Step 2 is to introduce the changes or improvements into the process, procedure or product. Step 3 is to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the changed system, at some future date. The appendix presents a review of Defense Acquisition Pilot Programs (DAPPs).
In 2006, the cumulative cost growth in DoD¿s portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs was $296 billion and the average delay in delivering promised capabilities to the warfighter was 22 months. These are very poor outcomes. The auditor has used metrics to review the mgmt. and health of these programs from within the framework of best practices. This testimony discusses: (1) ¿knowledge metrics,¿ used to determine how well programs manage tech., design, and manufacturing risks; (2) outcome metrics -- concerning cost, schedule, and capability -- that serve as ¿health indicators¿ of how well programs are being executed in terms of predicted outcomes; and (3) the prerequisites that must be met in order for a program¿s plans and goals to be realistic.
All major weapon system programs establish a program baseline early in the acquistion cycle which sets forth cost, schedule, and performance targets. If the thresholds are exceeded, a review and assessment procedure is initiated in an attempt to understand why the threshold was "breached" and how the program can be brought back on track. This research develops an analytic tool to compare historical trends in the number, duration, and factors affecting breaches and studies the relationship between program acquisition life-cycles and the factors affecting deviations from program baselines.
Includes observations on the performance of DoD's 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs; and observations on the implementation of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, the auditor analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data and collected data from program offices on performance requirements and software development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the implementation of DoD's acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. He also compiled assessments of 71 weapon programs. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.
"This ninth edition of Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management includes revisions to the regulatory framework for Defense systems acquisition management from the December 2008 Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 and includes policy for determining requirements for defense systems from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 3170 series, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. This publication is designed to be both an introduction to the world of defense systems acquisition management for the newcomer and a summary-level refresher for the practitioner who has been away from the business for a few years. It focuses on Department of Defense-wide management policies and procedures, not on the details of any specific defense system."--Publisher's website.
Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. Pages: 30. Chapters: Acquisition Program Baseline, Concept Development and Experimentation, Defense Acquisition Guide, Defense Acquisition University, Department of Defense Whistleblower Program, Electronic Defense Laboratories, Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, Joint Planning Document, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, National Military Strategy (United States), Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, Office of Defense Mobilization, Prompt Global Strike, Randy T. Fowler, RiskAoA, The Standard Procurement System, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, United States Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. Excerpt: The Department of Defense Whistleblower Program enables, in part, the federal mission of protecting whistleblowers by committing the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Defense to whistleblower protection and the training of DoD personnel on their whistleblower rights. It also administers the Defense Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Program (DICWP), as a sub-mission. The Inspector General's Defense Criminal Investigative Service also conducts criminal investigations which rely, in part, on Qui Tam relators. Whistleblowers disclose acts of illegality, fraud, waste and abuse. This can prevent government failure in the future. But whistleblowers can then be targeted for retailiation, "smeared as traitors, turncoats and liars by their superiors and suffer harassmenet, punishment or firing." The Department of Defense Whistleblower Program is increasingly focused on disclosures which will aid in resolving the United States' national security threat due to fiscal failure: In 2009, the Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense targeted the Whistleblower Protection Program as a top priority. For more than 20 years, the DoD...