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This study examines the pre- and post-September 11, 2001 mission, responsibilities, and duties of the U.S. Border Patrol in order to determine the applicability of collective bargaining exemption. These factors are analyzed in the context of specific criteria identified in the legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security. The conclusions are then weighed with respect to other entities, including Department of Defense entities, that have been granted collective bargaining exemptions to determine the potential impacts. The inclusion of the U.S. federal workforce into the realm of collective bargaining is a relatively recent occurrence. This happened during the 1960s when President John F. Kennedy issued Presidential Executive Order 10988 granting union rights to federal employees. Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter expanded union rights for federal employees. These expansions led to the enactment of the Civil Services Reform Act of 1978. Soon after, however, President Carter issued Presidential Executive Order 12171 that provided exemptions to collective bargaining for specific departments, organizations and offices. The common characteristic of these entities and thus the reason for their exemption was their national security mission. President Carter's executive order reflected a view that the consequences of failing to accomplish the mission of national security were more important than any benefit attained through collective bargaining. Several future presidents shared this belief and made nine amendments to President Carter's original Executive Order, adding additional entities they deemed should also be exempt from collective bargaining. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks resulted in the creation, via the Homeland Security Act of 2002, of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-a merger of several existing law enforcement, inspection, and intelligence organizations and the creation of some new entities-with a specific mission of safeguarding the United States from future attack. One new agency created within DHS was Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP consolidated several entities and changed their respective primary missions from enforcement and inspection to national security. The adoption of a national security mission for the entities within DHS should have been accompanied by a requisite collective bargaining exemption extended to others with a similar mission. This, however, did not occur. This inconsistency demands an answer to the following questions. Considering its current national security mission, should the U.S. Border Patrol, an office within DHS, be exempt from collective bargaining? What are the conditions that must be met in order to qualify for exemption? Have these criteria been met considering the pre- and post-September 11 mission and responsibilities of the U.S. Border Patrol?
Congress considers collective bargaining policies that would empower unions at the expense of national security.
On August 24-25, 2010, the National Defense University held a conference titled “Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?” to explore the economic element of national power. This special collection of selected papers from the conference represents the view of several keynote speakers and participants in six panel discussions. It explores the complexity surrounding this subject and examines the major elements that, interacting as a system, define the economic component of national security.
The U.S. national security decision-making system is a product of the Cold War. Formed in 1947 with the National Security Council, it developed around the demands of competing with and containing the USSR. But the world after the collapse of communism and, particularly, the tragedy of September 11, is vastly different. A threatening but familiar enemy has given way to a complex environment of more diverse and less predictable threats. As the creation of the Homeland Security Council and Office of Homeland Security indicate, the United States must now reevaluate standard national security processes for this more uncertain world.In this timely book, William W. Newmann examines the way presidents manage their advisory process for national security decision making and the way that process evolves over the course of an administration's term. Three detailed case studies show how the president and his senior advisors managed arms control and nuclear strategy during the first terms of the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush presidencies. These studies, enhanced by interviews with key members of the national security teams, including James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, reveal significant patterns of structure and adaptation. They provide a window to how decision making in the modern White House really works, at a moment when national security decisions are again at the top of the agenda.Specifically, Newmann investigates this pattern. Each president begins his administration with a standard National Security Councilÿbased interagency process, which he then streamlines toward a reliance on senior officials working in small groups, and a confidence structure of a few key advisors. Newmann examines the institutional pressures that push administrations in this direction, as he also weighs the impact of the leadership styles of the presidents themselves. In so doing, he reaches the conclusion that decision making can be an audition process through which presidents discover which advisors they trust. And the most successful process is one that balances formal, informal, and confidence sources to maintain full discussion of diverse opinions, while settling those debates informally at the senior-most levels.Unlike previous studies, Managing National Security Policy views decision making as dynamic, rather than as a static system inaugurated at the beginning of a president's term. The key to understanding the decision-making process rests upon the study of the evolving relationships between the president and his senior advisors. Awareness of this evolution paints a complex portrait of policy making, which may help future presidents design national security decision structures that fit the realities of the office in today's world.
This paper evaluates the hypothesis that exercise of collective bargaining rights by federal employees prevents effective functioning of the federal government and endangers our national security. It argues that federal workers engaging in collective bargaining do not endanger the national security. It discusses the history of federal sector collective bargaining, its successes and shortcomings and demonstrates that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), which provides the statutory basis for federal sector collective bargaining, adequately protects the right of agencies to do what is necessary to carry out their missions and does not hamper the effective execution of government business. It begins by examining of the nature of collective bargaining and the appropriateness of providing bargaining rights to federal workers. It next examines the legal history of federal sector bargaining culminating with passage of Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. It analyzes those sections of Title VII that give federal agencies the requisite flexibility needed to accomplish their missions. It examines the practical, real-world impact of collective bargaining on employee-management relations in the federal sector and shows that the objectives of Title VII have largely not been realized. It focuses on how the limited nature of bargaining in the federal sector has resulted in a system where minor issues become contentious and, with no pressure on either side to settle, drag on for years. It discusses how this problem is the cause of much of the hostility towards federal employee unions and collective bargaining and creates a mindset that sees them as obstructionist organizations that hamper the government's ability to carry out its esential functions and threaten national security.

Critical Mission

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 198


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