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We examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. We find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political/regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, we find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. They find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political and regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, the authors find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of bank supervision and regulation.
This book gives an overview of the most important theories on Corporate Governance, investigating the myth and the reality of it. It argues that within the banking sector exist two new agency costs (i.e., bank depositors and shareholders vs. directors and bank depositors vs. shareholders and directors). These agency problems are difficult to reduce for two reasons. First, banks are complex and opaque. Second, government implicit guarantees and the deposit insurance systems reduce the monitoring of depositors. This book also takes a deep dive into research on CG in the banking sector via a unique and innovative literature review covering the time period between 2000-2020. It finds that some specific CG characteristics affect banks: risk appetite, performance, accounting quality, compensation and corporate social responsibility disclosure. Furthermore, this publication contends that institutional investors are changing CG for the better, describing how major financial markets factors such as rating agencies and sell-side financial analysts make CG visible. Additionally, it investigates how managerial biases and irrational investors can affect CG negatively, leading to company distress. All-in-all, this book makes a threefold contribution: for regulators, it offers suggestions on how to improve banks’ supervision; for researchers, it suggests new research topics; and for practitioners, it connects CG theory with real cases of CG failure.
"Which commercial bank supervisory policies ease or intensify the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance? Based on new data from more than 2,500 firms across 37 countries, this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms' financing obstacles. We find that the traditional approach to bank supervision, which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to directly monitor, discipline, and influence banks, does not improve the integrity of bank lending. Rather, we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance. In extensions, we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions"--NBER website
Improving Banking Supervision shows how greater market discipline can be used to help improve the quality of banks and their management in a world of increasing complexity, size and innovation. The book is based on research undertaken in the Nordic countries and New Zealand, and set in an international context through reference and comparison to the experiences of banks throughout the EU and the US. The authors show how traditional methods of regulation, particularly across borders face limits and can impose substantial costs on customers. They propose alternatives for today's international banks, based on a network of incentives to prudential behaviour and focusing on three main issues: - the development of transparent corporate structures - the public disclosure of comparable meaningful information so that markets can assess banks - the implementation of effective means to allow banks to exit without unacceptable costs to society
The aim of this book is to bring academic work on contemporary issues in financial institutions and markets. The general theme is designed to allow for a wide range of topics covering the diverse nature of academic research in banking and finance. As a consequence the contributions cover a wide range of issues across a broad spectrum, including: bank business models, bank competition and stability, credit card pricing and risk; bank supervision; and international investments. This book was originally published as a special issue of The European Journal of Finance.