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Written by IMF's Legal Department, this book outlines the key issues involved in designing and implementing orderly and effective insolvency procedures, which play a critical role in fostering growth and competitiveness and may also assist in the prevention and resolution of financial crises. The book draws on lessons learned from firsthand experience by some of the IMF's 182 member countries. It includes an analysis of the major policy choices that countries need to address when designing an insolvency system, a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these choices, and a number of specific recommendations.
The understanding of the economic and legal structure of the institutions of bankruptcy has increased considerably over the past decade. This publication describes the state of current knowledge. Containing both theoretical studies and evidence from recent case studies, it shows the possibilities and methods of legal reform and the pitfalls of misguided political action.
This book contains 21 papers focusing on a wide range of issues concerning financial sector transition in the countries of Europe and Central Asia (ECA). It places the transition economies in the context of recent and prospective developments in global financial markets. This book also evaluates the experience of the last 10 years and reviews the progress from a command financial system to a market-based one, identifying some of the key characteristics of the financial transition.
Seventeen in a series of annual reports comparing business regulation in 190 economies, Doing Business 2020 measures aspects of regulation affecting 10 areas of everyday business activity.
We propose a new bankruptcy procedure. Initially, a firm's debts are cancelled, and cash and non-cash bids are solicited for the 'new" (all-equity) firm. Former claimants are given shares, or options to buy shares, in the new firm on the basis of absolute priority. Options are exercised once the bids are in. Finally, a shareholder vote is taken to select one of the bids. In essence, our procedure is a variant on the U.S. Chapter 7, in which non-cash bids are possible; this allows for reorganization. We believe our scheme is superior to Chapter 11 since it is simpler, quicker, market-based, avoids conflicts, and places appropriate discipline on management.
June 1995 The motivation for most of the reforms debated in transition economies is to impose market-based constraints on enterprise managers, whether through competition or through direct corporate governance. Baer and Gray explore debt's role as a control device in such economies, focusing on Hungary and Poland. The basic economic challenge in the transition from socialism to capitalism is creating incentive structures and institutions that promote enterprise change and restructuring. This is the motivation for most of the reforms debated during the transition--whether privatization, demonopolization, trade reform, or financial sector reform. Most research on corporate governance and privatization has focused on the role of owners--whether on the problems inherent in the separation of ownership and management (most Western literature) or on the need for true owners who represents the interests of capital (most literature on transition economies). But debt is also an important control device, as Western literature on corporate finance increasingly recognizes. Baer and Gray explore debt's role as a control device in transition economies, focusing especially on Hungary and Poland, which are relatively far along in the reform process. They ask, first, in what ways creditors exert control over firms in advanced market economies and how such control interacts with that exerted by equity holders. They then ask whether creditors in Central and Eastern European countries play similar roles and, if not, what roles they should play, and what can be done to give them the capacity and incentives to play those roles. They focus on three fundamental requirements for debt to function as a control device: information, proper incentives for creditors (including banks, suppliers, and government), and an efficient legal framework for debt collection (including collateral, workout, and bankruptcy regimes). While both countries are making progress in all three areas, there is still much to be done. Hungary and Poland illustrate only two of many approaches. Other transitional economies, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Russia, are following different approaches that should be explored in future analysis. This paper--a joint product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Department and the Transition Economics Division, Policy Research Department--is part of a larger effort in the Bank to explore issues of corporate governance in transition economies.
The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.