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We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy.
Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than the other? This text argues that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic, and suggests that a more nuanced approach is necessary.
This paper is an empirical analysis of competitiveness in the banking system of four out of the five East African Community (EAC) countries2. The results show that the degree of competition is low due to a combination of structural and socio-economic factors. By way of preview, the analysis ranks the countries in terms of banking sector competitiveness in the following order: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.
A distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks Does too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies. Xavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies. Focusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.
In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.
The third edition of a leading text on the microeconomic foundations of banking, comprehensively updated with new coverage of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, fintech, and the latest research in banking theory. The banking industry has undergone seismic change in the twenty-first century, from the overhaul of regulation in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis to the digitalization of the economy and the disruption of traditional business models by ascendant tech giants. Now in a comprehensively updated third edition, this essential graduate-level text on the microeconomic foundations of banking provides the rigorous theoretical approach required to understand these new structures and norms, functioning as a user’s guide to recent academic literature. Microeconomics of Banking offers a comprehensive view of the evolution of banking theory and the rapidly changing realm of financial intermediation, examining the central issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled. New edition highlights: Up-to-date coverage of the latest research in banking theory as well as the events of the global financial crisis and resultant Basel III regulatory framework New chapters on liquidity and systemic risk New material throughout on cryptocurrencies, fintech, and other facets of a digitalized economy
Incisive, authoritative and thoughtful, this important and timely collection of papers exploring the unresolved issues left by the recent global financial turmoil, will undoubtedly shape the policy responses to come. Interdisciplinary in approach and wide-ranging in jurisdictional scope, it draws together influential commentators, practitioners and regulators, to create a new milestone in the search for the fundamentals of a more stable global financial system.? - Eva Lomnicka, King?s College London, UK ?This book contains a large number of chapters, nearly 30 in all, by acknowledged experts on various aspects of the recent financial crisis. Whichever aspect of this crisis that may interest you, such as bank taxes, deposit insurance, TBTF and how to respond, cross-border issues, and many, many others, you will find chapters that are both authoritative and stimulating in this collection. The editors are to be congratulated not only in their selection of authors but also in the speed with which they have taken them from conference presentation to book chapter.? - Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics, UK Managing Risk in the Financial System makes important and timely contributions to our knowledge and understanding of banking law, financial institution restructuring and related considerations, through the production of an innovative, international and interdisciplinary set of contributions which link law and policy issues surrounding systemic risk and crisis management. The recent financial crisis has exposed both the banking industry and financial system safety net players in many countries to a considerable level of distress as well as economic and reputational damage. These circumstances have heightened the need for policymakers to consider remedial measures under a broad umbrella that encompass inter alia prompt corrective actions, early closure of distressed entities, deposit insurance, bail-outs, state-aid, bank resolution and restructuring techniques. These essays provide an important contribution to research in this area, at a crucial time in the debate around the future financial industry. Contributors