Download Free Bank Capital And Lending An Extended Framework And Evidence Of Nonlinearity Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Bank Capital And Lending An Extended Framework And Evidence Of Nonlinearity and write the review.

This paper studies the transmission of bank capital shocks to loan supply in Indonesia. A series of theoretically founded dynamic panel data models are estimated and find nonlinear effects of capital on loan growth: the response of weaker banks to changes in their capital positions is larger than that of stronger banks. This non-linearity implies that not only the level of capital but also its distribution across banks in the financial system affects the transmission of shocks to aggregate lending. Likewise, the effects of bank recapitalization on loan growth depend on banks’ starting capital positions and the size of capital injections.
The monograph presents a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European banking, both at a macro and a micro level. It analyses the impact of the pandemic on bank stability, performance and credit policies, as well as their strategic adjustments to the challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. The initial chapters analyze the various governmental responses to the pandemic. Topics of discussion include the scale and scope of the wide range of public policies undertaken to mitigate the consequences of the crisis, and their efficiency in limiting the negative impact of the pandemic on the economy. The results suggest that the extensive public interventions have been largely successful in averting the possible disastrous consequences for the financial sector on a macro level. On a micro level, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the restructuring and recovery of the banking industry started after the 2008 crisis which has had a significant impact on economies around the world, arguably leading to a negative long-lasting effect on sustainable development. To examine this, the book focuses on the impact of the pandemic on bank lending policies, bank stability and performance, and on competitive position of the banks vis a vis the FinTech sector. Offering a thorough overview of the issues that banks will have to face as a consequence of pandemic related macroeconomic and industry adjustments, the book will be of interest to scholars, researchers and students of banking and finance as well as banking specialists concerned with the impact of crises on financial markets, risks and resilience.
The effect of bank capital on lending is a critical determinant of the linkage between financial conditions and real activity, and has received especial attention in the recent financial crisis. The authors use panel-regression techniques to study the lending of large bank holding companies (BHCs) and find small effects of capital on lending. They then consider the effect of capital ratios on lending using a variant of Lown and Morgan's VAR model, and again find modest effects of bank capital ratio changes on lending. The authors¿ estimated models are then used to understand recent developments in bank lending and, in particular, to consider the role of TARP-related capital injections in affecting these developments. Illus. A print on demand pub.
We study bank portfolio allocations during the transition of the real sector to a knowledge economy in which firms use less tangible capital and invest more in intangible assets. We show that, as firms shift toward intangible assets that have lower collateral values, banks reallocate their portfolios away from commercial loans toward other assets, primarily residential real estate loans and liquid assets. This effect is more pronounced for large and less well capitalized banks and is robust to controlling for real estate loan demand. Our results suggest that increased firm investment in intangible assets can explain up to 20% of bank portfolio reallocation from commercial to residential lending over the last four decades.
This paper presents new evidence on the empirical relationship between bank solvency and funding costs. Building on a newly constructed dataset drawing on supervisory data for 54 large banks from six advanced countries over 2004–2013, we use a simultaneous equation approach to estimate the contemporaneous interaction between solvency and liquidity. Our results show that liquidity and solvency interactions can be more material than suggested by the existing empirical literature. A 100 bps increase in regulatory capital ratios is associated with a decrease of bank funding costs of about 105 bps. A 100 bps increase in funding costs reduces regulatory capital buffers by 32 bps. We also find evidence of non-linear effects between solvency and funding costs. Understanding the impact of solvency on funding costs is particularly relevant for stress testing. Our analysis suggests that neglecting the dynamic features of the solvency-liquidity nexus in the 2014 EU-wide stress test could have led to a significant underestimation of the impact of stress on bank capital ratios.
In the presence of adverse macroeconomic shocks, simultaneous capital losses in multiple banks can prompt them to contract their balance sheets. These bank responses generate externalities that propagate in the form of macro-financial feedback loops. This paper develops a credit response and externalities analysis model (CREAM) that integrates a disaggregated banking sector into an otherwise standard macroeconomic structural vector autoregressive model. It shows that accounting for macro-financial feedback loops can significantly affect macroeconomic outcomes and bank-specific stress tests results. The heterogeneity in bank lending responses matters: it determines how each bank fares under adverse conditions and the external effects that banks impose on each other and on economic activity. The model can thus be used to assess the contributions of individual banks to systemic risk along the time dimension.
This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.
The appropriate level of bank capital and, more generally, a bank’s capacity to absorb losses, has been at the core of the post-crisis policy debate. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on how much capital would have been needed to avoid imposing losses on bank creditors or resorting to public recapitalizations of banks in past banking crises. The paper also looks at the welfare costs of tighter capital regulation by reviewing the evidence on its potential impact on bank credit and lending rates. Its findings broadly support the range of loss absorbency suggested by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee for systemically important banks.
We study how investors account for the riskiness of banks' risk-weighted assets (RWA) by examining the determinants of stock returns and market measures of risk. We find that banks with higher RWA had lower stock returns over the US and European crises. This relationship is weaker in Europe where banks can use Basel II internal risk models. For large banks, investors paid less attention to RWA and rewarded instead lower wholesale funding and better asset quality. RWA do not, in general, predict market measures of risk although there is evidence of a positive relationship before the US crisis which becomes negative afterwards.