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Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.
With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.
This book is devoted to one of the central issues in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations—ballistic missile defense. Drawing on more than 2,000 primary sources, interviews with Russian and NATO officials, and a variety of Russian and Western publications, this book offers an unparalleled, in-depth analysis of the reasons behind Russia’s policy towards the construction of a U.S ballistic missile defense in Europe. It provides a critical assessment of the decision-making mechanisms that shape Russia’s position on ballistic missile defense, as well as Russia’s strategic relations with the United States and Russia’s interaction with European and non-European powers. Lilly argues that contrary to Moscow’s official claims during the Putin era, Russian objections to the construction of ballistic missile defense in Europe have not been wholly dictated by security concerns. To Russia, missile defense is not purely an issue in and of itself, but rather a symbol and instrument of broader political considerations. At the international level, the factors that have shaped Russia’s response include Moscow’s perception of the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations, the Kremlin’s capacity to project influence and power abroad, and NATO’s behavior in the post-Soviet space. Domestically, the issue of missile defense has been a facilitating instrument for strengthening Putin’s regime and justifying military modernization. Taken together, these instrumental considerations and their fluctuating intensity in different periods prompt the Russian leadership to pursue contradictory policy approaches simultaneously. On the one hand, the Kremlin seeks U.S. cooperation, while on the other hand, it threatens retaliation and reinforces Russian offensive capabilities. The result is Moscow’s incoherence, inconsistency, and double-speak over the issue of missile defense.
"[Seize the high ground is a] narrative history of the Army's aerospace experience from the 1950s to the present. The focus is on ballistic missile defense, from the early NIKE-HERCULES missile program through the SAFEGUARD acquisition site allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty to the more advanced 'Star Wars' concepts studies toward the end of the century. [What is] covered is not only the technological response to the threat but the organizational and tactical development of the commands and units responsible for the defense mission"--CMH website.
With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.
Traces and analyzes the complex and often contradictory forces that led to a popular belief in the United States that the Soviet Union possessed a commanding superiority over the United States in ballistic missiles during the period 1958-1961.
The authors assess alternatives for a next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) across a broad set of potential characteristics and situations. They use the current Minuteman III as a baseline to develop a framework to characterize alternative classes of ICBMs, assess the survivability and effectiveness of possible alternatives, and weigh those alternatives against their cost.
“This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new introduction to the work shows how Schelling’s framework—conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction—still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.