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Intro -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1. Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers -- 2. "Progress" and the Presidency -- 3. The Age of the Heroic Presidency -- 4. Hero Takes a Fall -- 5. Superman Returns -- 6. War President -- 7. Omnipotence and Impotence -- 8. Why the Worst Get on Top ... and Get Worse -- 9. Toward Normalcy -- Afterword: Our Continuing Cult of the Presidency -- Notes -- About the Author -- Cato Institute
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Charlie Savage's penetrating investigation of the Obama presidency and the national security state. Barack Obama campaigned on changing George W. Bush's "global war on terror" but ended up entrenching extraordinary executive powers, from warrantless surveillance and indefinite detention to military commissions and targeted killings. Then Obama found himself bequeathing those authorities to Donald Trump. How did the United States get here? In Power Wars, Charlie Savage reveals high-level national security legal and policy deliberations in a way no one has done before. He tells inside stories of how Obama came to order the drone killing of an American citizen, preside over an unprecendented crackdown on leaks, and keep a then-secret program that logged every American's phone calls. Encompassing the first comprehensive history of NSA surveillance over the past forty years as well as new information about the Osama bin Laden raid, Power Wars equips readers to understand the legacy of Bush's and Obama's post-9/11 presidencies in the Trump era.
Nearly 1.9 million U.S. troops have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq since October 2001. Many service members and veterans face serious challenges in readjusting to normal life after returning home. This initial book presents findings on the most critical challenges, and lays out the blueprint for the second phase of the study to determine how best to meet the needs of returning troops and their families.
In this paper, Michael Schmitt explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the "jus ad bellum," that component of international law that governs when a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy. Although States have conducted military counterterrorist operations in the past, the scale and scope of Operation Enduring Freedom may signal a sea change in strategies to defend against terrorism. This paper explores the normative limit on counterterrorist operations. Specifically, under what circumstances can a victim State react forcibly to an act of terrorism? Against whom? When? With what degree of severity? And for how long? The author contends that the attacks against Al Qaeda were legitimate exercises of the rights of individual and collective defense. They were necessary and proportional, and once the Taliban refused to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands to turn over the terrorists located in Afghanistan, it was legally appropriate for coalition forces to enter the country for the purpose of ending the ongoing Al Qaeda terrorist campaign. However, the attacks on the Taliban were less well grounded in traditional understandings of international law. Although the Taliban were clearly in violation of their legal obligation not to allow their territory to be used as a terrorist sanctuary, the author suggests that the degree and nature of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda may not have been such that the September 11 attacks could be attributed to the Taliban, thereby disallowing strikes against them in self-defense under traditional understandings of international law. Were the attacks, therefore, illegal? Not necessarily. Over the past half-century the international community's understanding of the international law governing the use of force by States has been continuously evolving. The author presents criteria likely to drive future assessments of the legality of counterterrorist operatio7.
Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, the Bush administration has come under fire for its methods of combating terrorism. Waging war against al Qaeda has proven to be a legal quagmire, with critics claiming that the administration's response in Afghanistan and Iraq is unconstitutional. The war on terror—and, in a larger sense, the administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto accords—has many wondering whether the constitutional framework for making foreign affairs decisions has been discarded by the present administration. John Yoo, formerly a lawyer in the Department of Justice, here makes the case for a completely new approach to understanding what the Constitution says about foreign affairs, particularly the powers of war and peace. Looking to American history, Yoo points out that from Truman and Korea to Clinton's intervention in Kosovo, American presidents have had to act decisively on the world stage without a declaration of war. They are able to do so, Yoo argues, because the Constitution grants the president, Congress, and the courts very different powers, requiring them to negotiate the country's foreign policy. Yoo roots his controversial analysis in a brilliant reconstruction of the original understanding of the foreign affairs power and supplements it with arguments based on constitutional text, structure, and history. Accessibly blending historical arguments with current policy debates, The Powers of War and Peace will no doubt be hotly debated. And while the questions it addresses are as old and fundamental as the Constitution itself, America's response to the September 11 attacks has renewed them with even greater force and urgency. “Can the president of the United States do whatever he likes in wartime without oversight from Congress or the courts? This year, the issue came to a head as the Bush administration struggled to maintain its aggressive approach to the detention and interrogation of suspected enemy combatants in the war on terrorism. But this was also the year that the administration’s claims about presidential supremacy received their most sustained intellectual defense [in] The Powers of War and Peace.”—Jeffrey Rosen, New York Times “Yoo’s theory promotes frank discussion of the national interest and makes it harder for politicians to parade policy conflicts as constitutional crises. Most important, Yoo’s approach offers a way to renew our political system’s democratic vigor.”—David B. Rivkin Jr. and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, National Review
This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014 and the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines through training and equipping Philippine security forces, providing operational advice and assistance, and conducting civil–military and information operations.
The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.
Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.