Download Free Authority Cooperation And Accountability Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Authority Cooperation And Accountability and write the review.

How should we decide a single employee's accountability in a corporation that commits egregious wrongs? What about a single solider fighting in an unjust war? Or a single participant in a lynching? We need a way to make sense of individual moral accountability in cases where multiple individuals are cooperating in a way that results in a wrongful harm. Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability develops a novel strategy for addressing this issue. Saba Bazargan-Forward makes the case for thinking that distinct aspects of human agency, normally wrapped up in a single person, can be 'distributed' practically across different people. He argues that we 'distribute' agency routinely, by forming promises, by making requests, by issuing demands, and by undertaking shared action. The resulting division of agential labour makes possible a distinctive way in which one person can be accountable for the actions of another. Bazargan-Forward highlights that what matters morally is not just our causal contributions to wrongful cooperative activity. In addition, the purposes we confer upon one another can inculpate us as well. The result is an account that can help us make sense of individual moral accountability in a bureaucratized world.
We need a way to make sense of moral accountability in cases where multiple individuals are cooperating in a way that results in a wrongful harm. Saba Bazargan-Forward argues that distinct aspects of human agency can be 'distributed' among different people. He presents case studies of accountability in war, law, business, and racism.
How should we decide a single employee's accountability in a corporation that commits egregious wrongs? What about a single solider fighting in an unjust war? Or a single participant in a lynching? We need a way to make sense of individual moral accountability in cases where multiple individuals are cooperating in a way that results in a wrongful harm. Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability develops a novel strategy for addressing this issue. Saba Bazargan-Forward makes the case for thinking that distinct aspects of human agency, normally wrapped up in a single person, can be 'distributed' practically across different people. He argues that we 'distribute' agency routinely, by forming promises, by making requests, by issuing demands, and by undertaking shared action. The resulting division of agential labour makes possible a distinctive way in which one person can be accountable for the actions of another. Bazargan-Forward highlights that what matters morally is not just our causal contributions to wrongful cooperative activity. In addition, the purposes we confer upon one another can inculpate us as well. The result is an account that can help us make sense of individual moral accountability in a bureaucratized world.
This book examines how international intelligence cooperation has come to prominence post-9/11 and introduces the main accountability, legal and human rights challenges that it poses. Since the end of the Cold War, the threats that intelligence services are tasked with confronting have become increasingly transnational in nature – organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The growth of these threats has impelled intelligence services to cooperate with contemporaries in other states to meet these challenges. While cooperation between certain Western states in some areas of intelligence operations (such as signals intelligence) is longstanding, since 9/11 there has been an exponential increase in both their scope and scale. This edited volume explores not only the challenges to accountability presented by international intelligence cooperation but also possible solutions for strengthening accountability for activities that are likely to remain fundamental to the work of intelligence services. The book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, international law, global governance and IR in general.
The authority to make decisions is often bundled with accountability. Decision makers are often made accountable for failures. We propose an incomplete-contract approach to investigate four systems of accountability: no accountability, personal accountability, collective accountability, and reverse accountability. We consider an organization defined by three assignments: assignments of income, authority and accountability. These assignments are endogenously and jointly determined in equilibrium. This setup allows us to investigate whether and when authority and accountability are bundled in equilibrium. Our main findings are: (1) authority and accountability are usually, but not always, bundled in equilibrium; (2) personal and collective accountability systems are equally efficient; (3) it can be optimal to have no accountability, but only if the authorities are incapable; it is always optimal to impose accountability on capable authorities; (4) authority tends to be assigned to persons whose marginal costs of control are relatively small; and (5) reverse accountability is generally inferior to normal accountability; reverse accountability can be optimal only if everyone's marginal cost of control is sufficiently large.
There is growing recognition of the need for new approaches to the ways in which donors support accountability, but no broad agreement on what changed practice looks like. This publication aims to provide more clarity on the emerging practice.
"World Rule is essential reading for scholars, managers, and policy makers interested in the rules that underpin the global economy. Koppell authoritatively and convincingly explains the origins of the dense network of global rules and elucidates their effects on both markets and practices; his theoretical insights into the politics of organizations are profound." Rawi Abdelal, Harvard Business School.
An increasing number of fora and networks have been recognised to play a role in international or transnational normative processes. While lawmaking by formal, intergovernmental international organizations received abundant attention over the past years, we know less about a phenomenon that this paper refers to as 'informal international lawmaking' (IN-LAW). Lawyers struggle with the new and extensive normative output in global governance. We nevertheless use the term 'law' to connote the exercise of public authority, as opposed to what is often referred to more broadly as 'regulation' (covering both public and private regulation). IN-LAW, as we define it, can include private actor participation, but excludes cooperation that only involves private actors. The present paper thus purports to introduce the concept of 'informal international lawmaking' and it will present some findings based on case studies in the IN-LAW project related to the reasons for actors to opt for informal lawmaking. We also analyse whether - and to what extent - IN-LAW bodies are subject to some form of accountability and, if so, in what form and at what level. Finally, we will look at some consequences of informal international lawmaking, in particular in relation to the changing role of law in global governance.