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In Authoritarian Containment, Marie-Eve Reny examines why local public security bureaus tolerate unregistered Protestant churches in urban China--an officially atheist country where religious practice is controlled by the state--when the central government considers them illegal. She argues that local states tolerate these churches to contain the underground practice of Protestantism. Containment necessitates a bargain between informal religious organizations and the state. Even though they are not regulated, unregistered churches are allowed to operate conditionally, so long as church leaders keep a low profile, share information as needed with local authorities, and agree that the state will not grant them formal institutional recognition. Reny also considers authoritarian regimes other than China that employ a similar strategy to control informal religious communities. She focuses on two Middle East cases-President Sadat's control of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1970s Egypt and the Jordanian monarchy's containment of jihadi Salafists after 2006. By reducing the incentives for local religious leaders to politicize and inducing such leaders to willingly provide inside information, governments can avoid the heavy hand of coercion and forceful co-optation. Based on extensive fieldwork, Authoritarian Containment offers insight into the way authoritarian regimes neutralize underground religious leaders and discourage opposition to the state.
The democratization of a national government is only a first step in diffusing democracy throughout a country's territory. Even after a national government is democratized, subnational authoritarian 'enclaves' often continue to deny rights to citizens of local jurisdictions. Gibson offers new theoretical perspectives for the study of democratization in his exploration of this phenomenon. His theory of 'boundary control' captures the conflict pattern between incumbents and oppositions when a national democratic government exists alongside authoritarian provinces (or 'states'). He also reveals how federalism and the territorial organization of countries shape how subnational authoritarian regimes are built and how they unravel. Through a novel comparison of the late nineteenth-century American 'Solid South' with contemporary experiences in Argentina and Mexico, Gibson reveals that the mechanisms of boundary control are reproduced across countries and historical periods. As long as subnational authoritarian governments coexist with national democratic governments, boundary control will be at play.
With democracy in decline, authoritarian governments are staging a comeback around the world. Over the past decade, illiberal powers have become emboldened and gained influence within the global arena. Leading authoritarian countries—including China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—have developed new tools and strategies to contain the spread of democracy and challenge the liberal international political order. Meanwhile, the advanced democracies have retreated, failing to respond to the threat posed by the authoritarians. As undemocratic regimes become more assertive, they are working together to repress civil society while tightening their grip on cyberspace and expanding their reach in international media. These political changes have fostered the emergence of new counternorms—such as the authoritarian subversion of credible election monitoring—that threaten to further erode the global standing of liberal democracy. In Authoritarianism Goes Global, a distinguished group of contributors present fresh insights on the complicated issues surrounding the authoritarian resurgence and the implications of these systemic shifts for the international order. This collection of essays is critical for advancing our understanding of the emerging challenges to democratic development. Contributors: Anne Applebaum, Anne-Marie Brady, Alexander Cooley, Javier Corrales, Ron Deibert, Larry Diamond, Patrick Merloe, Abbas Milani, Andrew Nathan, Marc F. Plattner, Peter Pomerantsev, Douglas Rutzen, Lilia Shevtsova, Alex Vatanka, Christopher Walker, and Frederic Wehrey
What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
Lowenthal, founding director of the Latin American Program, who wrote the original volume's foreword.
Why are some authoritarian regimes highly competitive and others highly unified? Do they function differently? And what does it mean for our understanding of democracy and democratization? In The Social Roots of Authoritarianism, Natalia Forrat describes two models of authoritarianism: the first in which people see the state as their team leader and the other where they trust informal (non-state) leaders and see the state as a source of perks or punishment. Depending on which vision of the state is dominant in society, she argues that autocrats must use different tools to consolidate their regimes or risk a pushback. If people view the state as their team leader, autocrats rely on social conformity and teamwork logic. If people view the state as an outsider, autocrats rely on clientelist bargains and utility maximization logic. Unpacking the grassroot mechanisms maintaining unity-based and division-based authoritarianisms further, Forrat compares the structures of political machines in four Russian regions. She finds that the two regions with centralized organizational structures bound by social solidarity and team logic delivered predictable, stable results across multiple elections. But the other two regions that relied on decentralized structures with multiple levels of brokers acting independently of each other were less effective in delivering stable results. Carefully crafted and sophisticated, Forrat's theory of authoritarian power sheds new light on state-society relations in Russia. But it is also broadly applicable beyond Russia and helps explain the divergent patterns of regime maintenance strategies in authoritarian countries throughout the world.
To shed light on the global reassertion of authoritarianism in recent years, this volume analyses transnational diffusion and international cooperation among non-democratic regimes. How and with what effect do authoritarian regimes learn from each other? For what purpose and how successfully do they cooperate? The volume highlights that present-day autocrats pursue mainly pragmatic interests, rather than ideological missions. Consequently, the connections among authoritarian regimes have primarily defensive purposes, especially insulation against democracy promotion by the West. As a result, the authors do not foresee a major recession of democracy, as occurred with the rise of fascism during the interwar years. The chapters in this book were originally published in a special issue of Democratization.