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As in other Asia-Pacific countries, boosting trade with China has provided a growth engine for Australia's economy. Australia shared concerns over security threats posed by China's military expansion, but up until the mid-2010s hard balancing against China did not seem to be an option for Australia. Australia's recent moves against China, however, signal that Canberra has reset its China policy, with an overhaul of its national security and defense strategy. The shift of Australia's China policy is an interesting case to explore how the regional order is likely to evolve in the growing US-China competition. Assessing Australia's recent foreign policy is also relevant to Korea, both in terms of navigating Korea's relations with the US and China and enhancing strategic ties between Australia and Korea. Against this backdrop, this study unravels Australia's strategic responses to the changing regional order and draw implications for Korea's foreign policy.
Following the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Global Financial Crisis, China's foreign policy shifted to become more assertive, effecting a systematic deterioration in the US-China relationship. In 2017, the US' China policy shifted from that of 'engagement' to 'strategic competition' under Trump — a policy which has remained under the Biden administration.Indo-Pacific Security: US-China Rivalry and Regional States' Responses explores how states in the Indo-Pacific region have had to adjust to the reality and implications of this growing great power rivalry. In the process, this book fills a gap in the area studies, international relations, and security studies literature. It provides a compelling account of the trajectory of US-China relations while illuminating the varied responses of regional states: from Australia, India and Japan, to South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and Pacific Island states.
English Abstract: As former Prime Minister Tony Abbott once admitted, Australia's China policy has been driven by “fear and greed,” implying that China is a source of both economic prosperity and security discomfort. As in other Asia-Pacific countries, facilitating trade with China has provided a growth engine for Australia's economy. Up until the mid-2010s, despite concerns over security threats posed by China's military expansion, hard balancing against China did not seem to be an option for Australia. Australia's recent moves against China, however, signal that Canberra has reset its China policy, with an overhaul of its national security and defense strategy. The shift of Australia's China policy is an interesting case to study how the regional order is likely to evolve in the growing US-China competition. Assessing Australia's recent foreign policy is also relevant to South Korea, both in terms of navigating Korea's relations with the US and China and enhancing strategic ties between Australia and Korea. Against this backdrop, this study aims to unravel Australia's strategic responses to the changing regional order and draw implications for Korea's foreign policy.
In this report, the author examines whether and how the United States can increase its cooperation with Indonesia in order to manage China's rise as a strategic competitor to the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.
China's importance in the Asia-Pacific has been on the rise, raising concerns about competition the United States. The authors examined the reactions of six U.S. allies and partners to China's rise. All six see China as an economic opportunity. They want it to be engaged productively in regional affairs, but without becoming dominant. They want the United States to remain deeply engaged in the region.
To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.
One of Chinese president Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy programs is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a web of infrastructure development plans designed to increase Eurasian economic integration. Chinese official rhetoric on the BRI focuses on its economic promise and progress, often in altruistic terms: all countries have been invited to board this "express train" to wealth and prosperity. Missing from the rhetoric is much discussion of the initiative's security dimensions and implications. Chinese officials avoid describing the strategic benefits they think the BRI could produce, while also gliding over major security risks and concerns. Yet at the unofficial level, China's security community has paid close attention to these issues, probing in great depth the gains Beijing can expect, the challenges it will face, and the new demands it will have to satisfy. Understanding those Chinese assessments is helpful as the United States considers how, when, and in what capacity to engage the BRI.
As the relationship between China and the United States becomes increasingly complex and interdependent, leaders in Beijing and Washington are struggling to establish a solid common foundation on which to expand and deepen bilateral relations. In order to examine the challenges facing U.S.-China relations, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding (iGCU) at Peking University brought together a group of leading experts from China and the United States in Beijing and Honolulu to develop a conceptual foundation for U.S.-China relations into the future, tackling the issues in innovative ways under the banner of U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The resulting chapters assess U.S.-China relations in the maritime and nuclear sectors as well as in cyberspace and space and through the lens of P2P and mil-to-mil exchanges. Scholars and students in political science and international relations are thus presented with a diagnosis and prognosis of the relations between the two superpowers.
There is a small risk of deliberate nuclear use and a larger risk of inadvertent nuclear use in a future US-China conflict, both of which could increase if the possibility of conflict grows or if Washington or Beijing pursue more ambitious nuclear strategies. China’s nuclear strategy has to date focused on deterring an adversary’s nuclear threats and use. While its recent nuclear arsenal modernisation is consistent with this strategy, Beijing has acquired new capabilities that could enable a shift to a nuclear first-use strategy. The United States and China are not in a nuclear arms race. Nevertheless, efforts by the United States to maintain its current margin of superiority over China’s nuclear forces, or to deter North Korea or Russia, could prompt further growth in China’s arsenal. Australia’s interests would be best served by an allied military strategy for countering China that emphasises robust conventional capabilities, relies on US nuclear weapons to deter the unlikely prospect of Chinese nuclear first-use, and strives to mitigate the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation. Australia should work through existing mechanisms for consultation in the alliance, as well as multilateral fora, to lessen the risks of nuclear use in a future US-China conflict scenario and support informal arms control among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, the United States, Australia and their regional allies and partners face a myriad of strategic challenges that cut across every level of the competitive space. Driven by China’s use of multidimensional coercion in pursuit of its aim to displace the United States as the region’s dominant power, a new era of strategic competition is unfolding. At stake is the stability and character of the Indo-Pacific order, hitherto founded on American power and longstanding rules and norms, all of which are increasingly uncertain. The challenges that Beijing poses the region operate over multiple domains and are prosecuted by the Chinese Communist Party through a whole-of-nation strategy. In the grey zone between peace and war, tactics like economic coercion, foreign interference, the use of civil militias and other forms of political warfare have become Beijing’s tools of choice for pursuing incremental shifts to the geostrategic status quo. These efforts are compounded by China’s rapidly growing conventional military power and expanding footprint in the Western Pacific, which is raising the spectre of a limited war that America would find it difficult to deter or win. All of this is taking place under the lengthening shadow of Beijing’s nuclear modernisation and its bid for new competitive advantages in emerging strategic technologies. Strengthening regional deterrence and counter-coercion in light of these challenges will require the United States and Australia — working independently, together and with their likeminded partners — to develop more integrated strategies for the Indo-Pacific region and novel ways to operationalise the alliance in support of deterrence objectives. There is widespread support for this agenda in both Washington and Canberra. As the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy makes clear, allies provide an “asymmetric advantage” for helping the United States deter aggression and uphold favourable balances of power around the world. Australia’s Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds mirrored this sentiment in a major speech in Washington last November, observing that “deterrence is a joint responsibility for a shared purpose — one that no country, not even the United States, can undertake alone.” Forging greater coordination on deterrence strategy within the US-Australia alliance, however, is no easy task, particularly when this undertaking is focussed on China’s coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific. Although Canberra and Washington have overlapping strategic objectives, their interests and threat perceptions regarding China are by no means symmetrical. Each has very different capabilities, policy priorities and tolerance for accepting costs and risks. Efforts to operationalise deterrence must therefore proceed incrementally and on the basis of robust alliance dialogue. To advance this process of bilateral strategic policy debate, the United States Studies Centre and Pacific Forum hosted the second round of the Annual Track 1.5 US-Australia Deterrence Dialogue in Washington in November 2019, bringing together US and Australian experts from government and non-government organisations. The theme for this meeting was “Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” with a focus on exploring tangible obstacles and opportunities for improving the alliance’s collective capacity to deter coercive changes to the regional order. Both institutions would like to thank the Australian Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grants Program and the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency for their generous support of this engagement. The following analytical summary reflects the authors’ accounts of the dialogue’s proceedings and does not necessarily represent their own views. It endeavours to capture, examine and contextualise a wide range of perspectives and debates from the discussion; but does not purport to offer a comprehensive record. Nothing in the following pages represents the views of the Australian Department of Defence, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency or any of the other officials or organisations that took part in the dialogue.