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This evaluation assesses the development effectiveness of the World Bank's lending and non-lending assistance to the Russian Federation since 1991, a 10-year period of tumultuous political, economic, and social change. This report concludes that an assistance strategy, concentrating on analytical and advisory services with limited financial support for Russia, would have been more appropriate than one involving large volumes of adjustment lending.
This book discusses and dissects the strategies of international institutions and donors to assist it in its economic and political transition to a market economy. Considerable detail is provided on the activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Bank for Reconstruction, the World Bank, and the European Union in Russia. The book is based on a GAO Report that has been excerpted and augmented by explanatory commentary. A full subject index is provided.
Privatizing Russia offers an inside look at one of the most remarkable reforms in recent history. Having started on the back burner of Russian politics in the fall of 1991, mass privatization was completed on July 1, 1994, with two thirds of the Russian industry privately owned, a rapidly rising stock market, and 40 million Russians owning company shares. The authors, all key participants in the reform effort, describe the events and the ideas driving privatization. They argue that successful reformers must recognize privatization as a process of depoliticizing firms in the face of massive opposition: making the firm responsive to market rather than political influences. The authors first review the economic theory of property rights, identifying the political influence on firms as the fundamental failure of property rights under socialism. They detail the process of coalition building and compromise that ultmately shaped privatization. The main elements of the Russian program -- corporatization, voucher use, and voucher auctions -- are described, as is the responsiveness of privatized firms to outside investors. Finally, the market values of privatized assets are assessed for indications of how much progress the country has made toward reforming its economy. In many respects, privatization has been a great success. Market concepts of property ownership and corporate management are shaking up Russian firms at a breathtaking pace, creating powerful economic and political stimuli for continuation of market reforms. At the same time, the authors caution, the political landscape remains treacherous as old-line politicians reluctantly cede their property rights and authority over firms.
IFC Discussion Paper No. 38.QUOTEIt is now universally acknowledged that ownership matters; that private ownership in and of itself is a major determinant of good performance in firms... Decent economic policy and well-functioning legal and administrative institutions... matter greatly as well.QUOTEThis paper looks at what happens when the shift to private ownership gets far out in front of the effort to build the institutional underpinnings of a capitalist economy. The emphasis is on what went wrong and why and what, if anything, can be done to be correct it. Proposals include renationalization and/or postponement of further privatization, both to be accompanied by measures to strengthen the managerial capacities of the state. Neither approach seems likely to produce short-term improvements. The regrettable fact is that governments that botch privatization are equally likely to botch the management of state-owned firms. In a number of Central European transition countries, privatization is living up to expectations; and there is no need for such measures. For institutionally-weak countries, the less dramatic but reasonable short-term course of action is to push ahead more slowly with case- by-case and tender privatization in cooperation with the international assistance community in hopes of producing some success stories that will lead by example.
“Beyond Peace is Mr. Nixon’s best book.” —The New York Times Beyond Peace is a manifesto for a new America, written with visionary insight and a realistic idealism by the 37th President of the United States—and only completed weeks before his death. In this last testament, Nixon offers a new agenda for the United States and defines its role in the complex post-Cold War era. Nixon charts the course America should take in the future to ensure that the opportunities of this new era beyond peace are not lost. America’s issues, he argues, extend from a crisis of spirit which manifests itself in a corrosive entitlement mentality that he describes as “one of the greatest threats to our fiscal health, our moral fiber, and our ability to renew our nation.” With his unrivaled experience in foreign affairs gained over many years as a statesman in the international arena, he gives answers to complex foreign issues facing the United States. And his intimate portraits and analyses of world leaders—past and present—offer us a unique, bird’s-eye view of leadership and international politics. This book challenges us to seek more than just peace; it must be a mission that will unify and inspire the country, built on peace but able to transcend it.
The transition to a market economy proves to be far more difficult in Russia than in the former centrally planned economies of eastern Europe. The Russian economy continues to face serious problems, including substantial inflationary pressures, falling output, and capital flight. The most positive aspect of the transition has been the relatively fast pace of privatization. Challenges for Russian Economic Reform contains papers published by the post-Soviet Business Forum at the Royal Institute of International Affairs that have been revised for this volume. The contributers, specalists in Russian economic affairs, examine the principal economic and institutional factors that have hindered transformation in Russia. The sheer size of the country has complicated the problem of exposing domestic producers to foreign competition and has weakened the ability of central authorities to control the regions. Economic stabilization has been hampered by the difficulties in establishing sound economic relations with the former Soviet republics. David Dyker and Michael Barrow analyze the problems of monopoly and competition policy in Russia. Philip Hanson assesses the obstacles to economic stabilization posed by regional economic interests and examines regional diversity in reform implementation. Michael Kaser examines the problems of privatization by regions and sectors in Russia and the CIS and the institutional obstacles encountered by foreign investors. Alan Smith explores the problems created by the breakup of traditional trade and payment relations with the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union and bilateral trade links with Eastern Europe. He also provides an overall assessment of Russian economic performance since the collapse of communism.
Moscow's use of its military abroad in recent years has radically reshaped perceptions of Russia as an international actor. With the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the invasion of eastern Ukraine and sustainment of an insurgency there, and (in particular) the 2015 intervention in Syria, Russia repeatedly surprised U.S. policymakers with its willingness and ability to use its military to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Despite Russia's relatively small global economic footprint, it has engaged in more interventions than any other U.S. competitor since the end of the Cold War. In this report, the authors assess when, where, and why Russia conducts military interventions by analyzing the 25 interventions that Russia has undertaken since 1991, including detailed case studies of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War and Moscow's involvement in the ongoing Syrian civil war. The authors suggest that Russia is most likely to intervene to prevent erosion of its influence in its neighborhood, particularly following a shock that portends such an erosion occurring rapidly. If there were to be a regime change in a core Russian regional ally, such as Belarus or Armenia, that brought to power a government hostile to Moscow's interests, it is possible (if not likely) that a military intervention could ensue.