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The German victory in France at the onset of the Second World War was sudden, brutal and brilliant; by contrast the British and French preparations were miserable, faulty, badly carried through and fraught with mistrust. In the midst of these Allied responses was the eminent liaison officer Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears, sent by the new prime Minister Winston Churchill to be his representative to the French Prime Minister. Spears was very well suited to his role as he had seen much military service and he had served in a senior liaison capacity between the British and French armies during the First World War. Keenly observant, well connected, urbane and respected by many of the French politicians and generals, his two volume memoirs are justly famous.
This book analyses British official reactions to the apparent decline of France, politically, socially and economically, in the three years before the outbreak of war in Europe. The book is based on public and private archival sources and on the memoirs and biographies of leading British figures and describes the British Government's efforts to cope with the desperate strategic situation created by its own military weakness and the malaise of the Third Republic, its own potential great power ally in a war with the Axis powers.
Even after the legendary evacuation from Dunkirk in June 1940 there were still large British formations fighting the Germans alongside their French allies. After mounting a vigorous counterattack at Abbeville and then conducting a tough defence along the Somme, the British were forced to conduct a second evacuation from the ports of Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest and St Nazaire. While France was in its death throes, politicians and soldiers debated what to do – flee to England or North Africa, or seek an armistice. Case Red captures the drama of the final three weeks of military operations in France in June 1940, and explains the great impact it had on the course of relations between Britain and France during the remainder of the war. It also addresses the military, political and human drama of France's collapse in June 1940, and how the windfall of captured military equipment, fuel and industrial resources enhanced the Third Reich's ability to attack its next foe – the Soviet Union.
General Lord Ismay's name is little known today, but he participated in, and was witness to, decision-making at the highest level of government, before, during and after the Second World War. Immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities, he was Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence responsible for advising government on strategy and preparations for war. As wartime Chief Staff Officer to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, he became a close confidant and rarely left Churchill's side, whether in Britain or abroad at international conferences. He was instrumental in conciliating the sometimes-fractious relationship between the Prime Minister and the Service Chiefs of Staff. In 1947, Ismay went to India as Chief of Staff to the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, and was closely involved in the drama of Partition. As the first Secretary General of NATO from 1952 to 1957, he was instrumental in building the foundations of the Alliance and preserving its unity and cohesion at the height of the Cold War. He also played a central role in reshaping the higher management of defence in Britain, including the creation of the Ministry of Defence. This fascinating book tells the story of his life and work.
Here, for the first time in English, is an illuminating new German perspective on the decisive Blitzkrieg campaign of 1940. Karl-Heinz Frieser's account provides the definitive explanation for Germany's startling success and the equally surprising and rapid military collapse of France and Britain on the European continent. In a little over a month, Germany decisively defeated the Allies in battle, a task that had not been achieved in four years of brutal fighting during World War I. First published in 1995 as the official German history of the 1940 campaign in the west, the book goes beyond standard explanations to show that German victory was not inevitable and French defeat was not preordained. Contrary to the usual accounts of the campaign, Frieser illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign planning was sound. The key to victory or defeat, he argues, was the execution of operational plans—both preplanned and ad hoc—amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war. Frieser shows why on the eve of the campaign the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them. This study explodes many of the myths concerning German Blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for the 1940 campaign. A groundbreaking new interpretation of a topic that has long interested students of military history, it is being published in cooperation with the Association of the U.S. Army
The four years between the military defeat of France by Nazi Germany and D-Day were vital, dramatic and eventful years in Anglo-French relations. These years saw the first armed clashes between France and Britain since the Napoleonic Wars, including the infamous Royal Navy attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir. They also saw a curious relationship developing between Britain and Vichy France. Vichy was at once a hostile power, under German domination, and at the same time a porous regime through which British influence on its politics, attitudes towards the Resistance and the transit of British soldiers and airmen through its territory en route to Spain, could flow quite freely. Britain had an ambivalent attitude towards Vichy - obviously adversarial, but also pragmatic. The history of Vichy France is often viewed as a sideshow in the overall context of World War II. However, Peter Mangold here shows that the Vichy attitude towards the allies, especially the British, was ambivalent and complex. His absorbing and up-to-date account, based on original historical research, highlights the conflicts within the Vichy regime and the ways in which contacts and connections with de Gaulle in London and the British Government were maintained. This exciting and fast-paced book brings to life the major characters in the story - not only Churchill and de Gaulle, but also Macmillan, Petain and Leclerc. In this book, Mangold deftly reassesses the complex international wartime chessboard and, in the process, reveals a little known aspect of the World War II story.
Describes how, in 1940, a group of rebellious Tory members of Parliament defied the appeasement policies of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to force his resignation and bring to power Winston Churchill.