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This volume provides a survey of recent literature on certain aspects of vertical restraints. The book will make excellent supplementary reading for courses in industrial organization and other fields dealing with antitrust issues and will also be of interest to lawyers, researchers, and policy makers.
Vertical agreements between undertakings at the various levels of a supply chain have long been seen as a fundamental focus for antitrust legislation, such as the European Union’s Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER). It goes without saying that such issues are particularly prevalent in digital markets. This authoritative commentary analyses the main restrictions in vertical agreements, emphasising the numerous new and contentious issues arising in the context of Internet distribution. It offers both legal and economic perspectives, as well as examines enforcement and possible changes to the legislation. The contributors – leading competition authority officials, lawyers, economists, and academics – provide in-depth discussions of topics that have emerged as areas for conscious policy choices, including the following: restrictions of online sales; price parity obligations; resale price maintenance; the duration of non-compete obligations; sustainability agreements; geo-blocking practices; and restraint of trade in pharmaceuticals. The contributions have emerged from the 2020 conference of the Global Competition Law Centre at the College of Europe in the context of the currently ongoing review of the VBER and vertical guidelines. With its multidisciplinary approach highlighting the efficiencies and harms caused by the restrictions at stake, this important book clearly shows how law and practice apply to specific issues relating to digital markets and how the law is likely to change in the near future. It will be of immeasurable value to lawyers and officials concerned with European competition law and academics in the field.
Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta
Market dominance - encompassing single firm dominance, overt and tacit collusion, mergers and vertical restraints - raises many complex analytical and policy issues, all of which continue to be the subject of theoretical research and policy reform. This second edition of a popular and comprehensive text extends the arguments and combines an analysis of the issues with a discussion of actual policy and case studies. This new edition addresses the recent fundamental changes in antitrust law, especially in the UK and the EU, and reviews some high profile and controversial cases such as the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and the Microsoft monopoly. The author moves on to deal with several unresolved questions including the conflicts between trade and antitrust policy, the foreign take-over of domestic assets and extra-territorial claims made by certain countries.
Providing a detailed and practical analysis of the entire scope of the law relating to vertical agreements, including the new general block exemption regulations and the Vertical Guidelines, this book is an indispensible tool for all practitioners active in the drafting or reviewing of vertical agreements.
Examines dilemmas surrounding antitrust law and public and private power and the ways in which these problems have been addressed by legislatures and courts in the US and in Europe. Offers sometimes controversial observations on the history and doctrines of antitrust law, and conclusions as to how successfully the dilemma is being managed by the economies of the US and Europe. Amato is head of the Italian Antitrust Authority, a professor of law at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, and a former Prime Minister of Italy. Distributed by ISBS. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.