Download Free Anglo Italian Relations Sept 1939 June 1940 Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Anglo Italian Relations Sept 1939 June 1940 and write the review.

Between 1923 and 1934, Britain and Italy waged war by proxy in the Middle East. Behind the appearance of European collaboration, relations between London and Rome in the Red Sea were notably tense. Although realistically Mussolini could not establish or maintain colonies in the Arabian Peninsula in the face of British opposition, his regime undertook a number of initiatives in the region to enhance Italo-Arab relations and to pave the way for future expansion once the balance of power in Europe had shifted in Italy's favour. This book examines four key aspects of relations between Britain and Italy in the Middle East in the interwar period: the confrontation between London and Rome for political influence among Arab leaders and nationalists; the competition for commercial and trade advantages in the region; the Anglo-Italian propaganda war to win the hearts and minds of the Arab populations; and the secret world of British and Italian espionage and intelligence. An in depth analysis of these four key areas demonstrates how Anglo-Italian relations broke down over the interwar period and enhances our knowledge and understanding of the factors leading up to the widening of the Second World War in the Mediterranean. This book is essential reading for scholars concerned with Anglo-Italian relations, the activities of the Powers in the Middle East and the tensions between the colonial powers.
This collection of essays reviews the politico-military relationship between Britain and France between the two World Wars. As well as examining the relationship between the two nations' armed services, the book's contributors also analyse key themes in Anglo-French inter-war defence politics - disarmament, intelligence and imperial defence - and joint military, political and economic preparations for a second world war.
Marshal Pietro Badolgio was involved in the highest levels of the Italian political hierarchy ever since his early successes in the First World War, for which he was promoted General. He was head of the Italian Armed Forces from 1925 to 1940, and did his best to raise the military to a level that might match the expansionist views of Mussolini. He presided over the brutal invasion of Ethiopia, but nationally he acted as a counter-balance to Mussolini’s pre-World War II schemes. Unable to stop the inevitable disaster following the Italian-German Pact of Steel and the onset of war, he resigned as Chief Of Staff after the humiliating reverses of the Italian invasion of Greece. He was brought back into the political spotlight in 1943, after the fall of Mussolini, and was named Prime Minister of Italy during the turbulent months of their volte face change of sides. His position was unenviable, caught between the Italian people who cried out for peace and the Allied powers who pursued German defeat in Italy by armed force. In this fascinating book he recounts his memories and recollections of Italy during the Second World War, particularly focussed on his attempts to hold the country together in 1943 and 1944.
This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.
A comprehensive and challenging analysis of the British defence of Egypt, primarily against fascist Italy, in the critical lead-up period to the Second World War. Culminating in the decisive defeat of the Italian military threat at Sidi Barrani in December 1940, this is a fascinating new contribution to the field. The security of Egypt, a constant of British imperial strategy, is a curiously neglected dimension of the still burning appeasement debate. Steven Morewood adds to the originality of his interpretation by suggesting the old view should be reinstated: that Mussolini should and could have been stopped in his empire-building at the Abyssinian hurdle. Thereafter, as Nazi Germany tore the Versailles peace settlement to shreds, the drift to war accelerated as British resolve and credibility were brought into question. The fascist dictators in Rome and Berlin held no respect for weakness and Mussolini became the conduit through which Hitler could apply pressure to a sensitive British interest through reinforcing Libya at critical moments.
A comprehensive and challenging analysis of the British defence of Egypt, primarily against fascist Italy, in the critical lead-up period to the Second World War. Culminating in the decisive defeat of the Italian military threat at Sidi Barrani in December 1940, this is a fascinating new contribution to the field. The security of Egypt, a constant of British imperial strategy, is a curiously neglected dimension of the still burning appeasement debate. Steven Morewood adds to the originality of his interpretation by suggesting the old view should be reinstated: that Mussolini should and could have been stopped in his empire-building at the Abyssinian hurdle. Thereafter, as Nazi Germany tore the Versailles peace settlement to shreds, the drift to war accelerated as British resolve and credibility were brought into question. The fascist dictators in Rome and Berlin held no respect for weakness and Mussolini became the conduit through which Hitler could apply pressure to a sensitive British interest through reinforcing Libya at critical moments.
Poland, with the fifth largest army in Europe, was the first nation to feel the attack of the rejuvenated Nazi war machine. Because of later German conquests, the world has largely forgotten this initial success. Yet in one respect the rapid annihilation of the Polish Army was Germany's most important conquest. This campaign demonstrated to Germany, if not to the rest of the world, the correctness of her military doctrine. It furnished the proving ground for her organization and weapons. The rapidity of Poland's complete destruction came as a shocking surprise to the world at large. Eight days after the beginning of the war, all Polish forces were in demoralized retreat; and a month later, the entire fighting force of a million men had been annihilated. Military history offers no prior example of a conquest so rapid and complete. In this victory the new German air and mechanized forces played an unprecedented part. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that German success was due to these two arms alone. Simply stated, Germany's stupendous conquest may be attributed to the superiority of the entire German Army over the outmoded Polish war machine. Germany's balanced, well-trained, and ably led forces found no match in those of her smaller rival. This account of the campaign in Poland has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on material prepared by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department. -- Abstract.
Italy in the Second World War: Alternative Perspectives stems from the necessity to write an important page of Second World War history, by focusing on the Italian war experience, which has been overshadowed in international research by the attention given to its senior Axis partner. Drawing extensively on material from Italian and international archives, a team of Italian and international historians, led by Emanuele Sica and Richard Carrier, offers a broad-ranging volume on the war seen through the lens of Italian soldiers and civilians, and populations occupied by the Italian army. Contributors are: Luca Baldissara, Cindy Brown, Federico Ciavattone, Nicolò Da Lio, Paolo Fonzi, Francesco Fusi, Eric Gobetti, Federico Goddi, Andrea Martini, Niall MacGalloway, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, Paolo Pezzino, Matteo Pretelli, Nicholas Virtue.
From the comfortable distance of seven decades, it is quite easy to view the victory of the Allies over Hitler’s Germany as inevitable. But in 1940 Great Britain’s defeat loomed perilously close, and no other nation stepped up to confront the Nazi threat. In this cogently argued book, Robin Prior delves into the documents of the time—war diaries, combat reports, Home Security’s daily files, and much more—to uncover how Britain endured a year of menacing crises. The book reassesses key events of 1940—crises that were recognized as such at the time and others not fully appreciated. Prior examines Neville Chamberlain’s government, Churchill’s opponents, the collapse of France, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz. He looks critically at the position of the United States before Pearl Harbor, and at Roosevelt’s response to the crisis. Prior concludes that the nation was saved through a combination of political leadership, British Expeditionary Force determination and skill, Royal Air Force and Navy efforts to return soldiers to the homeland, and the determination of the people to fight on “in spite of all terror.” As eloquent as it is controversial, this book exposes the full import of events in 1940, when Britain fought alone and Western civilization hung in the balance.