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An indepth look at the origins and development of the current financial crisis, from an economist and Washington insider. Jarsulic explains how a wide array of financial institutions, including mortgage banks, commercial banks, and investment banks created a credit bubble that supported nonprime mortgage lending and helped to inflate house prices.
A comprehensive account of the rise and fall of the mortgage-securitization industry, which explains the complex roots of the 2008 financial crisis. More than a decade after the 2008 financial crisis plunged the world economy into recession, we still lack an adequate explanation for why it happened. Existing accounts identify a number of culpritsÑfinancial instruments, traders, regulators, capital flowsÑyet fail to grasp how the various puzzle pieces came together. The key, Neil Fligstein argues, is the convergence of major US banks on an identical business model: extracting money from the securitization of mortgages. But how, and why, did this convergence come about? The Banks Did It carefully takes the reader through the development of a banking industry dependent on mortgage securitization. Fligstein documents how banks, with help from the government, created the market for mortgage securities. The largest banksÑCountrywide Financial, Bear Stearns, Citibank, and Washington MutualÑsoon came to participate in every aspect of this market. Each firm originated mortgages, issued mortgage-backed securities, sold those securities, and, in many cases, acted as their own best customers by purchasing the same securities. Entirely reliant on the throughput of mortgages, these firms were unable to alter course even when it became clear that the market had turned on them in the mid-2000s. With the structural features of the banking industry in view, the rest of the story falls into place. Fligstein explains how the crisis was produced, where it spread, why regulators missed the warning signs, and how banksÕ dependence on mortgage securitization resulted in predatory lending and securities fraud. An illuminating account of the transformation of the American financial system, The Banks Did It offers important lessons for anyone with a stake in avoiding the next crisis.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.
In easy to understand terms and journalistic style, Read describes the reasons for global financial unrest arising from the sub-prime mortgage crisis and economic meltdowns. He walks the reader through a number of topics in economics and connects these topics to real world financial problems concluding with recommendations for the future.
Anatomy of a Meltdown: A Dual Financial Biography of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, traces the course of two financial icons, Lehman Brothers and WaMuâ "one operating in the investment sector, the other in the consumer financial services sectorâ "on their path to financial ruin. Illuminating the nature and severity of the subprime mortgage crisis, author Michael P. Malloy presents a clear and cogent analysis of the global economic meltdown, the steps necessary to restore the financial markets, and measures that must be taken to avoid similar crises in the future. This clear and concise text by one of the foremost authorities on bank regulation features: comprehensive coverage of all of the fundamental law, policy, and practical issues raised by the crisis and the government's response to it the core of key cases preserved in timely and salient excerpts a balanced policy perspective step-by-step, highly readable analysis of the practical and policy implications of the subprime mortgage crisis the author's cutting-edge web log that offers continuously updated supplemental material generous use of examples throughout the text effective use of visual aids to illustrate concepts and spark class discussion Anatomy of a Meltdown: A Dual Financial Biography of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, by Michael P. Malloy tells the story of the financial meltdown that swept through American and international markets, threatening to plunge the United States into depression as Wall Street and the global economy faced near-total collapse.
The Great Crash of 2020 was not caused by a virus. It was precipitated by the virus, and made worse by the crazed decision of governments around the world to shut down business and travel. But it was caused by economic fragility. The purpose of this collection is to highlight the important work of contemporary Austrian economists on the modern financial system. Although the mainstream financial press has been crediting American, European, and Chinese policymakers with upholding the global economy in the aftermath of 2008, Austrians have long been warning that these very same actions have only set the world up for a larger disaster. Promises in 2008 of the ease of normalizing monetary policy—such as by reducing balance sheets and phasing out market intervention—have been proven to be lies, just as Austrians warned. Authors Include: Ryan McMaken, Daniel Lacalle, Brendan Brown, Thorsten Polleit, Alasdair Macleod, Philipp Bagus, Ronald-Peter Stöferle, Mark J. Valek, Arkadiusz Sieroń, Ronald-Peter Stöferle, Jeff Deist, Joseph T. Salerno, and Claudio Grass.
The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble in 2006-7 is widely agreed to have been the immediate cause of the collapse of the financial sector in 2008. Consequently, one might think that uncovering the origins of subprime lending would make the root causes of the crisis obvious. That is essentially where public debate about the causes of the crisis began—and ended—in the month following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 502-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in mid-September 2008. However, the subprime housing bubble is just one piece of the puzzle. Asset bubbles inflate and burst frequently, but severe worldwide recessions are rare. What was different this time? In What Caused the Financial Crisis leading economists and scholars delve into the major causes of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression and, together, present a comprehensive picture of the factors that led to it. One essay examines the role of government regulation in expanding home ownership through mortgage subsidies for impoverished borrowers, encouraging the subprime housing bubble. Another explores how banks were able to securitize mortgages by manipulating criteria used for bond ratings. How this led to inaccurate risk assessments that could not be covered by sufficient capital reserves mandated under the Basel accords is made clear in a third essay. Other essays identify monetary policy in the United States and Europe, corporate pay structures, credit-default swaps, banks' leverage, and financial deregulation as possible causes of the crisis. With contributions from Richard A. Posner, Vernon L. Smith, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and John B. Taylor, among others, What Caused the Financial Crisis provides a cogent, comprehensive, and credible explanation of why the crisis happened. It will be an essential resource for scholars and students of finance, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology, as well as others interested in the financial crisis and the nature of modern capitalism and regulation.
This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.
The Great Financial Meltdown reviews, advocates and critiques the systemic, conjunctural and policy-based explanations for the 2008 crisis. The book expertly examines these explanations to assess their analytical and empirical validity. Comprehensive yet accessible chapters, written by a collection of prominent authors, cover a wide range of political economy approaches to the crisis, from Marxian through to Post Keynesian and other heterodox schools.