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Grand strategy integrates military, political, and economic means to pursue states ultimate objectives in the international system. American grand strategy had been in a state of ux prior to 2001, as containment of the Soviet Union gave way to a wider range of apparently lesser challenges. The 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade towers, however, transformed the grand strategy debate and led to a sweeping reevaluation of American security policy. It may still be too early to expect this reevaluation to have produced a complete or nal response to 9/11 policies as complex as national grand strategy do not change overnight. But after 3 years of sustained debate and adaptation, it is reasonable to ask what this process has produced so far, and how well the results to date serve American interests.
"Grand strategy" integrates military, political, and economic means to pursue states' ultimate objectives in the international system. American grand strategy had been in a state of flux prior to 2001, as containment of the Soviet Union gave way to a wider range of apparently lesser challenges. The 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade towers, however, transformed the grand strategy debate and led to a sweeping reevaluation of American security policy. It may still be too early to expect this reevaluation to have produced a complete or final response to 9/11- policies as complex as national grand strategy do not change overnight. But after 3 years of sustained debate and adaptation, it is reasonable to ask what this process has produced so far, and how well the results to date serve American interests. The author argues that, heretofore, the grand strategic response to 9/11 has combined ambitious public statements with vague particulars as to the scope of the threat and the end state to be sought. This combination of ambition and ambiguity creates important but unresolved tensions in American strategy. If the costs are low enough, these tensions are tolerable: the United States can avoid making hard choices and instead pursue ill-defined goals with limited penalties. But the higher the cost, the harder this becomes. And the costs are rising rapidly with the ongoing insurgency in Iraq. Eventually something will have to give-the ambiguity in today's grand strategy is fast becoming intolerable. There are two broad alternatives for resolving these ambiguities and creating a coherent strategy: rollback and containment. Rollback would retain the ambitious goals implicit in today's declaratory policy and accept the cost and near-term risk inherent in pursuing them. These costs include a redoubled commitment to nation building in Iraq and elsewhere, accelerated onset of great power competition, heightened incentives for proliferation, and hence an increased risk of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use by terrorists in the near term. But in exchange, it offers the mid-term possibility of rolling the terrorist threat, and hence the ultimate danger of WMD use, back to a level below the severity of September 10, 2001. By contrast, containment would settle for more modest goals in exchange for lower costs and lower near-term risks. In particular, it would permit America to withdraw from nation building in the Mideast, it would slow the onset of great power competition, and it would moderate the risk of near-term WMD terrorism. But this retrenchment would leave the underlying causes of Islamist terror unassailed, and would therefore accept a persistent risk of major terrorist attack for the indefinite future. And it could never eliminate entirely the risk of those terrorists acquiring WMD; though it might reduce the probability per unit time, by extending the duration of the conflict indefinitely it could ultimately increase, not decrease, the odds of WMD use on American soil in the longer term. Neither alternative dominates the other on analytical grounds. Both involve serious costs as well as benefits. And to resolve these costs and benefits requires at least two critical value judgments. Is accepting near-term risk for a long-term payoff preferable to the opposite? Rollback tolerates higher risk in the near term for a possibly lower cumulative risk in the longer term; containment reduces near-term risks but may increase them in the longer term. And is high payoff at high risk preferable to a sure thing for a smaller payoff? Rollback swings for the fences (it pursues something closer to absolute security) at the risk of striking out (catastrophe if we fail); containment ensures contact with the ball (lower risk of catastrophic failure), but promises only singles in return (it cannot eliminate the threat of terror).
International affairs expert and award-winning author of Special Providence Walter Russell Mead here offers a remarkably clear-eyed account of American foreign policy and the challenges it faces post—September 11.Starting with what America represents to the world community, Mead argues that throughout its history it has been guided by a coherent set of foreign policy objectives. He places the record of the Bush administration in the context of America’s historical relations with its allies and foes. And he takes a hard look at the international scene–from despair and decay in the Arab world to tumult in Africa and Asia–and lays out a brilliant framework for tailoring America’s grand strategy to our current and future threats. Balanced, persuasive, and eminently sensible, Power, Terror, Peace, and War is a work of extraordinary significance on the role of the United States in the world today.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration chose to pursue a broad, offensive, and preemptive campaign against terrorists and their purported state sponsors, versus executing a focused response against Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. This book argues that over the course of the next decade, this broad strategy, primarily leveraging military power, diverted manpower and resources away from the immediate threat, emboldened al Qaeda, and weakened the comprehensive national power of the United States. The lessons of the United States' 9/ 11 response are profound, and should be studied by today's and tomorrow's leaders in order to inform strategy development and decision-making in meeting tomorrow's national security challenges.
Some believe that America has had no real grand strategy since the end of the cold war. Critics argue that the Bush Doctrine and America's 'War on Terror' is not a true grand strategy because it lacks a coherent unifying framework, is highly resource intensive, and is unsustainable over the long term. America is at the pinnacle of its global power and influence, but it will not last forever. Many recommend that America should use this valuable time to develop a grand strategy to place it in favorable future position. A well thought out and articulated grand strategy should result in national security, economic prosperity, fulfilled national interests, and favorable political outcomes. Ultimately, for the sake of America's grand destiny, it is important we get our next grand strategy right. This project examines the definition, concept, framework, an example of good grand strategy, our current grand strategy, and our strategic environment. This project identifies proposed grand strategies, narrows the field against selected elimination criteria, compares and contrasts remaining strategies, and recommends which one should become America's next post 9-11 Grand Strategy for the Twenty First Century.
A foreign policy expert “presents a thoughtful, comprehensive case” for the War on Terror—a “historically powerful support of Mr. Bush and his doctrine” (Washington Times). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shattered the tranquil and prosperous optimism that had blossomed in the United States during the 1990s. President George W. Bush responded with a preemptive Global War on Terror. This controversial strategy led the nation into protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and ignited passionate debate about America’s role in the world. In Defense of the Bush Doctrine offers a vigorous argument for the principles of moral democratic realism that inspired the Bush administration's policy. Conservative columnist Robert G. Kaufman argues that the purpose of American foreign policy is to ensure the integrity and vitality of a free society and that America’s grand strategy must be guided by the cardinal virtue of prudence. Kaufman provides a broad historical context for America’s post-9/11 foreign policy, connecting the Bush Doctrine and other issues, such as how the United States should deal with China, to the deeper tradition of American diplomacy. Drawing from positive lessons as well as cautionary tales from the past, Kaufman concludes that moral democratic realism offers the most prudent framework for expanding the democratic zone of peace and minimizing threats to the United States.
The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."
In Reluctant Crusaders, Colin Dueck examines patterns of change and continuity in American foreign policy strategy by looking at four major turning points: the periods following World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He shows how American cultural assumptions regarding liberal foreign policy goals, together with international pressures, have acted to push and pull U.S. policy in competing directions over time. The result is a book that combines an appreciation for the role of both power and culture in international affairs. The centerpiece of Dueck's book is his discussion of America's "grand strategy"--the identification and promotion of national goals overseas in the face of limited resources and potential resistance. One of the common criticisms of the Bush administration's grand strategy is that it has turned its back on a long-standing tradition of liberal internationalism in foreign affairs. But Dueck argues that these criticisms misinterpret America's liberal internationalist tradition. In reality, Bush's grand strategy since 9/11 has been heavily influenced by traditional American foreign policy assumptions. While liberal internationalists argue that the United States should promote an international system characterized by democratic governments and open markets, Dueck contends, these same internationalists tend to define American interests in broad, expansive, and idealistic terms, without always admitting the necessary costs and risks of such a grand vision. The outcome is often sweeping goals, pursued by disproportionately limited means.
The definition and understanding of "terrorism" is in a state of unprecedented evolution. No longer are acts of terrorism rare and far-flung. Following the horrendous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. citizens have had their eyes opened to a new world where this nightmare stalks the daily news and is never far from consciousness. Attacking Terrorism brings together some of the world's finest experts, people who have made the study of this rising menace their life's work, to provide a comprehensive picture of the challenges and opportunities of the campaign against international terrorism. Part one, "The Nature of Terrorism," provides an overview and foundation for the current campaign, placing it within the political and historical context of previous threats and responses. Part two, "The Responses to Terrorism," looks at the range of policy instruments required in an effective strategy against terrorism. The contributors to this volume bring finely honed analyses and nuanced perspectives to the terrorist realities of the twenty-first century—history, analyses, and perspectives that have been too often oversimplified or myopic. They bring a new depth of understanding and myriad new dimensions to the crisis of terrorism. And they reach into aspects of counterterrorism that broaden our grasp on such important tools as diplomacy, intelligence and counterintelligence, psycho-political means, international law, criminal law enforcement, military force, foreign aid, and homeland security, showing not only how these tools are currently being employed but how often they are being underutilized as well. Attacking Terrorism demonstrates that there are no easy answers—and that the road toward victory will be long and arduous, frightening and dangerous—but as Audrey Kurth Cronin states in her introduction, "As the campaign against international terrorism unfolds, a crucial forward-looking process of strategic reassessment is under way in the United States, and this book is intended to be a part of it."
In this provocative book, a distinguished Cold War historian argues that September 11, 2001, was not the first time a surprise attack shattered American assumptions about national security and reshaped American grand strategy.