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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the idea that acting collectively, in associations, ordinary people can play a useful peacebuilding role. In both El Salvador and Colombia, accords signed as a result of elite-led negotiations for peace have had limited effect in reducing levels of violence. This thesis considers that rather than focusing predominantly on what can be achieved through negotiations, a more useful approach would be to examine the kind of peacebuilding activities which ordinary people are able to engage in, given the surrounding constraints. Chapter one explores the historical contexts of conflict in El Salvador and Colombia. Chapter two establishes the conceptual framework for the thesis. It reviews several different bodies of literature and explains the main ideas to be explored through empirical analysis in the case study chapters. Chapters three and four explore the limitations of elite-led negotiations for peace in El Salvador and Colombia respectively. Chapter five empirically explores six grassroots peacebuilding initiatives which provides the basis for a typology of peacebuilding strategies from 'below'. Chapter six explores how to create an infrastructure for peace which can help protect and validate spaces for grassroots peacebuilding. The conclusion argues that the international community and intermediary organisations have a dual role to play in acting as facilitators between different levels of peacebuilding activity, and in trying to prise open and maintain spaces for grassroots peacebuilding.
In Peace and Rural Development in Colombia Andrés García Trujillo investigates whether peace agreements geared toward terminating internal armed conflicts trigger rural distributive changes. Combining academic rigor with an insider’s perspective, García Trujillo shows that the peace agreement in Colombia opened an exceptional window for addressing rural inequality. Yet, despite some progress, he argues that the agreement’s leverage to stir change was severely constrained by opposing actors within and outside the government. García Trujillo later applies the framework developed for the Colombian case to explain key dynamics of other post-conflict societies that have dealt with agrarian issues under a transitional context, like El Salvador or South Africa. The original theoretical framework and empirically rich analysis make Peace and Rural Development in Colombia an indispensable read for scholars and practitioners who wish to gain an understanding on the political economy of peacemaking, policy change, and rural development in Colombia and beyond.
Colombia and El Salvador, two Latin American countries, have developed similar counterinsurgency processes and started similar processes of peace negotiations between the insurgent armies and the forces of order. One peace process was concluded in 1992, when El Salvador ended the war through a political solution (Peace Accords). Salvadoran insurgent forces agreed to demobilize its army and to become a legal political party, while the government agreed to make changes in the social and political structure. Colombia, after forty years of guerilla warfare and after failed peace talks during the last decade, is still trying to set conditions to gain peace through negotiations. The thesis, while contrasting both general contexts, emphasizes their differences to explain the success of the peace process in El Salvador and the failure in Colombia. After comparing the political actors involved - the military and the guerrillas, studying the intensity of the conflict, and analyzing the outcomes of the different peace processes, we arrived to the conclusion that the Salvadoran model of negotiation cannot be applied entirely to the Colombian case. Similarly, no government should try to copy the Salvadoran recipe as the remedy for their own social and political problems. Any simplistic interpretation should be avoided because it could lead to fallacies that could generate dangerous interpretations by the key actors in the process.
Colombia and El Salvador, two Latin American countries, have developed similar counterinsurgency processes and started similar processes of peace negotiations between the insurgent armies and the forces of order. One peace process was concluded in 1992, when El Salvador ended the war through a political solution (Peace Accords). Salvadoran insurgent forces agreed to demobilize its army and to become a legal political party, while the government agreed to make changes in the social and political structure. Colombia, after forty years of guerrilla warfare and after failed peace talks during the last decade, is still trying to set conditions to gain peace through negotiations. The thesis, while contrasting both general contexts, emphasizes their differences to explain the success of the peace process in El Salvador and the failure in Colombia. After comparing the political actors involved - the military and the guerrillas, studying the intensity of the conflict, and analyzing the outcomes of the different peace processes, we arrived to the conclusion that the Salvadoran model of negotiation cannot be applied entirely to the Colombian case. Similarly, no government should try to copy the Salvadoran recipe as the remedy for their own social and political problems. Any simplistic interpretation should be avoided because it could lead to fallacies that could generate dangerous interpretations by the key actors in the process.
Colombia and El Salvador, two Latin American countries, have developed similar counterinsurgency processes and started similar processes of peace negotiations between the insurgent armies and the forces of order. One peace process was concluded in 1992, when El Salvador ended the war through a political solution (Peace Accords). Salvadoran insurgent forces agreed to demobilize its army and to become a legal political party, while the government agreed to make changes in the social and political structure. Colombia, after forty years of guerilla warfare and after failed peace talks during the last decade, is still trying to set conditions to gain peace through negotiations. The thesis, while contrasting both general contexts, emphasizes their differences to explain the success of the peace process in El Salvador and the failure in Colombia. After comparing the political actors involved - the military and the guerrillas, studying the intensity of the conflict, and analyzing the outcomes of the different peace processes, we arrived to the conclusion that the Salvadoran model of negotiation cannot be applied entirely to the Colombian case. Similarly, no government should try to copy the Salvadoran recipe as the remedy for their own social and political problems. Any simplistic interpretation should be avoided because it could lead to fallacies that could generate dangerous interpretations by the key actors in the process.
As the year 2000 begins, the disintegration of Colombia in a situation of violence, political unrest, and economic upheaval is a very real threat to the national interests of the United States. It is critical that Washington's concern for failed states, such as Yugoslavia, apply to the Western Hemisphere as well. Ramifications of Colombia's demise are at least as important for the hemisphere as the fragmentation of Yugoslavia has been for Europe. Beyond the imminent threat to stability in the region, the 40-year old insurgency now torturing Colombia also poses an urgent dilemma for defense of the United States from the scourge of narcotraffic, for loss of Colombia as a lucrative trade partner, for protection of the Andean and Amazon environments from dangerous pollutants, and for the threat to promotion of democracy and humanitarian principles so close to the United States. In spite of years of engagement activities with the Colombian military and other government agencies, progress toward a solution has been elusive.
As the year 2000 begins, the disintegration of Colombia in a situation of violence, political unrest, and economic upheaval is a very real threat to the national interests of the United States. It is critical that Washington's concern for failed states, such as Yugoslavia, apply to the Western Hemisphere as well. Ramifications of Colombia's demise are at least as important for the hemisphere as the fragmentation of Yugoslavia has been for Europe. Beyond the imminent threat to stability in the region, the 40-year old insurgency now torturing Colombia also poses an urgent dilemma for defense of the United States from the scourge of narcotraffic, for loss of Colombia as a lucrative trade partner, for protection of the Andean and Amazon environments from dangerous pollutants, and for the threat to promotion of democracy and humanitarian principles so close to the United States. In spite of years of engagement activities with the Colombian military and other government agencies, progress toward a solution has been elusive.
Strengthening civil society may be all the rage in the international donor community, but what does it mean in practice? This seminal work critically examines the political aspects of civil society building and the role of non-governmental development aid agencies during recent democratic transitions in Central America.