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For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.
In January and February 1991, Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) conducted an air-to-ground onslaught against Iraq's Republican Guard. The requirements of this operation conflicted with several aspects of the U.S. Air Force's preparations for a European battleground. The low-altitude tactics CENTAF crews had practiced for the previous decade and a half were unsuitable for the task at hand. This study examines how effectively CENTAF adjusted air operations against the Republican Guards to the changing realities of combat. The extent to which existing USAF doctrine prepared CENTAF for this operation provides a baseline for the amount of adaptation required. The subsequent narrative identifies tactical innovations developed during the operation, the main elements of adaptive process, those factors that helped and hindered the process, and the sources of CENTAF's innovations. Initial F-16 and B-52 attacks on the Republican Guard registered little success. In response, CENTAF launched six significant tactical innovations in one week: A-10 deep interdiction, A-10 reconnaissance, F- 16 Killer Scout operations, F-16 forward basing, F-111 and F-15E "Tank Plinking," and the use of cockpit videotape as a bomb damage assessment (BDA) source. These innovations required CENTAF aviators to create new tactics as they conducted operations. CENTAF's effectiveness against the Guard divisions improved, resulting in greater destruction of Iraqi forces. Critically weakened by air attack, the two Guard divisions that stood and fought were annihilated during the campaign's ground phase. CENTAF's adaptation to the realities of war in the Gull, accomplished with impressive speed, was facilitated by four conditions.
For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.
In January and February 1991, Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) conducted an air-to-ground onslaught against Iraq's Republican Guard. The requirements of this operation conflicted in a number of respects with the US Air Force's extended preparations for conflict on a European battleground. A major case in point involved the low-altitude tactics CENTAF crews had practiced for the previous decade and a half, tactics that were manifestly unsuited for the task that confronted them in Iraq. Colonel Andrews's study, "Airpower against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the Republican Guard," examines how CENTAF adjusted air operations against the Republican Guard to meet the realities of combat. As he makes clear, four factors proved instrumental in facilitating CENTAF's rapid adaptation to the realities of war: 1) air superiority which created a permissive environment for innovative tactics, 2) open-minded attitudes of senior commanders which nurtured the growth of new methods of operation, 3) the faith of senior commanders in highly motivated and well-trained subordinates which permitted - and inspired - lower echelon units to find optimal solutions to complex problem in minimum time, and 4) the high degree of personal initiative - cultivated on training and tactics ranges, in classrooms at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and flight briefing rooms across the USAF - which served as the ultimate sine quo non of the adaptation process. Colonel Andrews's study also serves to powerfully reaffirm the fundamental truth of the old Air Force adage that "flexibility is the key to airpower." As we confront an uncertain international security environment, a fundamental lesson of "Airpower against an Army" is that we must encourage flexibility in peacetime if we are to possess the physical, mental, and organizational agility that will be required to master the unforeseen realities of the next war.
In January and February 1991, Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) conducted an air-to-ground onslaught against Iraq's Republican Guard. The requirements of this operation conflicted in a number of respects with the US Air Force's extended preparations for conflict on a European battleground. A major case in point involved the low altitude tactics CENTAF crews had practiced for the previous decade and a half, tactics that were manifestly unsuited for the task that confronted them in Iraq. This paper was originally submitted as a thesis by Maj (now lieutenant colonel) William F. Andrews to the faculty of Air University's School of Advanced Airpower Studies for completion of graduation requirements, academic year 1995-96. Colonel Andrews's study, Airpower against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the Republican Guard, examines how CENTAF adjusted air operations against the Republican Guard to meet the realities of combat. Initial F-16 and B-52 attacks on the Republican Guard met little success. In response, CENTAF instituted six significant tactical innovations in the space of one week: A-10 deep interdiction, A-10 reconnaissance, F-16 killer scout operations, F-16 forward basing, F-111 and F-15E tank plinking, and the use of cockpit videotape as a source for bomb damage assessment. These innovations required CENTAF aviators to create new tactics in the midst of combat operations. Quickly devised and implemented, these new tactics markedly improved CENTAF's effectiveness against the Republican Guard. Critically weakened by air attack, the two guard divisions that stood and fought were annihilated during the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm. As Colonel Andrews makes clear, four factors proved instrumental in facilitating CENTAF's rapid adaptation to the realities of war: (1) air superiority which created a permissive environment for innovative tactics; (2) open-minded attitudes of senior commanders which nurtured the growth of new methods of operation; (3) the faith of senior commanders in highly motivated and well-trained subordinates which permitted-and inspired-lower echelon units to find optimal solutions to complex problems in minimum time; and (4) the high degree of personal initiative-cultivated on training and tactics ranges, in classrooms at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and flight briefing rooms across the USAF-which served as the ultimate sine qua non of the adaptation process. Colonel Andrews's study also serves to powerfully reaffirm the fundamental truth of the old Air Force adage that "flexibility is the key to airpower." As we confront an uncertain international security environment, a fundamental lesson of Airpower against an Army is that we must encourage flexibility in peacetime if we are to possess the physical, mental, and organizational agility that will be required to master the unforeseen realities of the next war.
Personal account by the U.S. Air Force general who planned and executed 1991 Persian Gulf War with emphasis on use of technology and new strategies as they apply to modern warfare.