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Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-13 Information Operations 28 April 2016 The purpose of information operations (IO) is to affect adversary and potential adversary decision making with the intent to ultimately affect their behavior in ways that help achieve friendly objectives. Information operations is defined as "the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities [IRCs] in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own." Deliberate targeting of an adversary's decision making process is enabled by understanding the cognitive factors related to that process, the information that they use, and how they receive and send information. IO is an integrating function, which means that it incorporates capabilities to plan, execute, and assess the information used by adversary decision makers, with the intent of influencing, disrupting, corrupting, or usurping that process. This is not the same as integrating non-lethal capabilities and activities, which may or may not have a behavior-related objective as their primary purpose.
Air Force Doctrine ANNEX 3-27 Homeland Operations 28 April 2016Introduction to Homeland OperationsHomeland Operations ConstructNational Policy for Homeland SecurityUSAF Support of DOD Homeland SecurityHomeland Security RelationshipsCommandOrganizationCommand RelationshipsOther AuthoritiesHD Planning Purpose and SupportPlanning, Execution, And AssessmentEmergency PreparationsAppendix: National Policy and Law
This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-13, Air and Space Doctrine. AFDD 3-1 Air Warfare establishes operational doctrine for air warfare. It provides initial guidance for conducting air operations as part of aerospace warfare. Specifically, this document contains beliefs and principles that guide the organization, command and control, employment, and support of air forces conducting wartime operations. It examines relationships among objectives, forces, environments, and actions that enhance the ability of air operations to contribute to achieving assigned objectives. It focuses on the sequencing of events and the application of forces and resources to ensure aerospace power makes useful contributions to military and national objectives. It examines the importance of command relationships, intelligence, space, logistics, and other factors to the planning and conduct of air warfare.
Air Force Doctrine ANNEX 3-17 Air Mobility Operations 5 April 2016 Air mobility operations doctrine represents an accumulation of best practices and lessons learned, from World War II to the most recent conflicts and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. Air mobility operations support all of the geographic combatant commanders and functional combatant commanders. The foundational components of air mobility operations-airlift, air refueling, air mobility support, and aeromedical evacuation-work with other combat forces to achieve national and joint force commander objectives. Joint doctrine defines air mobility as "the rapid movement of personnel, materiel, and forces to and from or within a theater by air. "The Department of Defense (DOD) transportation mission involves many transportation communities and assets, services, and systems owned by, contracted for, or controlled by the DOD. US Transportation Command serves as the manager of the transportation community and is supported by the Air Force's Air Mobility Command, the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and the US Navy's Military Sealift Command. Mobility air forces (MAF) provide rapid global mobility and conduct air mobility operations. These forces deliver the global reach and global power necessary to achieve US national objectives. The US military is called upon by national leaders to perform their functions around the globe either directly accomplishing national objectives or supporting other agencies. All Services and US government agencies rely upon Air Force MAF to rapidly move personnel and resources. "Mobility forces are more than 'enablers' and 'enhancers' in that they quickly project forces and take the fight to the enemy. As the United States moves into a realm of uncertain adversaries, it is the capability of our mobility forces that will ensure the force projection necessary to protect US national interests. "To properly discuss air mobility operations, the Air Force builds on the joint definition to include the support required to conduct air mobility operations.
Air Force Doctrine ANNEX 3-0 Operations and Planning 4 November 2016 Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0 is the Air Force's foundational doctrine publication on strategy and operational design, planning, employment, and assessment of airpower. It presents the Air Force's most extensive explanation of the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) and contains the Air Force's doctrinal discussion of operational design and some practical considerations for designing operations to coerce or influence adversaries. It presents doctrine on cross-domain integration and steady-state operations-emerging, but validated concepts that are integral to and fully complement EBAO. It establishes the framework for Air Force components to function and fight as part of a larger joint and multinational team. Specific guidance on particular types of Air Force operations can be found in other operational-level doctrine as well as Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures documents. This publication conveys basic understanding of key design and planning processes and how they are interrelated. It also educates Airmen in ways of thinking through these processes.
Much has changed in the overall operational environment in the past few years. The character of contemporary conflict has driven a significant shift in the US approach to warfighting. The large-scale, complex, force-on-force scenarios that drove much of Cold War planning, and were executed in Operation DESERT STORM and the opening stage of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are now viewed almost as the exception, replaced by the careful, precise, and relatively measured pace of irregular warfare against nontraditional enemies. Adversary capabilities may range from long-range, precision-guided attacks to explosive vests worn by suicide bombers. The threat of mass destruction from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks. These changes have significant, long-term implications for the planning and conduct of US operations: The need for current, precise, and detailed analysis requires a continuing expansion in the scale of information collection and processing; networks are as important as a single bullet or bomb. Sensors, shooters, and fusion centers are routinely interconnected worldwide to achieve a unified battle rhythm, and Threats against the US homeland will increase. The United States can expect future opponents to launch both terrorist and unconventional attacks on the territory of the United States. Civil, military, and industrial cyber networks have already seen an upswing in probes, intrusions, exploitations, and attacks. The proliferation of commercially available technology will allow adversaries to develop niche capabilities that will threaten, in varying degrees, the successful conduct of operations in areas where US forces were previously unchallenged. Space and cyber networks are increasingly vulnerable to a wide array of new threats. Adversary anti-access capabilities will continue to improve, challenging US ability to project power and influence. Countering these capabilities is vital to assure freedom of action in, through, and from air, space, and cyberspace. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, is the Air Force's foundational doctrine publication for Air Force operations in, through, and from the cyberspace domain. This document means to provide insight for Airmen to follow. This document speaks to Air Force support of maintaining Cyberspace Superiority, a common military function. Chapter 1, Cyberspace Fundamentals, establishes the fundamental nature and context of Air Force cyberspace operations in this newly defined operational environment. This chapter defines fundamental terms and concepts for cyberspace operations. Discussions in this chapter include the strategic environment, general strategic policy, missions, military challenges, the Airman's perspective, relationship to other doctrine, principles of war, tenets of airpower, and cross-domain integration. Chapter 2, Command and Organization, describes the command, control, and organization of cyberspace forces. It depicts operational-level policy, command relationships, and commander roles and responsibilities. It discusses how global and theater cyberspace operations will be conducted through integrated command, control, and organization of military capabilities to achieve JFC objectives. Chapter 3, Design, Planning, Execution, and Assessment, describes how Air Force cyberspace operations are designed, planned, executed, and assessed. Also described are legal concerns, logistics, and operational considerations across the range of military operations. Appendix A, Ten Things Every Airman Must Know, is a list of ten things that every Airman ought to know, with respect to cyberspace operations. Appendix B, Policy and Doctrine Related to Cyberspace Operations, matrix includes recent and relevant National, Department of Defense-level, joint, and Air Force documents, publications, and doctrine which are related to cyberspace operations.
This United States Air Force USAF manual, Air Force Doctrine Publication AFDP 3-60 Targeting November 2021, provides the fundamental principles for targeting which is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response while taking account of command objectives, operational requirements, and capabilities. This process is systematic, comprehensive, and continuous. Combined with a clear understanding of operational requirements, capabilities, and limitations, the targeting process identifies, selects, and exploits critical vulnerabilities within targeted systems to achieve the commanders' desired end state. Targeting is a command function requiring commander oversight and involvement to ensure proper execution. It is not the exclusive province of one specialty or division, such as intelligence or operations, but blends the expertise of many disciplines. Targeting occurs at all levels of warfare (strategic, operational, and tactical), across the competition continuum and over the full range of Air Force operations. It helps translate strategy into discrete actions by linking ends, ways, means, and risks. It allows commanders to choose the best ways to attain desired outcomes. From strategy comes the plans and guidance used to task specific capabilities through the tasking process. The processes of planning, tasking, targeting, and assessing effects provide a logical progression that forms the basis of decision-making. Targeting is often tied only to the kinetic delivery of capabilities. However, joint force commander objectives can be accomplished through a variety of non-kinetic capabilities and actions to create lethal and nonlethal effects. All of this involves the targeting process. To optimize military action, targeting should integrate the full spectrum of capabilities including conventional and nuclear operations. This allows joint forces to continue the fight in, around, and through nuclear or radiological environments. In addition, targeting should occur well before hostilities and continue through post-hostilities.
The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. A crucial part of achieving that mission involves obtaining and maintaining superiority in the air domain. That domain, defined for the first time in this publication, is the area, beginning at the Earth's surface, where the atmosphere has a major effect on the movement, maneuver, and employment of joint forces. Within that domain, forces exercise degrees of control or levels of influence, characterized as parity, superiority, or supremacy. The US has enjoyed at least air superiority in all conflicts since the Korean War. The US will probably retain that superiority in today's ongoing conflicts, but the prospect of near-peer competitors in the not-too-distant future raise the possibility of air parity - a condition in the air battle in which one force does not have air superiority over others - or even conceding superiority to the adversary if Air Force forces are not properly employed. Our possession of air superiority helps enable joint forces to dominate adversary operations in all domains and to achieve a wide range of cross-domain effects. Unless we can freely maneuver in the air while denying the enemy the ability to do the same, we do not have superiority. Therefore, this publication addresses how the commander of Air Force forces can best employ his assets within a joint force to achieve control in the air domain to enable the overall joint force effort. Counterair is more than just force protection or air and missile defense. It also includes offensive actions against an enemy's capabilities, allowing us to seize the initiative and force the adversary into a defensive posture. Furthermore, counterair is executed by more than just air assets. Counterair is a joint, multinational, and interagency team effort, comprising a combination of command and control systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, aircraft and missile systems in air-to-air and air-to-ground roles, and surface-to-air defense weapons. The effect of air superiority is not normally an end unto itself. Air superiority provides enormous military advantages, allowing the joint force greater freedom of action to carry out its assigned missions (freedom to attack) while minimizing its vulnerability to enemy detection and attack (freedom from attack). The success of any major air, land, or maritime operation may depend on the degree of air superiority achieved. This Air Force doctrine document provides guidance for designing, planning, integrating, coordinating, executing, and assessing counterair operations. It provides operational doctrine to gain and maintain control of the air. As such, it focuses on how air forces can be organized and employed to successfully conduct counterair operations.
Air Force Doctrine ANNEX 3-2 Irregular Warfare Airpower provides essential capabilities to the joint force across the range of military operations. This annex provides operational level doctrinal guidance for irregular warfare (IW) and presents fundamental IW principles and core IW activities in the context of challenges to US national security. Next, this annex defines IW, and highlights the role of airpower in IW and the main characteristics of IW that should be taken into account when developing IW-related strategy, plans, assessment, and command and control. This annex concludes with how Air Force forces are organized and presented, and Air Force capabilities are used to support IW operations.
With billions of computers in existence, cyberspace, 'the virtual world created when they are connected,' is said to be the new medium of power. Computer hackers operating from anywhere can enter cyberspace and take control of other people's computers, stealing their information, corrupting their workings, and shutting them down. Modern societies and militaries, both pervaded by computers, are supposedly at risk. As Conquest in Cyberspace explains, however, information systems and information itself are too easily conflated, and persistent mastery over the former is difficult to achieve. The author also investigates how far 'friendly conquest' in cyberspace extends, such as the power to persuade users to adopt new points of view. He discusses the role of public policy in managing cyberspace conquests and shows how the Internet is becoming more ubiquitous and complex, such as in the use of artificial intelligence.