Download Free Air Defence Initiative Program Cost And Schedule Not Yet Determined Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Air Defence Initiative Program Cost And Schedule Not Yet Determined and write the review.

This book presents the proceedings of the joint conference held in Delft, the Netherlands inJune 2012, incorporating the 3rd International Air Transport Operations Symposium ATOS, the 3rd Association of Scientific Development in Air Traffic Management in Europe ASDASeminar, the 6th International Meeting for Aviation Products Support Processes IMAPP and the 2012Complex World Seminar. The book includes the majority of academic papers presented at the conference, and provides a wide overview of the issues currently of importance in the world of air transport.pIOS Press is an international science, technical and medical publisher
This book contains more than 360 documents relevant to the international legal position of the Yugoslav territories in the 19th century, the creation of Yugoslavia as a common state of the Serbs, Croats & Slovenes, 1918, its constitutional development, & the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia & the creation of the new states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia & the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It includes documents from the beginning of the 19th century showing the international legal position of the Yugoslav territories under the Austro-Hungarian & Ottoman Empires, the independence of Serbia & Montenegro, recognized by the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, & the major events in the history of the creation of Yugoslavia as a joint state of the Serbs, Croats & Slovenes, in 1918, concerning both its international position & its constitutional organization. The process of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (covering the period from 1990 to September 1, 1993) is presented through reproduced documents of international organizations (United Nations, European Community, Western European Union, Organization of Islamic Conference, etc.), of the different conferences & forums (CSCE, Group of Seven, etc.) & documents issued by Yugoslav organs & the organs of new states of the former Yugoslavia. The book also includes documents of a constitutional nature concerning the creation of the new states of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia & the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It provides researchers in the field of international law, political science of history with documentary information involving international legal & constitutional aspects relating to Yugoslavia.
Since the mid-1950s, successive Canadian governments have grappled with the issue of Canada’s role in US ballistic missile defence programs. Until Paul Martin’s government finally said no, policy-makers responded to US initiatives with fear and uncertainty as they endlessly debated the implications – at home and abroad – of participation. However, whether this is the end of the story remains to be seen. Drawing on previously classified government documents and interviews with senior officials, James Fergusson examines Canada’s policy deliberations during five major US initiatives. He reveals that a combination of factors such as weak leadership and a tendency to place uncertain and ill-defined notions of international peace and security before national defence resulted in indecision on what role Canada would play in ballistic missile defence. In effect, policy-makers have failed to transform debates about the issue into an opportunity to define Canada’s strategic interests at home and on the world stage. Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense is the first comprehensive account of Canada’s response and indecision regarding US ballistic missile defence initiatives, and the implications of this inaction.
The Committee has serious concerns following the decision in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) programme. Although the MoD's own capability investigations have concluded that a MPA is the solution to the UK's maritime surveillance requirements over the next 20 years, the MoD has postponed any decision on a further MPA until at least the next SDSR in 2015. The MoD has acknowledged that the resultant capability gap cannot be completely covered by an existing single asset or collection of assets. The Committee is concerned that the MoD is sending mixed messages in respect of the need for a maritime patrol aircraft. On one hand it says that there is no requirement for such an aircraft and that it is not funded or in the programme but on the other hand it acknowledges that its absence is a risk and something may need to be done. The Committee is also concerned about the withdrawal of other maritime surveillance assets. However the report acknowledges the work the MoD has undertaken to explore the potential options for maritime surveillance in the longer term, such as unmanned systems, lighter-than-air vehicles and space technology. The report welcomes the establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group and the National Maritime Information Centre as first steps towards a more strategic and co-ordinated output and as a way of mitigating some of the capability gaps
This book, first published in 1981, examines the broader aspects of international strategic relations, and analyses Cold War developments within particular nations, fields of warfare and areas of political-military interaction. The role of force in international society changed as the nuclear deadlock between the superpowers continued, with military forces being deployed for political purposes in situations only just short of war. The balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces also changed as American technology increased and short-range nuclear missiles were deployed in Europe. This book also examines the development of strategic thinking in China, Japan and India, as well as insurgency in the Third World, so often the site for proxy superpower conflict.
In respect of its largest defence projects there are early signs that the Ministry of Defence has begun to make realistic trade-offs between cost, time, technical requirements and the amount of equipment to be purchased. Nevertheless, the continuing variances to cost and time show the MOD needs to do consistently better. This report, which gives a progress review of the 16 largest defence projects, shows that in the last year there has been a total forecast slippage of 139 months and increase in costs of £468 million. This means that, since the projects were approved, costs have increased by £6.6 billion (around 12 per cent more than the planned cost) and the projects have been delayed by 468 months, taking almost a third longer than originally expected. It would be unrealistic to expect MOD and industry to identify every risk at the start of technically challenging projects. However, the continuing problems indicate that MOD has more to learn from historic. The MOD is accepting the capability risk and some wider costs resulting from these project delays and is having to make difficult decisions about long-term capabilities. The MOD has made a significant investment in new and upgraded helicopters to address the shortfall identified in the NAO's 2004 report. The MOD has also spent £787 million on air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft to support current operations and address capability gaps, such as those caused by the previously reported delays to the A400M transport aircraft. However, capability gaps remain
The Committee's findings include that the Smart Acquisition procurement programme, introduced by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 1998, has failed to deliver on almost all counts. In 2002-03, the top 20 defence equipment projects experienced in-year cost increases totalling £3.1 billion, as well as time delays on promised delivery dates. The head of the Defence Procurement Agency has found that only one of the seven principles underlying Smart Acquisition has been implemented in full, and a fundamental overhaul of the initiative has been announced. On specific projects, the Committee's findings include that the in-service date for Eurofighter/Typhoon was achieved during 2003, a total of 54 months late; and an assessment phase contract for the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) is to be placed at the end of the year, although there are concerns that the in-service date of 2009 is unrealistic.