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This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel el Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a variety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be on guard against them in the future. Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, and popular support.
Hitler's forces had pressed in on the small Belgian town in a desperate offensive designed to push back the Allies, starting the Battle of the Bulge. So far, the US soldiers had managed to repel waves of attackers and even a panzer onslaught, but as their ammunition dwindled, the weary paratroopers of the 101st Airborne could only hope for a miracle--a miracle in the form of General George S. Patton and his Third Army. More than a hundred miles away, Patton, ordered to race his men to Bastogne, was already putting in motion the most crucial charge of his career. Tapped to spearhead his counterstrike against the Wehrmacht was the Fourth Armored Division, a bloodied but experienced unit that had fought and slogged its way across France. But blazing a trail into Belgium meant going up against some of the best infantry and tank units in the German Army. Failure to reach Bastogne in time could result in the overrunning of the 101st--a catastrophic defeat that could turn the tide of the war and secure victory for the Nazis.
If the machine gun changed the course of ground combat in the First World War, it was the tank that shaped ground combat in World War II. The tank was introduced in World War I in an effort to end the stalemate of the machine gun versus barbed-wire trenches, and by World War II, the tank’s mobility and firepower became a rolling, thundering difference-maker on the battlefield. In this detailed, deeply researched, and heavily illustrated book, tank expert Richard Anderson tells the story of how the United States developed its armored force, turning it into a war-winning weapon in World War II that powered American ground forces and supplied armies around the world, including the British and Soviets. For decades, American tanks of World War II have been undervalued in comparisons with German and Soviet tanks—and it’s true that the best of American armor tended to underperform the best of German and Soviet armor during the war. That’s because the U.S. had a different goal: not only to create battleworthy tanks like the Sherman, and to develop other tanks, but also to supply American allies with serviceable, combat-ready tanks. The United States did all this, but until now the complete story of American tanks in World War II has yet to be told. Anderson’s book is deeper and more thorough a chronicle of American tanks in World War II than has ever been done. This book is colorful, vivid, and thought-provokingly insightful on how the U.S. produced a tank force capable of conducting its own battlefield efforts and sustaining key allies around the world. This will be the go-to volume on American tanks for years to come.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
A description of General Eisenhower's wartime command, focusing on the general, his staff, and his superiors in London and Washington and contrasting Allied and enemy command organizations.