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The strengthening of institutions that oversee and implement anti-corruption measures in Afghanistan is a key operational principle of the U.S. Government's draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for Afghanistan. The United Nations Convention against Corruption requires Afghanistan to establish accounting and auditing standards, as well as related oversight. As Afghanistan's Supreme Audit Institution, the Control and Audit Office (CAO) is responsible for auditing the financial matters of the government. It has audit authority over state entities within central and provincial governments as well as public enterprises, and carries out audits of funds provided to the Afghan government by external donors. This report assesses: (1) the CAO's current capability and performance in fulfilling its mandate, (2) the assistance provided by the international community to strengthen the internal capacity of the CAO, and (3) the assistance provided by the U.S. Government to strengthen the CAO's internal capacity. This report is part of a series of audits SIGAR is conducting to address U.S. efforts to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law in Afghanistan. SIGAR conducted this performance audit in Kabul, Afghanistan, and in Washington, D.C., from December 2009 to April 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Afghanistan's Control and Audit Office requires operational and budgetary independence, enhanced authority, and focused international assistance to effectively prevent and detect corruptio .
This report examines how the U.S. government -- primarily the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, Treasury, and Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) -- understood the risks of corruption in Afghanistan, how the U.S. response to corruption evolved, and the effectiveness of that response. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and makes recommendations for both legislative and executive branch action. This analysis reveals that corruption substantially undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. It concludes that failure to effectively address the problem means that U.S. reconstruction programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and, at worst, will fail. Figures and tables.. This is a print on demand report.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DoD) award direct assistance to Afghanistan, using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds that provide funds through the Afghan national budget. This report assessed: (1) the extent to which the U.S., through USAID and DoD, has increased direct assistance; (2) USAID and DoD steps to ensure accountability for bilateral direct assistance; and (3) USAID and DoD steps to ensure accountability for direct assistance via multilateral trust funds for Afghanistan. The report reviewed USAID, DoD, and multilateral documents and met with U.S. officials in Wash., D.C., and Afghanistan. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.

Afghanistan

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 296


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Since 2002, the U.S. has appropriated more than $50 billion for reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan, and in 2010 the Obama administration submitted budget requests for an additional $20 billion to help the Afghan government build its capacity to defend itself and govern effectively. Fighting corruption and increasing accountability are important components of the U.S. reconstruction strategy for Afghanistan. This report identifies: (1) U.S. assistance to help the Afghan government develop its anti-corruption capabilities; and (2) the capacity of Afghanistan's key anti-corruption institutions. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find report.
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's review of U.S. and other donor efforts to strengthen the capability of Afghanistan's High Office of Oversight (HOO) to fight corruption. It includes five recommendations. This report is part of a series of audits of U.S. efforts to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law in Afghanistan. In addition to its own funds, the HOO has received about $1 million in assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is budgeted to receive a total of $7.3 million from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This assistance has been devoted to the institutional development of the HOO. With this assistance, the HOO has undertaken anti-corruption initiatives, with varying degrees of progress. These include a vehicle registration project and an asset declaration process for Afghan public officials. However, the HOO suffers from significant gaps in operational capacity. The HOO is greatly understaffed, and many of its employees are either inexperienced or lack basic skills, such as computer use and information gathering techniques. Moreover, the HOO' enabling legislation does not invest it with sufficient authority or enforcement power and the legislation needs substantial revision. Furthermore, the HOO lacks the organizational, external, and personal independence required by international standards for an oversight institution. Finally, although the international assistance provided thus far to the HOO has been greatly valued, the U.S. government has had no office or individual specifically designated to oversee or coordinate U.S. assistance to the HOO, and U.S. overall coordination and level of demonstrated commitment of support to the HOO needs improvement.