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Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: America’s Longest War examines the lessons of how America’s “longest war” came to an ignominious end with staggering consequences for the United States and the Afghan nation. Afghanistan today faces an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, looming threat of a civil war and a resurgence of violent extremism organizations similar to pre-9/11. As the U.S. enters a new era in the strategic geopolitical Great Power Competition, an analysis of the original mission intent, shifting policy and strategic objectives, and ineffective implementation of security, political and economic programs reveal critical lessons and questions such as: What led to the “strategic failure” of the U.S. in Afghanistan? What decisions resulted in the present-day humanitarian, civil, and political crises in Afghanistan? Were these consequences in fact avoidable? Was there an alternative approach that could have maintained the hard-fought gains of the last two decades, and better demonstrated America's standing as a defender of global human rights? Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: America’s Longest War further explores lessons of the past negotiations between the United States, Taliban, and former U.S. backed Afghan government to suggest alternative pathways that honor the original intent of the mission and meet present-day obligations to an Afghan nation in crisis.
Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war.
Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: America's Longest War examines the lessons of how America's "longest war" came to an ignominious end with staggering consequences for the United States and the Afghan nation. Afghanistan today faces an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, looming threat of a civil war and a resurgence of violent extremism organizations similar to pre-9/11. As the U.S. enters a new era in the strategic geopolitical Great Power Competition, an analysis of the original mission intent, shifting policy and strategic objectives, and ineffective implementation of security, political and economic programs reveal critical lessons and questions such as: What led to the "strategic failure" of the U.S. in Afghanistan? What decisions resulted in the present-day humanitarian, civil, and political crises in Afghanistan? Were these consequences in fact avoidable? Was there an alternative approach that could have maintained the hard-fought gains of the last two decades, and better demonstrated America's standing as a defender of global human rights? Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: America's Longest War further explores lessons of the past negotiations between the United States, Taliban, and former U.S. backed Afghan government to suggest alternative pathways that honor the original intent of the mission and meet present-day obligations to an Afghan nation in crisis.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
Domestic public opinion is frequently and correctly described as a crucial battlefront in the war in Afghanistan. Commentary by media and political figures currently notes not only the falling support for the war in the United States but also in many of its key allies in Europe and elsewhere, making it all the more difficult for the Obama administration to secure the help it believes it needs to bring the war to a successful conclusion. This study is an extensive examination of the determinants of domestic support for and opposition to the war in Afghanistan in the United States and in five of its key allies--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Tracing the trajectory of public opinion on the war from the original invasion in 2001 to the fall of 2009, this paper concludes that the combination of mounting casualties with a declining belief that the war could be won by the Coalition is the key factor driving the drop in support. Other factors, such as the deployment of numerous and shifting rationales by the political leadership in various countries, and the breakdown of elite consensus have played important but secondary roles in this process.
Endgame in Afghanistan: For Whom the Dice Rolls covers a wide territory related to the war in Afghanistan, the stakes the whole world-and not just the United States-has in it, and its possible outcome. It shows that it is not merely a war for the future of Afghanistan, but a conflict between the regressive worldview of the Taliban and al Qaeda and modernity. The book examines the consequences of an American exit from Afghanistan under circumstances indicating a defeat; the ability of the Karzai government or its successor to hold its own thereafter; and the regional and global geo-strategic consequences, including those on Pakistan, of a Taliban-al Qaeda takeover of Afghanistan. It also explores the possibility of the United States arriving at a peace settlement with the Taliban as well as that of the Americans winning the Afghan war. Taking an analytical multi-disciplinary approach, coupled with meticulous research, this book focuses on areas hitherto neglected. Linking known but scattered information in entirely new and cohesive analyses, the author presents the kind of comprehensive picture of the Afghan war and its consequences that no other book has done.
This book investigates agency in the historical resistance movement in Kashmir by initiating a fresh conversation about Muslim Kashmiri women. It exhibits Muslim women not merely as accidental victims but conscientious agents who choose to operate within the struggles of self-determination. The experience of victimization stimulates women to take control of their lives and press for change. Despite experiencing isolating political conditions, Kashmiri women do not internalize their supposed inferiority. The author shows that women’s struggles against patriarchy are at the heart of a very complex historical resistance to the Indian rule.
I am not an expert on foreign affairs, and I acknowledge that opinions are like assholes--everybody got one. In this book, I will share with you my experiences as an Afghanistan/Pakistan Hand (AFPAK Hand) member working in Afghanistan to train, advise, and assist the new government's national defense institutions on how to properly plan, program, budget, and execute funding in support of military and policing operations.I found myself caught in the mist of what seemed to be our endless attempt at bad parenting. Some reasons people chose to do things the way they did, I still can't understand. You can point out countless clichés, but it all boiled down to a systemic trend of sending in poorly trained military advisors and ego-driven leaders at all levels. Compounding this fact was that many corrupt Afghan leaders had no desire to change or embrace advances in their system until they could figure out a way to effectively manipulate it, especially if the advances didn't serve their personal interest, greed, or some prefer calling it, "self-preservation."