Download Free Admiral Gorshkov On Navies In War And Peace Analysis Of The Cold War Soviet Navy Use Of Russian Naval Forces In Wartime And Peacetime Ussr Military Strategy Politico Strategic Approach To War Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Admiral Gorshkov On Navies In War And Peace Analysis Of The Cold War Soviet Navy Use Of Russian Naval Forces In Wartime And Peacetime Ussr Military Strategy Politico Strategic Approach To War and write the review.

This unique book summarizes and analyzes the series of articles entitled "Navies in War and Peace" by Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov, USSR, during the Cold War. The analysis by three analysts of the Soviet Navy covers several aspects of the Gorshkov articles: the possibility that they reveal an internal debate over Soviet naval missions and budgets, their implications for the future course of Soviet naval construction, and their meaning for the use of Soviet naval forces in wartime and peacetime. "Navies in war and peace: " Content, context, and significance * Admiral Gorshkov's statement . * Subject and objectives * Central argument * Historical discussion * Discussion of the present * The context of Gorshkov's statement * Possible political influences on publication * Comparison with other statements * Conclusions * Notes * Advocacy of seapower in an internal debate * Gorshkov is advocating * The debate * The wider debate and cleavage in high political circles * The debate clarifies Soviet naval developments * The crux of the naval debate and its current status * The subjects of the naval policy debate * Gorshkov's argument and his view of the navy * Concluding comments * Notes * Gorshkov's doctrine of coercive naval diplomacy in both peace and war * Gorshkov's main points * Interpretation of Gorshkov * "Politico-strategic" approach to war * Withholding strategy * Survivability of SSBNs * Safeguarding the submarine * Diverting enemy ASW forces * Problems of interpretation * Deterrence * "Defense" and "combat" capabilities * "Defense" as the "main task" * Naval missions in support of state interests * Protection of state interests * Local war * Requirements for state interest and local war missions * Polemics in the Gorshkov series * Against the marshals * Against naval limitations * Notes
The series of articles entitled 'Navies in War and Peace' by Soviet navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov, are summarized and analyzed by three analysts of the Soviet navy. Their analyses cover several aspects of the Gorshkov articles: the possibility that they reveal an internal debate over Soviet naval missions and budgets, their implications for the future course of Soviet naval construction, and their meaning for the use of Soviet naval forces in wartime and peacetime.
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov was the product of a tradition unlike those of his Western contemporaries. He had a unique background of revolution, civil war, world wars, and the forceful implementation of an all-controlling communist dictatorship. Out of this background of violence and overwhelming transformation came a man with a vivid appreciation of the role and value of navies, but with his own unique ideas about the kind of navy that the Soviet Union required and the role that navy should play in Soviet military and national strategy. Western naval observers have persisted in attempting to define Admiral Gorshkov in Western naval terms. Many of these observers have been baffled when they found that the man and his actions simply did not fit conventional narratives. This book lays out the tradition, background, experiences, and thinking of the man as they relate to the development of the Soviet Navy that Gorshkov commanded for almost three decades and that was able to directly challenge the maritime dominance of the United States—a traditional sea power. His influence persists to this day, as the Russian Navy that is at sea in the twenty-first century is, to a significant degree, based on the fleet that Admiral Gorshkov built.
This collection of documents, released in 2017 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), spans three decades from the 1960s to the 1980s and focuses on the CIA's collection and analysis of the Soviet Navy. In addition, this collection is a continuation of previous releases on the Warsaw Pact forces and adds 82 newly released documents ranging from translations of the clandestinely-obtained articles from the Soviet military journal, Military Thought, to the high-level National Intelligence Estimates. Many of the documents in this collection reflect the tensions in the bipolar Cold War and specifically focus on the Soviet Navy's development of its naval forces during that timeframe. After World War II, U.S. leaders faced a nuclear armed rival and in no time, Soviet tanks were in the streets of Budapest, and the first Sputnik satellite was launched. Understanding how the Soviet Union envisioned the next combat situation required in-depth knowledge of both their high-level theory of warfare and probable tactical behavior. The collection will provide new insight into the Agency's analysis of the evolving Soviet Navy and its military posture during the Cold War.Under Stalin's direction, the Soviet Navy underwent a dramatic expansion after World War II, first in the Cruiser-destroyer force and later in submarines, becoming by many measures the second largest Navy in the world by 1957. The Stalin-era navy generally reflected the Soviet World War II experience but did not reflect the impact of nuclear weapons nor did it represent any real expeditionary capability-the Soviet Navy was seldom seen outside of home waters. When Stalin died the Navy lost its patron. After Khrushchev became First Secretary of the party in 1955, the decisively altered Stalin's naval policy and the direction of military policy and doctrine in general. His vision for the navy was not without precedent. In the earliest days of the Communist state until the early 1930s, the navy and naval thinking was dominated by ex-Tsarist officers, the "old school" theorists, who advocated the development of a high-seas fleet analogous in composition and intent to the fleets of other naval powers.
Based on formal content analysis of the writings of Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov and past Soviet ministers of defense and heads of the Politburo, James J. Tritten interprets what the Soviets say they will do in the event of nuclear war. He then constructs a hardware and exercise analysis of the strategic employment of the Soviet Navy in a nuclear war, offering three possible cases–the a bolt from the blue, with existing forces on patrol; full mobilization; and a plausible case of partial mobilization. In addition, Dr. Tritten examines, from a Soviet perspective, concepts of deterrence, the strategic goals and missions of the fleet, nuclear targeting policy, the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) disruption mission, and the potential for tactical nuclear warfare limited to the sea. The author concludes by assessing the implications of Soviet politico-military planning for Western defense strategy and arms control.
Admiral Gorshkov has transformed the Soviet fleet into a world sea power for the first time in Russian history. He is Russia's most brilliant naval strategist of all time. He has created the modern Soviet navy. His book examines the main components of sea power among which attention is focused on the naval fleet of the present day, capable of conducting operations and solving strategic tasks in different regions of the world's oceans, together with other branches of the armed forces and independently
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov led the Soviet Navy for almost three decades during the height of the Cold War. He was the architect of the Red Fleet, turning it from little more than a coastal defense force into the most powerful navy that the Soviet Union ever possessed. 21st Century Gorshkov is a collection of articles, many of which have not previously been published in English, and passages from Admiral Gorshkov’s more famous books, each with an introduction linking the work to the challenges facing navies everywhere today. Strategists worldwide have much to learn from the Soviet legend behind the most rapid naval expansion program in peacetime history. Gorshkov’s ideas on naval power remain relevant today.
As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy’s naval strategy system from the post–World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s’maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred –ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy’s maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year “strategy of means” where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force’s ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy’s ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post–Cold War era.
Two of Great Britain's leading maritime specialists take a comprehensive, analytical look at the development, purposes, and importance of the Soviet Navy.