Download Free Addressing The Fog Of Cog Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Addressing The Fog Of Cog and write the review.

This book examines multiple insurgent areas of operation and the dynamic and varied nature of multiple insurgent operational centers of gravity, recognizing and accounting for the notion that insurgency can form a complex, shifting mosaic. More specifically, many insurgencies conduct different types and combinations of operations at the local or tactical levels. For example, in one area an insurgency can be weak and consequently conducting small-scale operations, where forces of the same insurgency in an adjacent area can be strong and conducting larger-scale operations. From a macro or theater perspective, these variations form a mosaic not of small colored tiles, but of areas of varying insurgent efforts. This contextual understanding of the mosaic nature of most insurgencies and their multiple operational centers of gravity facilitates equally nuanced and tailored efforts to effectively counter insurgency. Similarly, conducting effective counterinsurgency depends on recognizing when there are multiple insurgencies operating in the same area. The first section is a review of key literature on centers of gravity, insurgency, centers of gravity in counterinsurgency, and the independent variables used in the case studies. The second section of the manuscript consists of two case studies. The conclusion is the final section of the manuscript and provides a summary of insights into centers of gravity in counterinsurgency. Carl von Clausewitz's discussion on a center of gravity appears relatively late in On War. Clausewitz stated that: "[O]ne must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." Based on this statement, each belligerent has a center of gravity, and a center of gravity must be determined in relative opposition. In other words, each side's center of gravity emerges depending on its political aims in opposition to the opposition's political aims. Thus, Clausewitz explicitly supports the notion that multiple centers of gravity vary by time, space, and purpose. While Clausewitz's key statement on a center of gravity defines a single center of gravity, he allowed for multiple centers of gravity. He stated that it was a goal or ideal to analyze back to the fewest number or, preferably, to one center of gravity. Clausewitz outlined two aspects important when attempting to isolate a single center of gravity. The first was to examine the distribution of political power. For example, an alliance may have only one center of gravity if the members of that alliance only loosely share political interests. The second analytical aspect was the situation in the theater of war. "[T]he effect that events in a given theater will have elsewhere can only be judged in each particular case. Only then can it be seen how far the enemy's various centers of gravity can be reduced to one." Clausewitz added, that when an enemy's "resistance cannot be reduced to a single center of gravity...two almost wholly separate wars have to be fought simultaneously."
Many of war's lethal failures are attributable to ignorance caused by a dearth of contemporary, accessible theory to inform warfighting, strategy, and policy. To remedy this problem, Colonel Geoffrey F. Weiss offers an ambitious new survey of war's nature, character, and future in the tradition of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. He begins by melding philosophical and military concepts to reveal war's origins and to analyze war theory's foundational ideas. Then, leveraging science, philosophy, and the wisdom of war's master theorists, Colonel Weiss presents a genuinely original framework and lexicon that characterizes and clarifies the relationships between humanity, politics, strategy, and combat; explains how and why war changes form; offers a methodology for forecasting future war; and ponders the permanence of war as a human activity. The New Art of War is an indispensable guide for understanding human conflict that will change how we think and communicate about war.
National security affairs analystEhud Eilam examines the strategy of containment in the Middle East as it is currently pursued. For the United States, containment is a way to avoid war with Iran and thwart its nuclear weapons program. For Israel it has been a way to prevent a confrontation with the Palestinians in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In other cases containment is meant to weaken a foe without starting a war, as Israel did by bombing shipments of weapons to Hezbollah. Containment was also part of the war in Syria—because the West lacked the ability to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, though it cost the civilian population there dearly. Egypt has been trying to contain both its enormous economic hardships and ISIS, primarily in the Sinai Peninsula. Ultimately Eilam provides important and timely insights into the Middle East’s perennially fluid and volatile political environment. His insights and analyses will be of interest not least in the corridors of power both here and abroad.
Includes a foreword by Major General David A. Rubenstein. From the editor: "71F, or "71 Foxtrot," is the AOC (area of concentration) code assigned by the U.S. Army to the specialty of Research Psychology. Qualifying as an Army research psychologist requires, first of all, a Ph.D. from a research (not clinical) intensive graduate psychology program. Due to their advanced education, research psychologists receive a direct commission as Army officers in the Medical Service Corps at the rank of captain. In terms of numbers, the 71F AOC is a small one, with only 25 to 30 officers serving in any given year. However, the 71F impact is much bigger than this small cadre suggests. Army research psychologists apply their extensive training and expertise in the science of psychology and social behavior toward understanding, preserving, and enhancing the health, well being, morale, and performance of Soldiers and military families. As is clear throughout the pages of this book, they do this in many ways and in many areas, but always with a scientific approach. This is the 71F advantage: applying the science of psychology to understand the human dimension, and developing programs, policies, and products to benefit the person in military operations. This book grew out of the April 2008 biennial conference of U.S. Army Research Psychologists, held in Bethesda, Maryland. This meeting was to be my last as Consultant to the Surgeon General for Research Psychology, and I thought it would be a good idea to publish proceedings, which had not been done before. As Consultant, I'd often wished for such a document to help explain to people what it is that Army Research Psychologists "do for a living." In addition to our core group of 71Fs, at the Bethesda 2008 meeting we had several brand-new members, and a number of distinguished retirees, the "grey-beards" of the 71F clan. Together with longtime 71F colleagues Ross Pastel and Mark Vaitkus, I also saw an unusual opportunity to capture some of the history of the Army Research Psychology specialty while providing a representative sample of current 71F research and activities. It seemed to us especially important to do this at a time when the operational demands on the Army and the total force were reaching unprecedented levels, with no sign of easing, and with the Army in turn relying more heavily on research psychology to inform its programs for protecting the health, well being, and performance of Soldiers and their families."
A selective review of modern decision science and implications for decision-support systems. The study suggests ways to synthesize lessons from research on heuristics and biases with those from "naturalistic research." It also discusses modern tools, such as increasingly realistic simulations, multiresolution modeling, and exploratory analysis, which can assist decisionmakers in choosing strategies that are flexible, adaptive, and robust.