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This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agent’s inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, "objective" approach in normative ethics. It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label "agent," must be engaged during an act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an act’s moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomson’s dismissal of the agent knowledge and volition requirements, Scanlon’s arguments for a derivative relevance of intentions to permissibility, Frowe’s "causal roles" of agents in the moral evaluation of acts, and Bennett’s explicit defense of the objective approach. The book concludes by offering the author’s preferred replacement for the objective approach, an Aristotelian-Thomist view of acts. Acts, Intentions, and Moral Evaluation will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, just war theory, the ethics of self-defense, and philosophy of action.
This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agent's inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, 'objective' approach in normative ethics. It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label 'agent', must be engaged during an act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an act's moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomson's dismissal of the agent knowledge and volition requirements, Scanlon's arguments for a derivative relevance of intentions to permissibility, Frowe's causal roles of agents in the moral evaluation of acts, and Bennett's explicit defense of the objective approach. The book concludes by offering the author's preferred replacement for the objective approach, an Aristotelian-Thomist view of acts. Acts, Intentions, and Moral Evaluation will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, just war theory, the ethics of self-defense, and philosophy of action.
Business ethics - The Death Penalty - War and peace - Medical ethics Euthanasia - Medical ethics at the end of life - Sexual ethics - Global economic ethics.
The first edition of The Morality of War was one of the most widely-read and successful books ever written on the topic. In this second edition, Brian Orend builds on the substantial strengths of the first, adding important new material on: cyber-warfare; drone attacks; the wrap-up of Iraq and Afghanistan; conflicts in Libya and Syria; and protracted struggles (like the Arab-Israeli conflict). Updated and streamlined throughout, the book offers new research tools and case studies, while keeping the winning blend of theory and history featured in the first edition. This book remains an engaging and comprehensive examination of the ethics, and practice, of war and peace in today’s world.
"Supererogation" is an awkward term but a useful concept. While not a term that we use every day, the concept is very familiar to most of us. It is an act that is neither obligatory nor forbidden and that possesses moral worth. While Roman Catholics and a large number of moral philosophers affirm the possibility and value of such acts, Evangelicals from the time of the Reformation have rejected them. Yet, this is to their detriment. Relying on Gregory Mellema's insight that acts of supererogation are possible without compromising the orthodox Evangelical doctrine of justification, I argue that there is clear evidence for supererogation in the New Testament and that performing such deeds with a proper motive is essential in an Evangelical account of supererogation. It is my hope that Evangelicals will reconsider the possibility of supererogation and embrace the concept as a useful tool in counseling contexts, biblical interpretation, and homiletics.
This innovative book is written in an accessible, compact style that sets forth and explains a sound framework for professional ethics that readers can quickly put into practice in analyzing and writing about cases. Through a series of moral conflicts, it aims at improving the skills of moral reasoning and achieving moral development.
This volume examines the complex and vitally important ethical questions connected with the deployment of nuclear weapons and their use as a deterrent. A number of the essays contained here have already established themselves as penetrating and significant contributions to the debate on nuclear ethics. They have been revised to bring out their unity and coherence, and are integrated with new essays. The books exceptional rigor and clarity make it valuable whether the reader's concern with nuclear ethics is professional or personal. Part I explores the morality of nuclear deterrrence from each of the two dominant traditions in moral philosophy, deontology and consequentialism, and points out a number of interesting ethical dilemmas. Part II criticizes a variety of alternatives to deterrence - unilateral nuclear disarmament, world government, strategic defense against ballistic missiles, and nuclear coercion - and argues for mutual nuclear disarmament as a realistic and desirable long-run alternative.
In Soft Shepherd or Almighty Pastor? contributors seek to go beyond the taboo on "power" within pastoral contexts. They not only discuss fundamental theological and philosophical questions about power but also develop ways to prevent power abuse in pastoral context. Power is considered as omnipresent and is analyzed in its positive and negative aspects. Not only the classical associations of "power over" or "domination" are discussed in relation to ecclesial and pastoral situations, but also forms of power linked to "service" and "care." A sacrificial spirituality might also be dangerous. Soft Shepherd or Almighty Pastor? gathers ten contributions, all of which reflect on the complexity of power issues, also in relation to sexual abuse. The authors argue that dealing adequately with power requires renewed forms of theological thinking, especially about ministry.
This feminist critique of just war reasoning argues for an expansion of responsibility for harms inflicted on civilians in war.
One of the most sweeping, categorical, and absolute phrases that has ever been employed by the hierarchical teaching authority of the Roman Catholic Church refers to a concept called ‘intrinsic evil’. In short, intrinsic evil is invoked to describe certain kinds of human acts that can never be morally justified or permitted, regardless of the intention of the person who performs them or any circumstances within which they take place. The most common examples of things that people recognize as being classified as intrinsically evil are, suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and the use of contraception. The ease with which the term ‘intrinsic evil’ gets right to the point, thereby making the fairly complex field of ethical reflection seem manageable and widely accessible, is one of the reasons for its attractiveness within Roman Catholic ethical teaching. However, this kind of simplification risks or even encourages avoidance of critical questions such as, "Where does this concept come from and what meanings are associated with it?", "Is it supposed to express an ethical judgment or to form it?", and "Is there a substantial difference between intrinsically evil acts and morally wrong acts?". The contributors to this volume engage with these and similar issues surrounding the formation and use of the concept, and in the process dispel the naïve belief that the concept can somehow escape the complexity of ethical discourse or establish certainty of ethical judgments that is otherwise unattainable. In light of this realization, the most important issue becomes whether the concept can still be useful for Catholic theological ethics. Although the contributors to this volume do not completely agree on this issue, they have shown that a critical scrutiny of the concept must necessarily precede settling this issue and that the concept might not be able to withstand such critical judgment. The book provides a description of the origin and meanings of the concept of intrinsic evil. While the term itself tends to create confusion rather than clarity, eliminating its use does not imply that we cannot still have a meaningful discussion about ‘things that should never be done’.