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A new class of access pricing problems is analyzed in which upstream firms compete for customers and access to these customers is required by downstream markets. Using fixed-to-cellular calls as an example, a model is presented which shows that the determination of cellular termination charges is quite different to standard access pricing problems. Competition between cellular firms leads to access prices being set either at, or above, the monopoly level. Applications are given for other market settings, including the termination of long-distance calls on competing local exchange networks and the setting of interchange fees in payment systems.
This report addresses the regulation of access to telecommunication networks. Development of competition and the success of liberalisation often depend on the access terms and conditions chosen, and public policy interest in getting these terms and conditions right is important.
This volume focuses on incentive regulation and competition. While much of the regulatory action is taking place in telecommunications, the impact of competition and the resultant regulatory change is being felt in other traditional public utilities including electricity. The book reviews topics including price caps, incentive regulation, market structure and new regulatory technologies.
The development of competition and the success of liberalisation measures within public utility industries often depends on access terms and conditions. Prepared by the OECD's Competition Committee, this report focuses on the regulation of access to essential facilities within the telecommunications industry, drawing on theory and practice of access pricing to help regulators and policy-makers learn from OECD experiences to achieve efficient and competitive outcomes.
We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient-Component Pricing Rule (GECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component-Pricing Rule, Marginal Cost Pricing, or any non-negative fixed access charges.
Access prices are important for competition in formerly monopolistic industries, and also for industries where competition has long been established such as payment and credit card networks or mobile telecommunications. Organized into five parts, this book provides theoretical and empirical analyses in access pricing and related topics.
"The question which this report addresses is how the Commission should seek to ensure the success of initiatives taken with a view to liberalising the network industries. In other words, the key question is not 'how should a regulatory authority establish network access prices within the framework of its own particular objectives and institutional arrangements?' but 'within the framework of European competition law, how should the Commission take a view as to whether a particular set of network access prices is anti-competitive?'"--Introduction.
We develop a framework, extending the conventional duopoly model by replacing the Hotelling line with a simplex in high-dimension spaces, to study the competition and access regulation of multiple networks. We first characterize the competitive equilibrium when the substitutabilities of the networks are not too high, or the access charges are nearly cost-based. We then analyze how the equilibrium market shares respond to marginal variations in the access charges under various regimes of access regulation, and thereby examine the efficiency implications of such regulation regimes. In particular, we analyze the asymmetric scenario in which some networks are incumbent and some are entrants. It is shown that some existing results of the duopoly do not extend to a multi-firm setting, largely because regulation of multiple networks is structurally far richer.