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2014 Reprint of 1959 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. The organization of the book is simple and logical, the style extremely lucid and readable. In proposing measures of reform, the author e examines the current money and credit structure to see how it works, examines the role that government should play, and what criteria should guide the use of powers granted the monetary authorities. An essay and a powerful theoretical statement from an economist who would go on to dominate his field for the next thirty years.
Since the end of the Great Recession in 2009 the central banks of the advanced countries have taken unprecedented actions to reflate and stimulate their economies. There have been significant differences in the timing and pace of these actions. These independent monetary policy actions have had significant spillover effects on the economies and monetary policy strategies of other advanced countries. In addition the monetary policy actions and interventions of the advanced countries have had a significant impact on the emerging market economies leading to the charge of 'currency wars.' The perceived negative consequences of spillovers from the actions of national central banks has led to calls for international monetary policy coordination. The arguments for coordination based on game theory are the same today as back in the 1980s, which led to accords which required that participant countries follow policies to improve global welfare at the expense of domestic fundamentals. This led to disastrous consequences. An alternative approach to the international spillovers of national monetary policy actions is to view them as deviations from rules based monetary policy. In this view a return to rules based monetary policy and a rolling back of the " global great deviation" by each country's central bank would lead to a beneficial policy outcome without the need for explicit policy coordination. In this book we report the results from a recent conference which brought together academics, market participants, and policy makers to focus on these issues. The consensus of much of the conference was on the need for a classic rules based reform of the international monetary system.
This volume contains two major papers prepared for the Bank of England's Tercentenary Symposium in June 1994. The first, by Forrest Capie, Charles Goodhart and Norbert Schnadt, provides an authoritative account of the evolution of central banking. It traces the development of both the monetary and financial stability concerns of central banks, and includes individual sections on the evolution and constitutional positions of 31 central banks from around the world. The second paper, by Stanley Fischer, explores the major policy dilemmas now facing central bankers: the extent to which there is a short-term trade-off between inflation and growth; the choice of inflation targets; and the choice of operating procedures. Important contributions by leading central bankers from around the world, and the related Per Jacobsen lecture by Alexander Lamfalussy, are also included in the volume.
The background of monetary policy; The tools of the FRS; Debt management and banking reform; The goals and criteria of monetary policy.
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.
MONETARY PROBLEMS—a by-product of the indirect system of exchange—have long plagued the nations of the world. History is replete with instances in which such problems led not only to economic instability and uncertainty, but to political crises as well. In our own American experience there has hardly been a period when the economy was not beset by one type of monetary ill or another. Consider, for example, the more important monetary disturbances of our own time, viz., those of the last 30 years or so. Our legacy from the financial collapse of 1929 was a monetary and banking system which was virtually defunct. Though some progress was made in shoring up our monetary and banking institutions after 1933, this of itself was inadequate to help us escape the deflation and mass unemployment which persisted throughout the 1930’s. For the decade of the 1940’s, of course, the pendulum swung to the other side of the arc. Following the outbreak of World War II, and particularly after our direct involvement in 1941, an attempt was made to hold the line against inflation. This attempt achieved at best only partial success. Support by the Federal Reserve System of the prices of government securities, wartime military expenditures, the postwar investment boom, and the postwar pent-up demand for consumer goods backed by liquid assets acquired during the War combined to produce a rise in prices throughout the War and early postwar period. Although inflation subsided somewhat after 1948, it was intensified by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in the period after 1950. During the latter part of 1953, and throughout 1954 and 1955, prices remained relatively stable. But in 1956, the inflationary rise received a new stimulus. Caused largely by another investment boom, the inflationary movement had such momentum that it caused prices to rise even in the face of the 1957-1958 recession. Professor Friedman’s objective in this third of the Moorhouse I. X. Millar Lecture Series is certainly not one of finding a formula which will eradicate all uncertainty and instability attending monetary disturbances. For these, as he puts it, are “unavoidable concomitants of progress and change.” However, it is possible to attenuate further the amplitude of our fluctuations by modifying, and in some cases completely revamping the monetary and banking arrangements currently in force in the United States. Specifically, this is the task to which Professor Friedman addresses himself. This classic is organized as follows: Chapter One. The Background of Monetary Policy Why Should Government Intervene in Monetary and Banking Questions? The Historical Background The Period From 1837 To 1843 The Contraction of 1873-79 The 1890’s The Contraction of 1907-08 Under the Federal Reserve System Conclusion Chapter Two. The Tools of the Federal Reserve System Tools of Specific Credit Policy Eligibility Requirements Control Over Margin Requirements Control Over Consumer Installment Credit Control Over Interest Paid by Banks on Deposits Tools of Monetary Policy The Sufficiency of Open Market Operations Rediscounting Variation in Reserve Requirements Conclusion Chapter Three. Debt Management and Banking Reform Debt Management Banking Reform Defects of Present Banking System Possible Remedies How 100% Reserves Would Work Transition to 100% Reserves The Relation of 100% Reserves to Debt Management Why Interest Should Be Paid on Reserves How Interest Payments on Reserves Might Be Determined Conclusion Chapter Four. The Goals and Criteria of Monetary Policy International Monetary Relations Internal Monetary Policy Conclusion Summary of Recommendations
A rare insider's account of the inner workings of the Japanese economy, and the Bank of Japan's monetary policy, by a career central banker The Japanese economy, once the envy of the world for its dynamism and growth, lost its shine after a financial bubble burst in early 1990s and slumped further during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. It suffered even more damage in 2011, when a severe earthquake set off the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. However, the Bank of Japan soldiered on to combat low inflation, low growth, and low interest rates, and in many ways it served as a laboratory for actions taken by central banks in other parts of the world. Masaaki Shirakawa, who led the bank as governor from 2008 to 2013, provides a rare insider's account of the workings of Japanese economic and monetary policy during this period and how it challenged mainstream economic thinking.
At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.
Vital perspectives for the divided Trump era on what the Constitution's framers intended when they defined the extent—and limits—of presidential power One of the most vexing questions for the framers of the Constitution was how to create a vigorous and independent executive without making him king. In today's divided public square, presidential power has never been more contested. The President Who Would Not Be King cuts through the partisan rancor to reveal what the Constitution really tells us about the powers of the president. Michael McConnell provides a comprehensive account of the drafting of presidential powers. Because the framers met behind closed doors and left no records of their deliberations, close attention must be given to their successive drafts. McConnell shows how the framers worked from a mental list of the powers of the British monarch, and consciously decided which powers to strip from the presidency to avoid tyranny. He examines each of these powers in turn, explaining how they were understood at the time of the founding, and goes on to provide a framework for evaluating separation of powers claims, distinguishing between powers that are subject to congressional control and those in which the president has full discretion. Based on the Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, The President Who Would Not Be King restores the original vision of the framers, showing how the Constitution restrains the excesses of an imperial presidency while empowering the executive to govern effectively.
In a recently released New York Fed staff report, we present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track time-varying sources of systemic risk.