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* An exceptional illustrated account of the Maginot Line Contrary to popular opinion, the Maginot Line performed its duty without fault and fulfilled every role that was expected of it. After the war, the Line wrongly became the ideal scapegoat for the greatest military and political disaster ever suffered by France. Marc Halter, author of History of the Maginot Line, removes the mysteries that have long surrounded the legend of the much maligned fortification. In his work Halter explores the true history of these fortifications, their genesis, their functions, their construction, and the fierce fighting that took place in Alsace-Lorraine and in the Alps. He also restores the memory of the undefeated defenders of the fortress who can be counted among the first French Resistance fighters of 1940. Brian Chin, an American artist, brings a detailed knowledge of every aspect of this modern fortress system to his presentation of the settings and characters of this era. His realistic drawings bring us inside this closed world of concrete and reveal the secrets of this remarkable achievement. The comic book style employed in History of the Maginot Line is an innovative and exciting medium through which to communicate the fascinating history behind an often forgotten piece of French history. AUTHOR: Author of numerous articles and essays, Marc Halter, is an expert on the Maginot Line, which he has presented to thousands of tourists. Brian B. Chin is the author of a book on the harbour defences of San Francisco as well as a graphic album on the taking of a German fort at Metz. Illustrated throughout
"The Maginot Line, the complex system of strongpoints constructed between the world wars by the French to protect against attack from Germany, is one of the most famous, extensive and controversial defensive schemes in all military history. It stretched from Belgium to Switzerland, and from Switzerland to the Mediterranean, and it represented the most advanced and ambitious system of static defenses of its time. Much of this historic line -- with its fortresses, artillery positions, barbed-wire networks, casemates, concrete bunkers -- has survived and can be visited today ... The strategic thinking that gave rise to this enormous feat of military engineering is described, as is the planning, design, and construction of the line -- and its operational history. Each of the key sites is described in detail, and visitor information and plans are provided"--Jacket.
“[A] stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and Pétain, Poincaré and Blum—all emerge with veritable life in them. The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness.”—Michael Hurst, American Historical Review “Admirable...Instead of working backward from 1940, seeking causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French military policy in the broadest possible context of international developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism.”—Charles C. Bright, Political Science Quarterly The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a convincing view of how France’s military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation—and why they failed.
As German troops entered Paris following their victory in June 1940, the American journalist William L. Shirer observed that they carried cameras and behaved as "naïve tourists." One of the first things Hitler did after his victory was to tour occupied Paris, where he was famously photographed in front of the Eiffel Tower. Focusing on tourism by German personnel, military and civil, and French civilians during the war, as well as war-related memory tourism since, War Tourism addresses the fundamental linkages between the two. As Bertram M. Gordon shows, Germans toured occupied France by the thousands in groups organized by their army and guided by suggestions in magazines such as Der Deutsche Wegleiter fr Paris [The German Guide for Paris]. Despite the hardships imposed by war and occupation, many French civilians continued to take holidays. Facilitated by the Popular Front legislation of 1936, this solidified the practice of workers' vacations, leading to a postwar surge in tourism. After the end of the war, the phenomenon of memory tourism transformed sites such as the Maginot Line fortresses. The influx of tourists with links either directly or indirectly to the war took hold and continues to play a significant economic role in Normandy and elsewhere. As France moved from wartime to a postwar era of reconciliation and European Union, memory tourism has held strong and exerts significant influence across the country.
A few of the fortifications and fortified lines of the world wars are well known and have often been written about, illustrated and studied. But they tend to distract attention from the wide range of fixed defenses constructed across Europe on an enormous scale after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, during a period of insecurity and aggression. That is why this new, highly illustrated study, which covers the entire continent, is so valuable. The authors examine the major fortified positions and describe their strategic purpose, their design and construction, and the role they played in military planning and operations. The outstanding contribution of the major military architects of the time is a key theme. The work of Séré de Rivières, Brialmont and others had a major influence on the course of the First World War and on the fortifications built before and during the Second World War. Their approach is visible in the designs for the Maginot Line, the East and West walls of Germany, the Vallo Alpino in Italy, the Soviet Stalin and Molotov lines, the Mannerheim and Salpa lines of Finland, the Greek Metaxas Line, the Beneš Line of Czechoslovakia as well as the defenses built by the Dutch and Scandinavians. The breadth of the coverage, the degree of detail and the numerous illustrations make the book essential reading and reference for anyone who has a special interest in the world wars and the history of fortifications.
Ernest R. May's Strange Victory presents a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, Strange Defeat, about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of. In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances? Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field. Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.
Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography. Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army's defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows us to discover important implications for the study of national strategy today, but also serves to sharpen our understanding of the origins of World War II.
The Great War that engulfed Europe between 1914 and 1918 was a catastrophe for France. French soil was the site of most of the fighting on the Western Front. French dead were more than 1.3 million, the permanently disabled another 1.1 million, overwhelmingly men in their twenties and thirties. The decade and a half before the war had been years of plenty, a time of increasing prosperity and confidence remembered as the Belle Epoque or the good old days. The two decades that followed its end were years of want, loss, misery, and fear. In 1914, France went to war convinced of victory. In 1939, France went to war dreading defeat. To explain the burden of winning the Great War and embracing the collapse that followed, Benjamin Martin examines the national mood and daily life of France in July 1914 and August 1939, the months that preceded the two world wars. He presents two titans: Georges Clemenceau, defiant and steadfast, who rallied a dejected nation in 1918, and Edouard Daladier,hesitant and irresolute, who espoused appeasement in 1938 though comprehending its implications. He explores novels by a constellation of celebrated French writers who treated the Great War and its social impact, from Colette to Irène Némirovsky, from François Mauriac to Antoine de Saint-Exupéry. And he devotes special attention to Roger Martin du Gard, the1937 Nobel Laureate, whose roman-fleuve The Thibaults is an unrivaled depiction of social unraveling and disillusionment. For many in France, the legacy of the Great War was the vow to avoid any future war no matter what the cost. They cowered behind the Maginot Line, the fortifications along the eastern border designed to halt any future German invasion. Others knew that cost would be too great and defended the "Descartes Line": liberty and truth, the declared values of French civilization. In his distinctive and vividly compelling prose, Martin recounts this struggle for the soul of France.
The French Revolution, politics and the modern nation -- French and the civilizing mission -- Paris and magnetic appeal -- France stirs up the melting pot -- France hurtles into the future.
In 1940, the German army fought and won an extraordinary battle with France in six weeks of lightning warfare. With the subtlety and compulsion of a novel, Horne’s narrative shifts from minor battlefield incidents to high military and political decisions, stepping far beyond the confines of military history to form a major contribution to our understanding of the crises of the Franco-German rivalry. To Lose a Battle is the third part of the trilogy beginning with The Fall of Paris and continuing with The Price of Glory (already available in Penguin).