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This collection of philosophical essays looks at various technical problems in the use of probability theory for guidance in practical decisions. This text is intended for those who already have a basic grounding in philosophy, logic and probabilty theory.
The Equation of Knowledge: From Bayes' Rule to a Unified Philosophy of Science introduces readers to the Bayesian approach to science: teasing out the link between probability and knowledge. The author strives to make this book accessible to a very broad audience, suitable for professionals, students, and academics, as well as the enthusiastic amateur scientist/mathematician. This book also shows how Bayesianism sheds new light on nearly all areas of knowledge, from philosophy to mathematics, science and engineering, but also law, politics and everyday decision-making. Bayesian thinking is an important topic for research, which has seen dramatic progress in the recent years, and has a significant role to play in the understanding and development of AI and Machine Learning, among many other things. This book seeks to act as a tool for proselytising the benefits and limits of Bayesianism to a wider public. Features Presents the Bayesian approach as a unifying scientific method for a wide range of topics Suitable for a broad audience, including professionals, students, and academics Provides a more accessible, philosophical introduction to the subject that is offered elsewhere
This volume brings together many of Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes: Newcomb's problem, the Monty Hall problem, the two-envelope paradox, the sorites paradox, and the Sleeping Beauty problem. Newcomb's problem arises because the ordinary concept of practical rationality constitutively includes normative standards that can sometimes come into direct conflict with one another. The Monty Hall problem reveals that sometimes the higher-order fact of one's having reliably received pertinent new first-order information constitutes stronger pertinent new information than does the new first-order information itself. The two-envelope paradox reveals that epistemic-probability contexts are weakly hyper-intensional; that therefore, non-zero epistemic probabilities sometimes accrue to epistemic possibilities that are not metaphysical possibilities; that therefore, the available acts in a given decision problem sometimes can simultaneously possess several different kinds of non-standard expected utility that rank the acts incompatibly. The sorites paradox reveals that a certain kind of logical incoherence is inherent to vagueness, and that therefore, ontological vagueness is impossible. The Sleeping Beauty problem reveals that some questions of probability are properly answered using a generalized variant of standard conditionalization that is applicable to essentially indexical self-locational possibilities, and deploys "preliminary" probabilities of such possibilities that are not prior probabilities. The volume also includes three new essays: one on Newcomb's problem, one on the Sleeping Beauty problem, and an essay on epistemic probability that articulates and motivates a number of novel claims about epistemic probability that Horgan has come to espouse in the course of his writings on paradoxes. A common theme unifying these essays is that philosophically interesting paradoxes typically resist either easy solutions or solutions that are formally/mathematically highly technical. Another unifying theme is that such paradoxes often have deep-sometimes disturbing-philosophical morals.
Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) is the founder of the subjective interpretation of probability, together with the British philosopher Frank Plumpton Ramsey. His related notion of “exchangeability” revolutionized the statistical methodology. This book (based on a course held in 1979) explains in a language accessible also to non-mathematicians the fundamental tenets and implications of subjectivism, according to which the probability of any well specified fact F refers to the degree of belief actually held by someone, on the ground of her whole knowledge, on the truth of the assertion that F obtains.
This Element has two main aims. The first one (sections 1-7) is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim (sections 8-13) focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'.
This volume presents a definitive introduction to twenty core areas of philosophical logic including classical logic, modal logic, alternative logics and close examinations of key logical concepts. The chapters, written especially for this volume by internationally distinguished logicians, philosophers, computer scientists and linguists, provide comprehensive studies of the concepts, motivations, methods, formal systems, major results and applications of their subject areas. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic engages both general readers and experienced logicians and provides a solid foundation for further study.
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This volume presents twelve original essays on the metaphysics of science, with particular focus on the physics of chance and time. Experts in the field subject familiar approaches to searching critiques, and make bold new proposals in a number of key areas. Together, they set the agenda for future work on the subject.
The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. Philosophical Theories of Probability is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.