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Game theory is the theory of social situations, and the majority of research into the topic focuses on how groups of people interact by developing formulas and algorithms to identify optimal strategies and to predict the outcome of interactions. Only fifty years old, it has already revolutionized economics and finance, and is spreading rapidly to a wide variety of fields. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games is an assessment of the state of the art in its field and the first modern book on linear-quadratic game theory, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing strategic decision making problems in economics and management. Linear quadratic dynamic models have a long tradition in economics, operations research and control engineering; and the author begins by describing the one-decision maker LQ dynamic optimization problem before introducing LQ differential games. Covers cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and treats the standard information structures (open-loop and feedback). Includes real-life economic examples to illustrate theoretical concepts and results. Presents problem formulations and sound mathematical problem analysis. Includes exercises and solutions, enabling use for self-study or as a course text. Supported by a website featuring solutions to exercises, further examples and computer code for numerical examples. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games offers a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of this extensively used class of economic models, and will appeal to applied mathematicians and econometricians as well as researchers and senior undergraduate/graduate students in economics, mathematics, engineering and management science.
This book presents current advances in the theory of dynamic games and their applications in several disciplines. The selected contributions cover a variety of topics ranging from purely theoretical developments in game theory, to numerical analysis of various dynamic games, and then progressing to applications of dynamic games in economics, finance, and energy supply. A unified collection of state-of-the-art advances in theoretical and numerical analysis of dynamic games and their applications, the work is suitable for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students in applied mathematics, engineering, economics, as well as environmental and management sciences.
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
This book mostly results from a selection of papers presented during the 11th IFAC (International Federation of Automatic Control) Workshop on Time-Delay Systems, which took place in Grenoble, France, February 4 - 6, 2013. During this event, 37 papers were presented. Taking into account the reviewers' evaluation and the papers' presentation the best papers have been selected and collected into the present volume. The authors of 13 selected papers were invited to participate to this book and provided a more detailed and improved version of the conference paper. To enrich the book, three more chapters have been included from specialists on time-delay systems who presented their work during the 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, which held in December 10 - 13, 2013, at Florence, Italy. The content of the book is divided into four main parts as follows: Modeling, Stability analysis, Stabilization and control, and Input-delay systems. Focusing on various topics of time-delay systems, this book will be interesting for researchers and graduate students working on control and system theory.
This volume contains papers that were presented at the Symposium on Computation in Economics and Finance organised under the auspices of the International Federation of Automatic Control and the Society for Computational Economics. The Conference was held at Cambridge University, UK, from 29th June to the 1st July 1998. It attracted many members of the international academic and research community in computational economics, finance and econometrics. This volume brings together a number of papers that demonstrate the use of computational methods in a variety of areas in economics and finance. The contributions to the Symposium reflect the various shifts in the profession and the increasing use of computationally intensive techniques for the analysis of economic processes. Papers have been grouped into sections, according to their context rather than in the order in which they were presented. Section 1 groups papers in the area of Finance including both theoretical and empirical studies. Section 2 reflects a fast growing interest in seeking to model economic processes in novel ways drawing on the emerging literature in artificial intelligence and genetic adaptation. Section 3 demonstrates the growing use of computational languages as a tool for the analysis and modelling of economic systems. Subsequent sections range across many areas involving game theory, policy co-ordination, agent based models, time series and econometrics, neural networks, nonlinearities and simulation methods. The preparation and selection of this volume owes much to the assistance and advice of both Berccedil; Rustem and David Kendrick and the steering committee of the Society for Computational Economics.
This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
This contributed volume considers recent advances in dynamic games and their applications, based on presentations given at the 17th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games, held July 12-15, 2016, in Urbino, Italy. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, these papers cover various aspects of dynamic game theory including mean-field games, stochastic and pursuit-evasion games, and computational methods for dynamic games. Topics covered include Pedestrian flow in crowded environments Models for climate change negotiations Nash Equilibria for dynamic games involving Volterra integral equations Differential games in healthcare markets Linear-quadratic Gaussian dynamic games Aircraft control in wind shear conditions Advances in Dynamic and Mean-Field Games presents state-of-the-art research in a wide spectrum of areas. As such, it serves as a testament to the continued vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and graduate students.
Equilibrium Problems and Applications develops a unified variational approach to deal with single-valued, set-valued and quasi-equilibrium problems. The authors promote original results in relationship with classical contributions to the field of equilibrium problems. The content evolved in the general setting of topological vector spaces and it lies at the interplay between pure and applied nonlinear analysis, mathematical economics, and mathematical physics. This abstract approach is based on tools from various fields, including set-valued analysis, variational and hemivariational inequalities, fixed point theory, and optimization. Applications include models from mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium of non-cooperative games, and Browder variational inclusions. The content is self-contained and the book is mainly addressed to researchers in mathematics, economics and mathematical physics as well as to graduate students in applied nonlinear analysis. - A rigorous mathematical analysis of Nash equilibrium type problems, which play a central role to describe network traffic models, competition games or problems arising in experimental economics - Develops generic models relevant to mathematical economics and quantitative modeling of game theory, aiding economists to understand vital material without having to wade through complex proofs - Reveals a number of surprising interactions among various equilibria topics, enabling readers to identify a common and unified approach to analysing problem sets - Illustrates the deep features shared by several types of nonlinear problems, encouraging readers to develop further this unifying approach from other viewpoints into economic models in turn
The problem of privacy-preserving data analysis has a long history spanning multiple disciplines. As electronic data about individuals becomes increasingly detailed, and as technology enables ever more powerful collection and curation of these data, the need increases for a robust, meaningful, and mathematically rigorous definition of privacy, together with a computationally rich class of algorithms that satisfy this definition. Differential Privacy is such a definition. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy starts out by motivating and discussing the meaning of differential privacy, and proceeds to explore the fundamental techniques for achieving differential privacy, and the application of these techniques in creative combinations, using the query-release problem as an ongoing example. A key point is that, by rethinking the computational goal, one can often obtain far better results than would be achieved by methodically replacing each step of a non-private computation with a differentially private implementation. Despite some powerful computational results, there are still fundamental limitations. Virtually all the algorithms discussed herein maintain differential privacy against adversaries of arbitrary computational power -- certain algorithms are computationally intensive, others are efficient. Computational complexity for the adversary and the algorithm are both discussed. The monograph then turns from fundamentals to applications other than query-release, discussing differentially private methods for mechanism design and machine learning. The vast majority of the literature on differentially private algorithms considers a single, static, database that is subject to many analyses. Differential privacy in other models, including distributed databases and computations on data streams, is discussed. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy is meant as a thorough introduction to the problems and techniques of differential privacy, and is an invaluable reference for anyone with an interest in the topic.