Download Free A New Foundation For Representation In Cognitive And Brain Science Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online A New Foundation For Representation In Cognitive And Brain Science and write the review.

The purpose of the book is to advance in the understanding of brain function by defining a general framework for representation based on category theory. The idea is to bring this mathematical formalism into the domain of neural representation of physical spaces, setting the basis for a theory of mental representation, able to relate empirical findings, uniting them into a sound theoretical corpus. The innovative approach presented in the book provides a horizon of interdisciplinary collaboration that aims to set up a common agenda that synthesizes mathematical formalization and empirical procedures in a systemic way. Category theory has been successfully applied to qualitative analysis, mainly in theoretical computer science to deal with programming language semantics. Nevertheless, the potential of category theoretic tools for quantitative analysis of networks has not been tackled so far. Statistical methods to investigate graph structure typically rely on network parameters. Category theory can be seen as an abstraction of graph theory. Thus, new categorical properties can be added into network analysis and graph theoretic constructs can be accordingly extended in more fundamental basis. By generalizing networks using category theory we can address questions and elaborate answers in a more fundamental way without waiving graph theoretic tools. The vital issue is to establish a new framework for quantitative analysis of networks using the theory of categories, in which computational neuroscientists and network theorists may tackle in more efficient ways the dynamics of brain cognitive networks. The intended audience of the book is researchers who wish to explore the validity of mathematical principles in the understanding of cognitive systems. All the actors in cognitive science: philosophers, engineers, neurobiologists, cognitive psychologists, computer scientists etc. are akin to discover along its pages new unforeseen connections through the development of concepts and formal theories described in the book. Practitioners of both pure and applied mathematics e.g., network theorists, will be delighted with the mapping of abstract mathematical concepts in the terra incognita of cognition.
urrently a paradigm shift is occurring in for the conventional understanding of represen- which the traditional view of the brain as tions. The paper also summarizes the rationale for C representing the "things of the world" is the selection of contributions to this volume, which challenged in several respects. The present volume will roughly proceed from relatively "realist" c- is placed at the edge of this transition. Based on the ceptions of representation to more "constructivist" 1997 conference "New Trends in Cognitive Sci- interpretations. The final chapter of discussions, ence" in Vienna, Austria, it tries to collect and in- taped during and at the end of the conference, p- grate evidence from various disciplines such as p- vides the reader with the possibility to reflect upon losophy of science, neuroscience, computational the different approaches and thus contributes to b- approaches, psychology, semiotics, evolutionary ter and more integrative understanding of their biology, social psychology etc. , to foster a new thoughts and ideas. understanding of representation. The subjective experience of an outside world This book has a truly interdisciplinary character. It seems to suggest a mapping process where environ- is presented in a form that is readily accessible to mental entities are projected into our mind via some professionals and students alike across the cognitive kind of transmission. While a profound critique of sciences such as neuroscience, computer science, this idea is nearly as old as philosophy, it has gained philosophy, psychology, and sociology.
Our thoughts are meaningful. We think about things in the outside world; how can that be so? This is one of the deepest questions in contemporary philosophy. Ever since the 'cognitive revolution', states with meaning-mental representations-have been the key explanatory construct of the cognitive sciences. But there is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. Powerful new methods in cognitive neuroscience can now reveal information processing in the brain in unprecedented detail. They show how the brain performs complex calculations on neural representations. Drawing on this cutting-edge research, Nicholas Shea uses a series of case studies from the cognitive sciences to develop a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation. His approach is distinctive in focusing firmly on the 'subpersonal' representations that pervade so much of cognitive science. The diversity and depth of the case studies, illustrated by numerous figures, make this book unlike any previous treatment. It is important reading for philosophers of psychology and philosophers of mind, and of considerable interest to researchers throughout the cognitive sciences.
O Nuallain concludes that a science that fully attempts to treat cognition must remain au fait with the findings from all other approaches to the study of mind, from the purely behaviorist to the purely experiential."--BOOK JACKET.
Despite our impression of a seamless spatial world, mature human spatial knowledge is composed of sub-systems, each specialized. This book uses the case of Williams syndrome — a rare genetic deficit - to argue for specialization of function in both normal and unusual development. The evidence suggests a speculative hypothesis linking the genetic deficit to changes in the timing of emergence for different sub-systems. More broadly, the book shows the complexity of spatial cognition, its genetic correlates, and realization in the brain.
'Representation in Mind' is the first book in the new series 'Perspectives on Cognitive Science' and includes well known contributors in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychology and cognitive science.The papers in this volume offer new ideas, fresh approaches and new criticisms of old ideas. The papers deal in new ways with fundamental questions concerning the problem of mental representation that one contributor, Robert Cummins, has described as "THE problem in philosophy of mind for some time now". The editors' introductory overview considers the problem for which mental representation has been seen as an answer, sketching an influential framework, outlining some of the issues addressed and then providing an overview of the papers. Issues include: the relation between mental representation and public, non-mental representation; misrepresentation; the role of mental representations in intelligent action; the relation between representation and consciousness; the relation between folk psychology and explanations invoking mental representations
How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.
A groundbreaking argument challenging the traditional linguistic representational model of cognition proposes that representational states should be conceptualized as the cognitive equivalent of scale models. In this groundbreaking book, Jonathan Waskan challenges cognitive science's dominant model of mental representation and proposes a novel, well-devised alternative. The traditional view in the cognitive sciences uses a linguistic (propositional) model of mental representation. This logic-based model of cognition informs and constrains both the classical tradition of artificial intelligence and modeling in the connectionist tradition. It falls short, however, when confronted by the frame problem—the lack of a principled way to determine which features of a representation must be updated when new information becomes available. Proposed alternatives, including the imagistic model, have not so far resolved this problem. Waskan proposes instead the Intrinsic Cognitive Models (ICM) hypothesis, which argues that representational states can be conceptualized as the cognitive equivalent of scale models. Waskan argues further that the proposal that humans harbor and manipulate these cognitive counterparts to scale models offers the only viable explanation for what most clearly differentiates humans from other creatures: their capacity to engage in truth-preserving manipulation of representations.
The Mind and Brain are usually considered as one and the same nonlinear, complex dynamical system, in which information processing can be described with vector and tensor transformations and with attractors in multidimensional state spaces. Thus, an internal neurocognitive representation concept consists of a dynamical process which filters out statistical prototypes from the sensorial information in terms of coherent and adaptive n-dimensional vector fields. These prototypes serve as a basis for dynamic, probabilistic predictions or probabilistic hypotheses on prospective new data (see the recently introduced approach of "predictive coding" in neurophilosophy). Furthermore, the phenomenon of sensory and language cognition would thus be based on a multitude of self-regulatory complex dynamics of synchronous self-organization mechanisms, in other words, an emergent "flux equilibrium process" ("steady state") of the total collective and coherent neural activity resulting from the oscillatory actions of neuronal assemblies. In perception it is shown how sensory object informations, like the object color or the object form, can be dynamically related together or can be integrated to a neurally based representation of this perceptual object by means of a synchronization mechanism ("feature binding"). In language processing it is shown how semantic concepts and syntactic roles can be dynamically related together or can be integrated to neurally based systematic and compositional connectionist representations by means of a synchronization mechanism ("variable binding") solving the Fodor-Pylyshyn-Challenge. Since the systemtheoretical connectionism has succeeded in modeling the sensory objects in perception as well as systematic and compositional representations in language processing with this vector- and oscillation-based representation format, a new, convincing theory of neurocognition has been developed, which bridges the neuronal and the cognitive analysis level. The book describes how elementary neuronal information is combined in perception and language, so it becomes clear how the brain processes this information to enable basic cognitive performance of the humans.