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Policymakers have long needed an improved analytic basis for their investment decisions regarding military intelligence assets. This report presents a new methodology for measuring the operational value of military intelligence, electronic warfare, and target acquisition (IEW/TA) and also describes two prototype models for studying IEW/TA in an operational context. The methodology enables the operational value of intelligence assets and activities to be expressed in quantifiable terms useful to resource acquisition decisionmakers, military planners, and operational managers. One application of the methodology is to help build the intelligence portion of the Army five-year program. The two prototype models were designed as aids for performing policy and other analysis of key issues. One is a spreadsheet model that can be used to assess the operational value of a given IEW/TA architecture at a point in time under various conditions; the other is a dynamic simulation that can be used to study how the value of IEW/TA changes through the course of an operation.
This report will be of particular interest to those who are involved in policy analysis for the Army's five-year program; in developing and applying methodology and models to assess military value, particularly the value of intelligence; and in comparing the potential contributions of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare/Target Acquisition (IEW/TA) systems, employment doctrine, and technologies in various military operations scenarios. The purpose of this project was to develop a methodology and one or more prototypes models for studying IEW/TA in an operational context; more specifically, the methodology enables the operational value of intelligence assets and activities to be expressed in quantifiable terms useful to resource acquisition decisionmakers, military planners, and operational managers. The two prototype models were designed as aids for performing policy and other analysis of key issues. The term prototype refers to a model that has been developed to the point that its usefulness has been demonstrated. The models can be used to help look for gaps and redundancies in current and proposed capabilities, help justify resource allocations, and seek desired mixes and employment strategies of IEW/TA assets and their communications network architectures to support operations. They were also used as tools for developing the methodology.
This Note documents the final executive-level briefing of a project called "Measuring the Operational Value of Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Target Acquisition (OPVIEW)". The purpose of the OPVIEW project was to develop and apply innovative analytic tools for quantifying the operational value of intelligence, electronic warfare/target acquisition (IEW/TA) assets and activities. It was expected that such tools would have applications to a broad range of analyses regarding military intelligence capabilities. The innovative feature of the OPVIEW project was that it attempted to relate IEW/TA results to the operational commander's decision making. The OPVIEW analytic tools accept as inputs both the commander's information requirements and the IEW/TA collection results. They also provide a way to track how collected information affects decisions about current plans and conduct of operations. The outputs of the models represent the effect or "value" of IEW/TA in this sense. The project developed three analytic tools: a methodology for relating commanders' requirements to collection results and two models that employ the methodology. The "static" model provides an aggregate assessment of the capability of specified systems and system packages to meet commanders' information needs in specified scenarios. The "dynamic" model is more detailed and broader in scope: it assesses the impact of intelligence collection on commanders' decision making over the course of an operation from initial planning to its conclusion. All three tools depend fundamentally on subjective-judgment data, but these data are systematically developed using experts in operations planning, intelligence collection and production, and analysis. The Note concludes with a discussion of the status of the three tools developed during the project and potential future directions for their use. (44 figures).
Policymakers have long needed an improved analytic basis for their investment decisions regarding military intelligence assets. This report presents a new methodology for measuring the operational value of military intelligence, electronic warfare, and target acquisition (IEW/TA) and also describes two prototype models for studying IEW/TA in an operational context. The methodology enables the operational value of intelligence assets and activities to be expressed in quantifiable terms useful to resource acquisition decisionmakers, military planners, and operational managers. One application of the methodology is to help build the intelligence portion of the Army five-year program. The two prototype models were designed as aids for performing policy and other analysis of key issues. One is a spreadsheet model that can be used to assess the operational value of a given IEW/TA architecture at a point in time under various conditions; the other is a dynamic simulation that can be used to study how the value of IEW/TA changes through the course of an operation.
How can the success (or failure) of Army special operations missions be assessed? The authors develop a methodology for doing so and illustrate the process through a fictional scenario.
A growing number of JMIC students have began to incorporate replicable research design into their theses. This distillation of Master Sergeant Folker's theses shows how fruitful this approach can be. By taking advantage of on-site research funds available from the College, he managed, in brief visits to four Unified Command Joint Intelligence Centers, to carry out a controlled experiment to measure the impact of analyst familiarity with and use of one structured analytic technique hypothesis testing. His findings, if corroborated by follow-on studies, could have a substantial impact on Intelligence Community analytical practices, and even some influence on how senior policy officials react to analytical products. Managers of analytical personnel might also note that structured methods would appear, from this study of non-specialized joint intelligence center analysts, to be useful to specialized analysts who may be required to move beyond their areas of deep expertise to cover new or unfamiliar assignments.
The authors describe a method for developing and using a model to measure the value of scout/reconnaissance to operational performance. The method employs (1) modern measurement techniques to credibly model the human processes involved in situation assessment and operational performance and (2) operator interactive simulation of scout/recon system operations in high-resolution combat models to represent a system's performance on the battlefield. The situation-assessment/operational-effectiveness model is system independent. It can be used to measure the value of any type of reconnaissance system and is relevant to any ground-combat force, organization, or composition. The method fills a critical gap in analytical support for scout/recon system development and acquisition decisionmaking because it provides a quantitative analytical basis for measuring and comparing combat intelligence systems in terms of resulting operational performance. The model applies only to heavy divisions, having been developed from the judgments of intelligence and operations officers about heavy divisions imminently to be engaged in combat with large, modern, enemy armored forces.
Includes publications previously listed in the supplements to the Index of selected publications of the Rand Corporation (Oct. 1962-Feb. 1963)