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The authors describe a method for developing and using a model to measure the value of scout/reconnaissance to operational performance. The method employs (1) modern measurement techniques to credibly model the human processes involved in situation assessment and operational performance and (2) operator interactive simulation of scout/recon system operations in high-resolution combat models to represent a system's performance on the battlefield. The situation-assessment/operational-effectiveness model is system independent. It can be used to measure the value of any type of reconnaissance system and is relevant to any ground-combat force, organization, or composition. The method fills a critical gap in analytical support for scout/recon system development and acquisition decisionmaking because it provides a quantitative analytical basis for measuring and comparing combat intelligence systems in terms of resulting operational performance. The model applies only to heavy divisions, having been developed from the judgments of intelligence and operations officers about heavy divisions imminently to be engaged in combat with large, modern, enemy armored forces.
"Information Gathering in Classical Greece opens with chapters on tactical, strategic, and covert agents. Methods of communication are explored, from fire-signals to dead-letter drops. Frank Russell categorizes and defines the collectors and sources of information according to their era, methods, and spheres of operation, and he also provides evidence from ancient authors on interrogation and the handling and weighing of information. Counterintelligence is also explored, together with disinformation through "leaks" and agents. The author concludes this fascinating study with observations on the role that intelligence-gathering has in the kind of democratic society for which Greece has always been famous"--Publisher description.
Includes publications previously listed in the supplements to the Index of selected publications of the Rand Corporation (Oct. 1962-Feb. 1963)
Quantifying the war fighting value of reconnaissance is a hard problem. Standard analytical techniques fail to identify second and higher order effects of reconnaissance when integrated in a combat model. Additionally, current simulation techniques fail to model the human factor in information transfer and decision making. Finally, conventional measures of effectiveness concentrating on attrition (loss exchange ratios, killer/victim scoreboards, etc.) are clearly inadequate when tasked to measure reconnaissance effectiveness. This study attempts to answer the question of how to quantify the value of reconnaissance. We first examine the role of reconnaissance in the battle process, to include defining reconnaissance and conducting a task/mission analysis. Next, we explore a potential methodology for Army analysts to use in quantifying the value of new reconnaissance systems, doctrine, or force structures. Lastly, this paper chronicles several ongoing efforts to validate and refine this proposed methodology.
Military resource allocation choices are often continuous, especially when--as now--international events and domestic budgets require significant changes in the character and capabilities of U.S. military forces. With major changes occurring in systems, forces, and the way those forces are used, it is more important than ever that new concepts be evaluated against an integrated set of capability needs based on future missions and operational objectives.
Illustrated with 60 maps, plans and diagrams Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance are battlefield missions as old as military history itself and missions for which many armies have created specialized units to perform. In most cases, these units were trained, equipped, and used differently from the majority of an army’s fighting units. Horse cavalry performed these missions for centuries, for it had speed and mobility far in excess of main battle units. Once the horse was replaced by mechanization, however, the mobility advantage once enjoyed by the horse cavalry disappeared. Since the early 20th century, the search for the proper mix of equipment, the proper organization, and the proper employment of reconnaissance units has bedeviled armies around the world. This survey uses a diverse variety of historical cases to illustrate the enduring issues that surround the equipping, organizing, and employment of reconnaissance units. It seems that these specialized units are either too heavily or too lightly equipped and too narrowly specialized or too conventionally organized. Pre-war reconnaissance doctrines tend to undergo significant change once fighting begins, leading to post-conflict analysis that reconnaissance units were “misused” in one way or another. McGrath ends his study with an intriguing conclusion about the role that specialized reconnaissance units should have in the future that may surprise many readers.
Originally published by the United States Army Combat Studies Institute Press in 2009, this monograph is a wide-ranging historical survey of the theory, doctrine, organization, and employment of reconnaissance units since the era of mechanization in the early 20th century. This study examines the development, role, and employment of units in modern armies designed specifically to perform reconnaissance and security (counterreconnaissance) missions. The analysis discerns common threads from the past. Conclusions are drawn from historical trends that may apply to future force development planning and unit operational employment. In the past, dedicated reconnaissance units were unique in their organization and capabilities due to the presence of the horse. This provided cavalry with a marked mobility differential over infantry and artillery. In the mechanized age, this monopoly on mobility vanished. Nonreconnaissance mechanized and motorized forces were equipped with similar weapons and vehicles. Reconnaissance units then became distinctive primarily by their organizational structure and specialized mission rather than by their equipment. This conceptual transformation has created a great dichotomy for modern reconnaissance forces. Should such forces be light or heavy? A lighter force might be able to conduct reconnaissance operations, at least theoretically, in a more nimble fashion, while a heavier force could defend itself when conducting reconnaissance and security operations. An additional consideration is the question as to what organizational level should dedicated reconnaissance forces be provided and used. This work examines these two major threads from a historical perspective since World War I.
The official United States Army manual, U.S. Army Reconnaissance and Surveillance Handbook provides tactics, techniques, and procedures for reconnaissance and surveillance planning, mission management, and reporting. Throughout history, military leaders have recognized the importance of reconnaissance and surveillance. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy is essential to win the battle, and U.S. military history contains many examples where our knowledge of the enemy, or lack of knowledge, directly led to victory or defeat. The role of reconnaissance and surveillance has not diminished on the modern battlefield; if anything, it has become even more important. Battles at the combat training centers prove that a good reconnaissance and surveillance effort is critical to successful attacks. On the other hand, a poor reconnaissance and surveillance effort almost guarantees defeat for the commander. The message is clear: success on the battlefield begins with reconnaissance and surveillance. This essential handbook covers: Surveillance Preparation Assets Equipment Planning Monitoring Organizing Missions Electronic warfare Counter-reconnaissance And more! It also looks at the development of intelligence, employment considerations for reconnaissance, and defines the roles of various personnel in planning operations. Intended for maneuver commanders and their staffs; intelligence staffs and collection managers; and other personnel involved in planning and reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations, and now available to everyone, U.S. Army Reconnaissance and Surveillance Handbook provides an insider’s look into the world of Army intelligence.
This paper presents a method to quantify the value of reconnaissance for both direct and indirect fire weapons for the defense-in-sector battle scenario. The Lanchester area fire model and the Helmbold equations were modified to allow the lethality of the defending blue force to be increased as they gained more combat intelligence about the attacking red force, thus modeling intelligence as a true combat multiplier. By adjustments made to parameters in the model, the lethality of blue direct and indirect fire weapons could be adjusted based on the quantity and quality of their intelligence assets. With information from a computer database, and the COMAN model, maximum likelihood attrition rate estimates were calculated for both red and blue forces for ten heavy defensive battles conducted at the Army's National Training Center. In each battle, the red force attrition rate was fitted to a curve which represented a percentage of blue's full potential, represented here by the square law. Using this model in a combat simulation, and with some preliminary work with comparable systems, one could implement a change in blue's intelligence assets and then provide a quantitative measure of the effect that this had on the outcome of a battle.