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Dive into 1965 when the subcontinent was rife with increasing tensions and the boiling over of decades of growing mistrust and uncontainable conflict. This is the account of a war that is celebrated by both countries but only won by one. This is the book detailing the actual happenings of the war, its causes, and aftermath.
Decades of Pakistani resentment over India’s stance on Kashmir, and its subsequent attempt to force a military solution on the issue, led to the 1965 war between the two neighbours. It ended in a stalemate on the battlefield, and after a mere twenty-one days, the war was brought to a dramatic end with the signing of a peace treaty at Tashkent. The opposing sides both claimed victory, however, and also catalogues of heroic deeds that have since taken on the character of mythology. Although neither prevailed outright, the one undoubted loser in the conflict was the incumbent President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, who staked his political and military reputation on Pakistan emerging victorious. With the superpowers unwilling assist in negotiations, and Pakistan reluctant to damage its alliance with America, the agreement that followed only reinforced India’s position not to surrender anything during diplomacy that Pakistan had failed to gain militarily. This book examines in detail the politics, diplomacy and military manoeuvres of the war, using British and American declassified documents and memoirs, as well as some unpublished interviews. It provides a comprehensive overview of the conflict and makes sense of the morass of diplomacy and the confusion of war.
The book covers the core aspects that combined to culminate in the Kargil war and an account of the why and how of the war. The Kargil war is also significant in that while Pakistan escalated its covert war (in 1998) after it acquired nuclear weapons in 1987, this is the first war was fought with regular forces between the two countries that had become overtly nuclear although not the first between nuclear-armed states. And, hence, this volume that attempts to place the latest war in the context of the earlier attempts to take Kashmir by force.
First In The Series Of Books Detailing Wartime Operations Of The Indian Air Force (Iaf) It Provides A History Of The Air Component Of A War Triggered By Pakistan`S Invasion Of Kashmir In 1965. Based On Interviews With Iaf War Veterans, Squadron Diaries And Never Before Published Photographs Including Gun Camera Photos, The Book Is Very Valuable In Understanding The Deployment Of Air-Power In The Twentieth Century.
The peculiar socio-political circumstances and historical factors amidst which a country is born, play a decisive and formative role in the qualitative efficiency as well as political outlook of an army. Thus the Israeli Army like the state of Israel was acutely conscious of the more than two thousand years of persecution which the Jews had suffered and determined to fight and die for the many century old dream of a Jewish state. The Red Army created by the military organisational genius of Leon Trotsky was again a highly motivated body of men resolved at all cost to fight for the preservation of the ideals of the Russian Revolution.The Khalsa Sikh Army created by Ranjit Singh was the final supreme qualitative result of the indomitable and legendary response of the Punjabi Sikhs to two centuries of oppression by the Mughals and Afghans. The Army of Ahmad Shah Abdali was imbued with the spirit of being the first independent army of the Pathan Muslim independent Kingdom of Afghanistan.The army of Cromwell was the result of a basically Puritan/Democratic sentiment, determined to stand against the tyranny of believers in Divine Rights of the Kings. The army of Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed was motivated by the desire to fight for the cause of their Pathan and Punjabi Muslim brethren who had been under the iron heal of an oppressive Sikh government for some three decades. The Prussian Army of 1813 was motivated by desire to expel the French who had occupied their fatherland since 1806, and the prime motivation in establishment of the famous German General Staff was in intense desire to qualitatively improve the defeated Prussian Army in such a manner that the humiliation of Jena and Auerstadt could be avenged.Similarly the motivational basis of the Wehrmacht of 1939 was an intense desire to avenge the humiliating peace treaty of Versailles. In short all armies created or owing their foundation to a state of revolutionary activity or an extraordinary situation were qualitatively superior than armies whose foundation rested on more unspectacular and ordinary political situation . The creation of India and Pakistan was not the result of an armed struggle bnt the result of a constitutional process started in 1858, and hastened by the First and Second World Wars.
In 1965, while India was still licking its wounds from the disastrous war against the Chinese in 1962, the belligerent Pakistanis decided to wrest Kashmir from India. To test the waters, they launched their first military probes into the Rann of Kutch between February and May; India responded. By the end of July, India gave in to the dictates of the UN and stood down the troops it had mobilized in the Punjab and Kargil sectors in response to the Rann of Kutch skirmishes. Pakistan then launched i
1965 War Was The First All-Out Clash Between The Two Nations India And Pakistan, After The Partition In 1947.Y.B. Chavan, India S Former Defence Minister, Recorded In His Own Hand The 22-Day War. The Inside Story Reveals:" Utter Failure Of Intelligence On Timing Of Pak Attack." How And Why Chavan Ordered Iaf To Launch Attack Without Even Informing The Pm." Why India Attacked Across The International Border? Reasons As Per Chavan Recording, If We Fail And I Cannot Even Imagine Of It The Nation Fails ." How A Division Commander Bolted From The Theatre Of Operation. " How The Army Commander Sacrificed Over 300 Men For The Greater Glory Of His Regiment . " Why The Indian Army Did Not March Into Lahore." Occasions When The Army Chief Almost Lost His Nerve." How The Defence Minister, The Army And Air Chiefs Worked As Team." How Pm Kept His Cool And Emerged As A Great Leader In War." Was It A Futile War? Did India Lose In Tashkent What Was Won On Battle-Fields." Finally, How The Political Leadership Re-Established Its Proper Relationship With The Defence Forces Leadership And Wiped Out Bitter Memories Of The 1962 India-China War.The Book Is A Tribute To The Iaf That Was Deployed In War For The First Time After The Independence. Also To India S Armoured Regiments That Fought Valiantly And Destroyed Myth Of Superiority Of The Pattons.
The conflict was short and limited, packed with intense activity, major movement, heavy fighting and crucial decisions. The initiative rested with Pakistan to commence hostilities, which they did with a mix of irregular and regular troops and tactics. This is a story of anticipation, of impending actions, of virtual equality of forces engaged in a savage battle of attrition in which no quarters were given or asked. The author, GOC-in-C Western Command during those fateful days provided an unflappable presence under whose command the Army imposed unacceptable levels of losses on the enemy, first toning down their rhetoric, then their confidence, and lastly their ability to sustain very high levels of material losses. There is very little material or records to draw upon for our military studies of warfare in and around the Indian subcontinent. War Despatches narrates for the first time the inside story through original despatches field by the Army Commander from the war zone. To maintain the authenticity of the Despatches, the military style of writing has been followed in the text as far as possible.
This book looks at the influence of military regimes in seven cases: Pakistan in 1965, India in 1971, Israel in 1956 and 1967, Egypt in 1973, Iran in 1969 and Iraq in 1980. The author contends that countries with military governments are warlike not because they glorify war, but rather because they are poorly equipped to manage diplomacy.